I think it's inevitable. We'll have probably 2 to $3 trillion of federal money. You know, spent to backstop and support the asset.View on YouTube
As of November 30, 2025, there is no evidence that the U.S. federal government has launched or actually deployed a new, dedicated $2–3 trillion program specifically to stabilize real‑estate‑ and bank‑related assets (e.g., a TARP‑style bailout or large CRE backstop).
What has happened since the March 2023 regional‑bank turmoil:
- FDIC systemic‑risk actions for SVB and Signature: The FDIC guaranteed uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank, with estimated losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund of about $18.6 billion, to be recouped via a special assessment on banks—not a multi‑trillion federal outlay. (fdic.gov)
- Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP): The Federal Reserve created the BTFP in March 2023 as an emergency lending facility, collateralized by Treasuries and agency MBS, with Treasury offering up to $25 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund as a backstop—far below trillions. (en.wikipedia.org) Usage peaked at roughly $160–165 billion of outstanding loans and the program stopped making new loans on March 11, 2024, then fully wound down. (bpi.com)
- No net multi‑trillion expansion targeted at banks/real estate: Over 2022–2025 the Fed has been reducing its balance sheet (quantitative tightening), from about $9 trillion to roughly $6.6 trillion, not adding 2–3 trillion of new support after the 2023 crisis. (reuters.com) There has been no new CRE‑specific federal rescue facility on the order of trillions; CRE stress is being worked through via private transactions like loan sales and repricing (e.g., banks selling multifamily and other CRE portfolios at discounts to private buyers) rather than a government bailout. (reuters.com)
These measures are two orders of magnitude smaller than the predicted $2–3 trillion and do not match the description of a new, explicit multi‑trillion backstop for real‑estate and bank assets.
However, the prediction used open‑ended language ("inevitable" but no explicit time horizon). The CRE refinancing wave and potential future banking stress will play out over many more years, and it remains possible that at some later date the government could deploy support on the scale Friedberg envisioned.
Because the horizon is not specified and events that might trigger such a program could still occur, the prediction cannot yet be judged definitively right or wrong, so the status is inconclusive (too early).