So the rest of the world is not happy with us. And this is why the Russian sanctions have not been effective. I think the Russian economy has had like a 3 to 4% hit. It is not the collapse that was predicted because there are enough other countries willing to do business with them.View on YouTube
Evidence since early 2022 supports Sacks’s core prediction that sanctions would inflict a modest macro‑level GDP hit rather than a “major collapse,” and that continued trade with non‑Western countries would cushion the blow.
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Observed GDP hit was low single‑digit, not a collapse
- Russia’s GDP fell by about 2.1% in 2022, far less than the double‑digit collapse many early forecasts predicted.(en.wikipedia.org)
- By 2023 the economy rebounded with ~3.6–4.1% real growth, with continued positive growth reported into 2024, again inconsistent with the notion of a post‑sanctions collapse.(ru.wikipedia.org)
These figures line up with Sacks’s “3–4% hit” characterization and clearly do not describe a major economic collapse.
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Sanctions underperformed early expectations and were cushioned by non‑Western trade
- Analyses have repeatedly noted that sanctions “might not be having the impact the West had hoped”, with the IMF and others highlighting Russia’s continued output and growth despite restrictions.(the-independent.com)
- Reporting on the war’s economic impact stresses Russia’s surprising resilience, with growth resuming in 2023–24, heavily supported by redirected energy exports and trade with countries that did not join Western sanctions (e.g., China and India).(theguardian.com)
- The IMF and other observers explicitly describe Russian trade being redirected from sanctioning to non‑sanctioning countries, matching Sacks’s reasoning that “enough other countries [are] willing to do business with them.”(the-independent.com)
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Sanctions are still harmful, but that does not contradict the prediction
Sanctions have clearly hurt Russia’s long‑term prospects—higher inflation and interest rates, fiscal strain, technology import restrictions, and growing dependence on war spending and a narrow set of trading partners.(en.wikipedia.org) But the prediction we are evaluating is narrower: whether sanctions would cause a major collapse versus a modest, low‑single‑digit GDP hit with continued trade via non‑Western partners. On those specific points, post‑2022 data and mainstream analyses align with Sacks’s view.
Given that Russia saw only a small initial GDP contraction, returned to growth, and avoided a macroeconomic collapse largely by re‑routing trade to non‑sanctioning countries, the prediction is best classified as right.