Last updated Nov 29, 2025
venture
During the 3–4 years following early 2023, venture capital firms will deploy their existing funds at a pace roughly 3–4 times slower than in the prior few years, leading to significantly reduced annual investment volume per year compared to the 2020–2021 period.
Yes. There's a record amount of money. Venture capital was raised over the last couple of years, but it's going to be deployed much more slowly and carefully over the next, say, 3 or 4 years, than it was over the previous few years. So divide that amount of money by 3 or 4, because the pace of deployment is going to go way down.View on YouTube
Explanation

Baseline: Global VC investment was about $294B in 2020 and $621B in the record year 2021, more than doubling year over year. (finbold.com) In the U.S., VC deal value was roughly $172.3B in 2020 and $329.9B in 2021. (nvca.org)

Post‑2023 reality: Global VC funding fell to roughly $248–262B in 2023 (about 40–60% below 2021, i.e., around 2–2.5x lower, not 3–4x), then partially recovered to about $275–315B in 2024, still well below the 2021 peak but clearly not at one‑third or one‑quarter of that level. (spglobal.com) H1 2025 already saw about $205B of global funding, the strongest half-year since H1 2022 and on pace to approach 2022 levels again, which is inconsistent with a sustained 3–4x deployment slowdown. (news.crunchbase.com)

U.S. data tell the same story: VC investment dropped from $329.9B in 2021 to $170.6B in 2023 (roughly half, i.e., about 2x slower than the peak, not 3–4x) and then rebounded to $215.4B in 2024. (nvca.org) In the first half of 2025 alone, U.S. startups raised $162.8B, up 75.6% year over year and already the strongest funding period since 2021, implying that full‑year 2025 will likely be back near or above pre‑slowdown levels rather than at one‑third or one‑quarter of 2020–2021. (reuters.com)

Qualitatively, Sacks was directionally right that funding would drop and deployment become more cautious compared with the 2021 boom, but the specific claim that deployment over the 3–4 years after early 2023 would run at roughly three to four times slower than in the prior few years is clearly not borne out by the actual multiples observed so far, and 2025’s AI‑driven rebound makes that magnitude of slowdown increasingly implausible for the remaining part of the window. Therefore, taken as a quantitative prediction about pace (3–4x slower), it is best judged as wrong.