The scenario Sachs warned about did not materialize. On March 12–13, 2023, just one–two days after the SVB failure, U.S. regulators (Treasury, Fed, FDIC) invoked the systemic risk exception and explicitly intervened to protect all Silicon Valley Bank depositors, including those above the normal $250,000 insurance cap. They transferred all deposits into an FDIC-operated bridge bank and guaranteed that depositors would have full access to their money starting March 13. (fdic.gov)

Regulators also launched the Bank Term Funding Program to provide broad liquidity support to other banks, specifically to prevent contagion and systemic stress from SVB’s failure. Congressional and FDIC testimony describe these actions as taken because officials feared widespread contagion if uninsured depositors at SVB (and Signature Bank) were left exposed. (fdic.gov)

Although there were additional high-profile failures (e.g., Signature Bank and later First Republic), these were resolved with further regulatory intervention and did not trigger the uncontrolled sequence of domino failures and systemic collapse that Sachs was concerned about. (reuters.com) Because the government did intervene quickly and took systemic-risk-mitigating actions, the conditional scenario he described (“government doesn’t step in” leading to dominoes and systemic risk) did not occur, so this prediction is best judged as wrong.