Available evidence shows the U.S. government has moved toward allowing and structuring a divestiture of TikTok’s U.S. operations, not toward a deliberate permanent shutdown chosen instead of divestiture.

1. Congress explicitly created a divest-or-ban framework. The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), signed April 24, 2024, mandates that apps like TikTok must be divested from foreign-adversary control within a set period or face a ban, and it explicitly states that the law ceases to apply if a “qualified divestiture” occurs. This shows lawmakers saw divestiture as a real, acceptable option, not something they would reject out of hand as technically unverifiable. Sources: legislative text and summaries of PAFACA (en.wikipedia.org)

2. The January 2025 "ban" was brief and not accepted as the final outcome. When the compliance deadline passed in January 2025, TikTok briefly went offline and was removed from U.S. app stores as the law took effect. Within roughly a day, President Trump issued an executive order delaying enforcement of the law, and TikTok service was restored. This reflects a desire to avoid a permanent shutdown and seek another solution, not a settled choice to end operations in the U.S. (en.wikipedia.org)

3. The Trump administration has formally endorsed a divestiture plan and found it sufficient on code/infrastructure grounds. On September 25, 2025, the executive order titled “Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security” states that an interagency process reviewed a detailed divestiture plan for TikTok’s U.S. operations and concluded it is a “qualified divestiture” under the Act. The order explicitly says:

   • the new U.S. joint venture will be majority-owned/controlled by U.S. persons;
   • TikTok’s algorithms and code for U.S. operations will be under the control of the new U.S. entity;
   • U.S. user data will be stored in an American-run cloud environment;
   • there will be intensive monitoring of software updates, algorithms, and data flows by trusted U.S. security partners.

   The order then determines that this divestiture resolves national security concerns and directs the Attorney General not to enforce the Act for 120 days so the deal can be completed. This is the opposite of lawmakers refusing to be satisfied that the codebase and infrastructure can be separated and verified; they explicitly say the proposed technical and governance measures are adequate. (whitehouse.gov)

4. Current policy aims to keep TikTok operating under new ownership, not to shut it down. As of late November 2025, enforcement of the statutory ban continues to be delayed to facilitate the divestiture, and the administration’s stated goal is to “save” TikTok while addressing security risks. TikTok remains operational in the U.S., and the company is still investing in U.S. public policy efforts amid this ongoing process. (whitehouse.gov)

Because U.S. policymakers have (a) legislated a divest-or-ban structure that explicitly accepts divestiture, (b) reversed from an initial brief shutdown to repeated enforcement delays, and (c) formally found a specific divestiture plan—including code and infrastructure controls—sufficient to mitigate national security concerns, Chamath’s prediction that the government would ultimately choose to shut TikTok down instead of allowing divestiture due to unverifiable code separation does not match the actual trajectory or reasoning of U.S. policy.

On both the mechanism (they are facilitating divestiture rather than choosing shutdown) and the justification (they have said technical separation and monitoring can be adequate), the prediction is wrong as of November 30, 2025.