Sacks suggested the Fed’s March 22, 2023 25‑bp hike might later be seen as the marginal decision that tipped an already‑stressed system into a more serious banking crisis.

What actually happened:

1. The acute banking stress pre‑dated the March hike. Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank had already failed on March 10 and March 12, 2023, respectively, marking the core of the 2023 U.S. banking crisis. Their collapses are widely attributed to cumulative rate hikes over 2022–23 combined with concentrated uninsured deposits and poor interest‑rate risk management, not to the incremental March 22 move. (en.wikipedia.org)
2. The main post‑hike failure (First Republic) is not attributed to that specific hike. First Republic was seized on May 1, 2023. FDIC’s own review cites contagion from SVB/Signature, overreliance on uninsured deposits, rapid growth, and failure to mitigate interest‑rate risk as key causes. It characterizes the failure as driven by loss of confidence and structural vulnerabilities, not by a single late‑March rate hike. (fdic.gov)
3. No escalating, systemic banking crisis followed. After a cluster of failures in spring 2023, only a small number of additional U.S. banks failed; by mid‑2024 there had been just one failure that year, and commentators noted that the feared wave of regional bank collapses had "yet to happen." (bisnow.com) Stress in commercial real estate and regional banks has persisted, but regulators and market analysts repeatedly describe the system as broadly resilient and expect, at most, problems at a “moderate number of smaller banks,” not a systemic meltdown. (reuters.com)
4. Macro outcome looks like a soft landing, not a crisis triggered by the March hike. By late 2023–24, mainstream analysis (Goldman Sachs, Congressional Research Service, etc.) characterized the U.S. as being on, or near, a soft‑landing path—inflation falling while GDP growth and employment remained positive—rather than entering a deep crisis caused by over‑tightening. (goldmansachs.com) Major banks continued to pass Fed stress tests comfortably, reinforcing the view that systemic risks were contained. (apnews.com)

In hindsight, the March 2023 25‑bp hike is seen as part of a broader tightening cycle that contributed to stress at poorly managed, rate‑sensitive banks, but it is not generally recognized as the straw that broke the camel’s back or as the clear tipping point into a more serious systemic crisis. The feared escalation did not materialize, and consensus post‑mortems focus on cumulative hikes plus bank‑specific mismanagement rather than that single decision.

Given both the absence of a subsequent, clearly more severe systemic crisis and the lack of historical treatment of that specific hike as the decisive tipping point, the prediction is best classified as wrong.