Sacks’ forecast has two parts: (1) a major repricing of big‑city U.S. office towers, and (2) that this would significantly reduce the value of pension‑owned properties and worsen the funding status of those pensions.

1. Major repricing of U.S. office towers
This clearly happened in the “near future” after April 2023:

• CommercialEdge/CommercialSearch data show the average U.S. office sale price fell 37% between 2019 and the end of 2024, with CBD office buildings down about 60% from 2019 levels, and many buildings selling at 20–50%+ discounts to prior prices. (commercialedge.com)
• Green Street’s index and related analyses put office values roughly 35–37% below their 2022 peak, the steepest drop of any major property type. (creanalyst.com)
• A Washington Post analysis estimates U.S. office buildings lost about $557 billion in value between 2019 and 2023, with big-city tax rolls (e.g., New York, D.C., Boston) now reflecting large downward reassessments. (washingtonpost.com)
• Individual towers in major markets have seen drastic markdowns—for example, One Worldwide Plaza in Manhattan was appraised at about 20% of its 2018 value by 2025, implying very large losses to its lenders and equity owners. (en.wikipedia.org)
  This strongly supports the “huge reckoning” / major repricing piece of the prediction.

2. Impact on pension funds and their funding status
Pension funds do own material office portfolios, and those portfolios have been hit:

• A CRE Daily summary of public pension results notes that large U.S. public pension funds recorded about a –6% real estate return for 2023, with CalSTRS specifically posting about a –9% real estate return, and office properties highlighted as a continuing drag. (credaily.com)
• Other large pension investors (e.g., CPPIB, PSP Investments) reported mid‑single‑ to mid‑teens real estate losses, with office the most impacted sector, and are actively cutting office exposure. (kelownarealestate.com)
  So the part about pension‑owned office assets being hit in value is supported.

However, the funding-status piece is much less clear and, at the aggregate level, appears to have moved in the opposite direction of what Sacks implied:

• Equable Institute and Reason Foundation both find the national funded ratio for U.S. state and local pension plans improved from the mid‑70% range in 2022 to roughly 78–80% by 2023–24, while total unfunded liabilities fell (e.g., from about $1.6T to around $1.4–1.5T). (prnewswire.com)
• Wilshire’s funding-status reports similarly show the aggregate funded ratio for U.S. state plans rising through 2023 and again in 2024, driven by strong overall investment returns, even though real estate was a weak sleeve. (wilshire.com)
• Large individual systems like CalSTRS and CalPERS report higher funded ratios over this period (CalSTRS at ~76.7% funded by mid‑2024; CalPERS around 79% by mid‑2025), despite negative real estate/office results, because equities and other assets performed strongly. (calstrs.com)

In other words, office repricing clearly hurt pension real-estate portfolios and forced reallocations, but did not, on net, produce a broad worsening of pension funding ratios; aggregate funded status actually improved modestly.

Because one core element of the prediction (a major office-tower repricing, including in pension-owned assets) is strongly supported by the data, while the other (that this would worsen pension funding status overall) is contradicted by observed funded-ratio trends, the forecast is only partially validated. The causal impact on funding is nuanced and depends on what counterfactual you assume (funding is better than before, but arguably worse than it would have been without office losses), so the overall verdict is ambiguous rather than cleanly right or wrong.