Evaluated as of November 30, 2025 (about 2.6 years after the prediction), the forecast of a three‑pronged U.S. financial crisis has not fully materialized:

1. Prong 1 – Long‑dated bond losses hitting regional/community banks: This clearly occurred. The 2023 U.S. banking turmoil saw Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic fail after steep unrealized losses on long‑maturity Treasuries and MBS, triggered by rapid Fed rate hikes; regulators and analysts explicitly tied these failures to interest‑rate‑driven losses on long‑dated securities at regional banks. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Prong 2 – Commercial real estate (CRE) downturn metastasizing into a banking crisis: CRE has become a serious stress point, especially for regional banks with large office and multifamily books. Research estimated $80–160 billion in potential bank losses from CRE defaults, and strategists have repeatedly described a "commercial real estate crisis" risk as a major threat. (forbes.com) New York Community Bancorp, for example, suffered large losses, credit‑rating downgrades to junk, and a stock collapse in 2024 largely due to CRE exposure, which briefly hammered the KBW regional‑bank index and revived fears of another banking crisis. (markets.businessinsider.com) However, so far this has produced ongoing strain and isolated institutional problems, not a broad systemic banking crisis: regulators emphasize that CRE risks are significant but generally manageable, with banks boosting reserves and gradually recognizing losses. (reuters.com)

3. Prong 3 – U.S. government debt crisis: U.S. public debt has surged past $38 trillion, and all three major agencies have now downgraded U.S. sovereign credit from the pre‑2011 AAA status, citing chronic deficits and a deteriorating fiscal trajectory. (en.wikipedia.org) There have been repeated episodes of fiscal brinkmanship, including the 2023 debt‑ceiling fight and a 43‑day government shutdown in 2025, but no actual default, loss of market access, or acute funding crisis: Treasury auctions continue to clear, the dollar remains the primary reserve currency, and officials still project ongoing (if slower) growth rather than an immediate solvency event. (en.wikipedia.org) Most mainstream descriptions frame this as a worsening long‑term debt problem, not a present‑tense government debt crisis.

Because only the first prong has clearly occurred, the second has produced stress but not a full‑blown banking crisis, and the third has not yet manifested as an actual debt crisis (despite growing risks and downgrades), the specific prediction that the U.S. would soon face a three‑pronged financial crisis is best judged wrong overall rather than fully or mostly correct.