As of 30 November 2025, the Russia‑Ukraine war is still ongoing, and its ultimate outcome for the United States—in terms of total cost, duration, clarity of objectives, and long‑term strategic consequences—remains uncertain.

Key points:

1. War not concluded
   The Russia‑Ukraine conflict, begun with Russia’s full‑scale invasion on 24 February 2022, has not reached a stable political settlement or clear end state. Front lines have fluctuated, periodic offensives and counteroffensives continue, and there is no agreed peace treaty or armistice that would let analysts definitively tally costs or strategic outcomes relative to the 1991 Gulf War.

2. Costs and duration are still moving targets
   – U.S. military and financial assistance to Ukraine has surpassed many tens of billions of dollars and continues to be debated and extended in Congress. Future aid levels, reconstruction commitments, and indirect economic costs (e.g., energy, supply chains, deterrence posture in Europe) could still rise or fall substantially.
   – The duration dimension is inherently open‑ended: while the 1991 Gulf War had a clear, short combat phase (January–February 1991) and a well‑defined coalition objective (expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait), the Russia‑Ukraine war does not yet have either a clear terminal date or agreed political outcome.

3. Strategic consequences are still unfolding
   Medium‑ and long‑term effects for the U.S.—on NATO cohesion and expansion, Russia’s military and economic strength, China’s calculus on Taiwan, global defense spending patterns, and the future of the rules‑based order—are still in flux. Some effects (e.g., an enlarged and more unified NATO) can be read as strategically positive for Washington; others (e.g., sustained higher defense and energy costs, risk of escalation, strain on U.S. munitions stockpiles) could prove negative. Which side ultimately dominates the ledger is not yet knowable.

4. The prediction is about the ultimate comparison
   Sacks’ claim was that this war “is going to turn out much worse than the Iraq war [Gulf War] did in 1991” for the U.S. overall. Because the Russia‑Ukraine war’s end state, total cost, and full strategic impact are not yet determined, we cannot conclusively say today that this has turned out worse—or that it definitively won’t.

Given these uncertainties and the ongoing nature of the conflict, the fairest assessment is that the prediction’s truth value cannot yet be determined, so the outcome is inconclusive (too early) rather than clearly right, wrong, or permanently ambiguous.