Evidence on post‑October 2022 fiscal outlays suggests that when you look at the first ~$0.5–1.0T in extra Western government spending, the dominant share went to cushioning domestic economic problems (especially energy and cost‑of‑living) rather than to Ukraine war spending.

1. Scale and focus of domestic stabilisation spending

• EU energy‑crisis measures. The European Commission reports that EU‑27 governments created large national measures to shield consumers from high energy prices, providing about €181B in 2022 alone for this purpose (≈1.12% of EU GDP), mostly targeted at households and businesses. (eumonitor.eu) A later Commission report shows total EU energy subsidies jumping from €213B in 2021 to €397B in 2022 and €354B in 2023, with crisis measures to protect consumers accounting for roughly €187B in 2022 and €145B in 2023. (energy.ec.europa.eu) These are overwhelmingly domestic bill and price supports, not foreign military spending.
• UK cost‑of‑living and energy support. The UK Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that energy‑price and cost‑of‑living support in 2022‑23 cost about £51.1B net, and that the broader UK energy‑support package across 2022‑23 and 2023‑24 was around £78.2B (about 3.1% of one year’s GDP), again almost entirely domestic subsidies to households and firms. (obr.uk)
• Broader OECD evidence. OECD/IEA data show global fossil‑fuel support measures (mostly consumer subsidies and tax breaks) nearly doubled to about US$1.48T in 2022, with around 81% of the direct fiscal cost going to consumers (households and firms) rather than producers. (oecd.org) Advanced “Western” economies account for a substantial portion of these consumer‑oriented supports.

Just combining EU (€181B + €145B) and UK (~£78B ≈ €90B) crisis and energy‑support measures from late 2022 into 2023 gets you to roughly €416B+ (≈US$450B+) of new domestic stabilisation spending. Adding similar measures in other European countries and North America (which face the same energy and cost‑of‑living shocks captured in the OECD/IEA data) easily pushes the first incremental half‑trillion dollars of Western post‑October‑2022 fiscal outlays into the “domestic subsidy/stabilisation” bucket.

2. Scale of Western spending related to the Ukraine war

• EU and member states. By late 2025, “Team Europe” (EU institutions + member states) had made available about €177.5B total support to Ukraine since the February 2022 invasion, including all financial, humanitarian, military aid and refugee support. (europarl.europa.eu) Of this, EU and member‑state military support over 2022–24 is on the order of €60–66B. (consilium.europa.eu)
• United States. U.S. reporting indicates that by the end of 2024, total U.S. assistance to Ukraine (military, economic, humanitarian) was about $175B. (reuters.com)
• Aggregate Western aid. Compilations based on the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker show that by March 2024, Western countries had pledged more than $380B in total aid to Ukraine since the invasion, including roughly $118B in direct military aid from individual countries. (en.wikipedia.org)

Crucially for Chamath’s timing condition, a material portion of that $380B total was committed in the first seven months of the war (Feb–Oct 2022), before his prediction date. Even if you conservatively assume that all $380B of Western aid were counted after October 2022 (which overstates the true post‑prediction figure), it is still of the same order or smaller than the clearly documented >US$450B of EU+UK domestic energy and cost‑of‑living subsidies alone over 2022–23, and much less than the broader US$1.48T in global consumer‑focused fossil‑fuel support in 2022 in which Western economies are heavily represented. (oecd.org)

3. Interpretation and verdict

• The normalised prediction you provided frames his claim as: given the next US$0.5–1.0T in incremental Western fiscal outlays after October 2022, “the bulk” would go toward subsidising or stabilising internal economic/financial problems (pensions, energy bills, credit markets, etc.) rather than financing new military adventurism in Russia.
• Empirically, the first large wave of post‑October‑2022 discretionary fiscal measures in Europe and the UK was dominated by domestic energy‑price and cost‑of‑living subsidies on the order of several hundred billion euros, which, when combined with similar measures elsewhere in the OECD, clearly exceeds $0.5T and plausibly approaches or surpasses $1T.
• While Western governments undeniably spent very large sums supporting Ukraine militarily and financially, that spending is smaller than, and lags behind, the surge of domestic crisis‑support spending when you look at the initial $0.5–1.0T of new fiscal outlays after October 2022.

Given that interpretation—that the majority of that marginal $0.5–1.0T went to domestic stabilisation, not to war‑fighting in Ukraine—Chamath’s prediction is directionally and quantitatively supported by the available data.

So, under the normalised “bulk of the money” reading, the prediction is right.