Evidence since the Feb 2023 episode shows China and Russia have indeed moved into an increasingly close, quasi‑allied alignment broadly opposed to U.S. interests, even if they stop short of a formal treaty alliance.

Key points:

• Deepening strategic partnership: Xi and Putin have repeatedly reaffirmed their pre‑2022 “no limits” partnership. In May 2024 Putin’s state visit to China was explicitly framed as a “new era” visit that underscored a deepening strategic partnership, coinciding with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations.(en.wikipedia.org) Analyses describe this as a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation “just short of a conventional alliance.”(isdp.eu)

• Bloc‑like opposition to U.S. leadership: Xi and Putin now routinely position their partnership as an alternative pole to the U.S.-led order. A 2025 summit in Moscow saw them condemn U.S. tariffs, sanctions, and what they called Washington’s “dual containment” of Russia and China, while presenting their relationship as a stabilizing counterweight.(washingtonpost.com) A U.S. congressional commission likewise warns that Xi is building an “alternative world order” centered on China and aligned with anti‑democratic states like Russia and North Korea.(axios.com) This is consistent with Sacks’s claim of a new axis‑like bloc opposed to U.S. interests.

• Ukraine war and U.S. policy as a binding force: Western (especially U.S.) support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia have made China an economic and political lifeline for Moscow—via surging trade, energy purchases and financial links—while Beijing avoids condemning the invasion.(aljazeera.com) NATO’s 2024 summit statement explicitly accuses China of becoming a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war through large‑scale support for its defense industrial base, referring directly to their “no limits” partnership.(foreignpolicy.com) That is precisely the dynamic Sacks described, where the Ukraine conflict and U.S. responses pull Beijing and Moscow closer together.

• Quasi‑allied, even if officially “not an alliance”: Beijing still publicly insists that China–Russia relations are not aimed at any third party and do not constitute a formal alliance. Yet Xi simultaneously affirms the long‑term, “no limits” nature of the relationship and emphasizes that the two are “good neighbours that cannot be moved apart,” while analysts note they are increasingly “challeng[ing] a US‑led global order” together.(asiaone.com) Think‑tank and economic analyses highlight real limits and asymmetries in the partnership, but still characterize it as a durable, strategically aligned front against Western pressure.(capitaleconomics.com)

Given this trajectory between early 2023 and late 2025, the core of Sacks’s prediction—that U.S. policy around Ukraine and concern over China’s support for Russia would push Beijing and Moscow into an increasingly close, quasi‑allied bloc opposed to U.S. interests, undermining the old Cold War aim of keeping them apart—matches observed reality. The partnership is not a formal alliance, but it functions in practice much like the “new axis bloc” he warned about, so the prediction is best judged right.