Evidence after 2023 does not support the prediction that a "restarted" Chinese growth engine would meaningfully drive U.S. growth or push U.S. inflation higher.

1. China’s post‑reopening growth was middling and structurally weak, not a restored “engine.”
After dropping zero‑Covid, China’s GDP did rebound to about 5.2% in 2023 and around 5% in the first half of 2024, helped by reopening and public investment. But the IMF and others emphasize that this growth came with significant slack, very low inflation, and continued property‑sector stress, and they project a steady slowdown to near 3% later in the decade.(imf.org) This is far from a return to the pre‑2015 “high‑octane” growth engine that reliably pulled the global economy.

2. U.S. inflation fell sharply despite China’s reopening, and China increasingly acted as a disinflationary force.
U.S. CPI inflation dropped from about 8.0% in 2022 to roughly 4.1% in 2023 and 2.9% in 2024, according to BLS-based series.(bls.gov) Over this same period, China slipped into producer‑price and intermittent consumer‑price deflation; economists at PIMCO and others noted that weaker Chinese demand, falling factory‑gate prices, and a softer yuan were lowering the prices of Chinese goods abroad and dampening global commodity demand, explicitly describing this as helpful to Western central banks battling high inflation.(cnbc.com) That is the opposite of a renewed Chinese boom significantly re‑inflating U.S. prices.

3. U.S. growth was driven mainly by domestic demand, not a China‑led external boost.
U.S. real GDP grew about 2.5% in 2023 and 2.8% in 2024, with BEA attributing the gains primarily to domestic consumer spending, business investment, and government outlays; exports were a secondary contributor.(bea.gov) IMF global outlooks through 2024–25 describe world growth as “modest” by historical standards, with the U.S. surprisingly strong while China’s property problems and weak confidence are a drag on prospects rather than a major positive spillover.(apnews.com) That pattern doesn’t match a story in which revived Chinese growth significantly boosts U.S. GDP.

4. Net assessment versus the prediction.

• “Chinese growth engine will resume” – only partly: China did rebound numerically, but the recovery was fragile, quickly confronted deflation and property‑sector crisis, and is widely characterized as a structurally slowing economy rather than a restored global engine.(imf.org)
• “…and this renewed Chinese growth will have significant effects on U.S. economic growth and U.S. inflation” – not borne out: U.S. inflation and growth paths are better explained by domestic policy and demand; China’s contribution appears modest and in inflation’s case largely disinflationary, not a sizable new inflation or growth impulse.

Given these outcomes, the specific forecast that China’s reopening would restart a powerful growth engine that then has significant effects on U.S. growth and inflation is best judged wrong.