Regulators did not arrange over the March 11–12, 2023 weekend to place Silicon Valley Bank into the hands of J.P. Morgan or a similar large acquirer. Instead, on Monday, March 13, the FDIC created Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., transferring all deposits and substantially all assets into this FDIC‑operated bridge bank, while it sought a buyer. A purchase-and-assumption agreement with First–Citizens Bank & Trust was only reached on March 26, well after the weekend in question, and involved a regional bank rather than a JPMorgan‑style G‑SIB. (content.govdelivery.com)

In the following week (March 13–17), the banking turmoil clearly continued to cascade:

• Signature Bank had already been closed on Sunday, March 12, with the FDIC creating Signature Bridge Bank and invoking a systemic‑risk exception—part of the same unfolding crisis. (fdic.gov)
• Regional bank stress intensified after markets opened Monday. First Republic Bank, which shared SVB’s vulnerability to large uninsured deposits, saw its stock price and depositor confidence collapse, prompting a $30 billion rescue deposit package on March 16 from 11 of the largest U.S. banks (including JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo), explicitly framed as an effort to stabilize the banking system amid post‑SVB turmoil. (cnbc.com)

So the first branch of Sacks’s disjunction (“they place SVB in the hands of a J.P. Morgan–type bank this weekend”) did not occur. The second branch (“or this thing keeps cascading next week, if they don’t”) did occur: no such weekend takeover happened, and the banking/startup‑funding shock continued into the following week with additional bank failures, severe stress at First Republic, and extraordinary rescue measures. On that basis, the overall conditional prediction—if no big‑bank takeover this weekend, the crisis keeps cascading next week—was essentially right, even though regulators chose a different resolution mechanism (full depositor protection plus a bridge bank) than the two options Sacks explicitly named.