Evidence from 2023–2025 supports Jason’s directional claim that U.S. “exceptionalism” has held up or strengthened relative to rivals, while Russia–China–Saudi efforts have not produced a credible alternative currency order.

1. U.S. relative strength has remained high or improved.
   IMF updates in 2024–2025 describe the U.S. as the clear growth out‑performer among major advanced economies, with stronger productivity, a leading tech sector, and upgraded growth forecasts, while the euro area and other advanced peers face weaker prospects. (imf.org) This keeps the U.S. far ahead in size and influence among advanced economies.

2. Dollar dominance remains intact; no rival reserve system has emerged.
   IMF COFER data for 2024–2025 show the U.S. dollar still accounting for roughly 56–58% of allocated global FX reserves, with the euro around 20% and the renminbi only about 2%. The IMF notes that, after adjusting for exchange‑rate moves, the dollar’s share is “little changed,” and it remains the primary reserve and invoicing currency. (leap-insights.org) Central banks are slowly diversifying and using slightly more yuan and gold, but this is a gradual multipolar drift, not a regime change.

Experiments around de‑dollarisation—Saudi‑China yuan oil settlements, petroyuan narratives, and regional payment systems—have been modest. Analyses stress that Gulf currencies remain pegged to the dollar, about half of world trade and ~80% of oil sales are still dollar‑denominated, and yuan‑priced oil contracts since 2018 have not significantly dented dollar dominance. (thenationalnews.com) BRICS has promoted using national currencies and launched BRICS Pay as messaging infrastructure, but Kremlin and BRICS statements in 2024–2025 explicitly say there is no imminent common BRICS currency; de‑dollarisation talk has not yielded a new reserve currency. (reuters.com) Overall, Russia–China–Saudi and the broader BRICS camp have not “moved the currency” in the sense of displacing the dollar‑centric order.

3. Rival bloc behavior shows self‑inflicted constraints and internal friction.
   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine produced heavy sanctions, a war‑driven fiscal and industrial tilt, and rising dependence on China. By 2025, roughly 40% of Russia’s federal spending is on defense and security, crowding out social and economic development, while sanctions and capital controls damage long‑term growth. (en.wikipedia.org) Meanwhile, secondary U.S. sanctions led about 98% of Chinese banks to stop processing direct yuan payments from Russia by mid‑2024, sharply curbing the very financial links meant to undercut the dollar. (en.wikipedia.org) Chinese exporters have also used Russia’s dependence to sharply raise prices on war‑related goods—an 87% price increase to Russia versus ~9% elsewhere—highlighting opportunistic, asymmetric relations rather than a tightly aligned bloc. (ft.com)

Saudi Arabia and Russia’s oil partnership has produced deep OPEC+ cuts that propped prices somewhat but also pushed Saudi GDP into contraction in 2023 and cut Russian oil‑and‑gas revenues, illustrating costly self‑inflicted adjustments. (re-russia.net) OPEC+ and BRICS meetings have been marked by quota disputes, over‑production by some members, and resistance from countries like Brazil and India to an explicitly anti‑U.S., China‑dominated line. (ogj.com) These dynamics fit the prediction’s spirit that these states would undercut each other’s leverage and struggle to form a coherent, effective counter‑order.

Taken together, as of late 2025 the U.S. still enjoys clear economic and financial primacy, and the Russia–China–Saudi/BRICS efforts have not created a viable alternative reserve currency or fundamentally shifted the global currency order, while suffering from sanctions, internal frictions, and costly policy choices. Although the very long‑term future is uncertain, the prediction about the direction of the “coming years starting from 2023” has been borne out so far, so it is best classified as right given current evidence.