Key elements of Sacks’s prediction broadly matched what happened in 2023:

1. Xi Jinping keeps or strengthens his grip on power
   Xi was unanimously reelected state president for an unprecedented third term on March 10, 2023, after the 2018 constitutional change removing presidential term limits, and analyses describe his administration as “rock solid” with a top leadership dominated by loyalists and no visible internal challenge to his authority. (en.wikipedia.org) This aligns with the claim that Xi would not “lose his grip in any way.”

2. Worsening conditions for Chinese citizens and private sectors (billionaires, tech, real estate)
   Billionaires/tech: China lost 229 billionaires from the Hurun Global Rich List 2023, more than half of all those who fell off the list worldwide, with the decline explicitly linked to Beijing’s crackdown on major tech companies and other headwinds. (dawn.com)
   Real estate/households: China’s property downturn deepened: property investment fell sharply in 2023 and new construction starts plunged; developers such as Country Garden missed bond payments, and the housing slump eroded household wealth and confidence. (euromonitor.com) Household sentiment, youth employment and equity markets were weak, with research noting high youth unemployment (above 20%), falling property prices, and a CSI 300 stock index down about 35% from mid‑2021 to end‑2023, all weighing on consumer confidence. (tspr.org) This is consistent with things getting “worse for everybody else in China,” especially the private sector and middle class.

3. 2023 not being a “good year” for China’s economy
   While official GDP growth around 5.2–5.4% in 2023 met or slightly exceeded Beijing’s headline target, the year was widely characterized by economists as a disappointing, weaker‑than‑expected post‑COVID recovery: soft consumption, weak exports, a deepening property crisis, and rising deflation pressures. (thenews.com.pk) Analysis from banks and research houses emphasized that deflation, property-sector contraction, and fragile confidence made 2023 a structurally poor year for China’s economy despite the headline growth figure, which matches Sacks’s directional call that it would “not be a good year.”

4. Potential contagion from China
   Sacks framed contagion as a risk (“I think there could be contagion”), not as a certainty. China’s real estate turmoil did in fact generate financial‑stability worries: liquidity strains at major developers, missed bond payments, and growing non‑performing loan risks for banks, with analysts explicitly warning that property stress could spill over into broader financial markets and the global economy. (euromonitor.com) While this did not culminate in a 2008‑style global crisis, the emergence of notable spillover risk is directionally consistent with his warning.

Because Xi’s political power remained firmly intact while 2023 turned out to be a weak, confidence‑sapping year for China’s economy—especially for real estate, private business, and the wealthy—and because the kind of financial‑sector and contagion risks he highlighted did materialize (even if not catastrophically), the overall prediction is best judged as right on direction and substance.