Sacks argued in March 2023 that the banking turmoil would not end with Silvergate, SVB, Signature, First Republic, and Credit Suisse, and that there were likely “more shoes to drop.” Subsequent events support this view:

• Additional U.S. bank failures after the initial five (2023): FDIC data show that, beyond SVB, Signature, and First Republic, two more U.S. banks failed later in 2023—Heartland Tri‑State Bank on July 28 and Citizens Bank of Sac City on November 3—indicating further stress in the system rather than a clean resolution in March. (forbes.com)
• A sizable new failure in 2024: On April 26, 2024, regulators closed Republic First Bank (about $6 billion in assets). The FDIC was appointed receiver, and S&P Global described it as the sixth‑largest U.S. bank failure since 2010, well after the March 2023 crisis peak. (fdic.gov)
• Ongoing chain of smaller failures into 2024–2025: FDIC and secondary summaries list further bank closures—First National Bank of Lindsay in October 2024, Republic First in April 2024, Pulaski Savings Bank in January 2025, and Santa Anna National Bank in June 2025—demonstrating that bank failures continued beyond the original set of five institutions. (forbes.com)
• Serious distress episodes short of outright failure: PacWest Bancorp suffered large deposit outflows and steep share‑price declines in spring 2023, explored “all options” including a sale, and ultimately needed a rescue merger with Banc of California, reflecting continued regional‑bank fragility linked to the same rate‑shock dynamics. (cnbc.com) New York Community Bancorp then became a fresh flashpoint in early 2024, reporting a surprise quarterly loss, taking a huge provision for credit losses, slashing its dividend twice (down 80% in total), raising over $1 billion in emergency capital, suffering a Moody’s downgrade of its debt to junk, and triggering the biggest one‑day drop in the KBW Regional Banking Index since March 2023. (cnbc.com)
• Sector‑wide stress persisting a year later: A March 2024 Reuters analysis concluded that, a year after SVB’s collapse, U.S. regional banks still faced significant headwinds from high deposit costs and commercial‑real‑estate exposure, with expectations of further reserve builds and ratings downgrades—evidence that systemic pressures had not fully resolved. (reuters.com)

Because multiple meaningful bank failures and high‑profile distress episodes occurred after March 2023, and regulators and markets continued to grapple with elevated regional‑bank risks, Sacks’s prediction that there would be further significant banking‑sector problems beyond the initially affected five institutions has been borne out.