Evidence since 2021 supports parts of Chamath’s thesis (a durable shift toward resilience-focused, more regional supply chains with very large associated investment), but contradicts the stronger claim that the prior era of globalization and just‑in‑time supply chains is effectively “over.” Because the prediction bundles these together and uses vague notions like “trillions of dollars of opportunity,” it can’t be cleanly classified as simply right or wrong.

1. Globalization “as we know it” clearly has not ended.

• Global trade remains near historic highs: world trade as a share of GDP was about 63% in 2022 and remained above mid‑2000s levels in 2023–24, indicating that the world economy is still highly integrated rather than deglobalizing in a sharp way. (ycharts.com)
• WTO data show that after a brief contraction in 2023, merchandise trade volumes are forecast to grow again in 2024–25, not collapse. (wto.org)
• OECD work on global value chains and a 2025 OECD report on economic security both find no clear evidence of large‑scale reshoring or major fragmentation of international supply chains so far; instead they describe a plateau/“slowbalisation,” with continued deep cross‑border production linkages. (oecd.org)
• The ECB similarly concludes that there is no strong reshoring response inside Europe; firms are mainly diversifying suppliers and building inventories while trade in intermediate goods stays high. (ecb.europa.eu)
• An investment note from T. Rowe Price on “friendshoring” explicitly says that “reports of globalization’s death were exaggerated” and finds little evidence of an overall increase in reshoring of manufacturing back home, even as supply chains are reconfigured. (troweprice.com)

Taken together, mainstream data and analysis suggest that globalization has been reorganized and slowed, not ended. That undercuts the literal claim that “globalization as we know it is over” and that the old model has fully given way to a new one centered on onshoring.

2. But there is a sustained shift toward resilience, regionalization, and (selective) onshoring/friendshoring.

• A 2020 McKinsey survey found 93% of supply‑chain executives planned to increase resilience (redundant suppliers, nearshoring, regionalization, etc.) after COVID‑19; Capgemini research the same year found only 14% of firms expected a return to “business as usual,” with resilience a top priority. (mckinsey.com)
• NBER research by Alfaro & Chor on the “looming great reallocation” of global supply chains shows US sourcing has shifted away from China toward Vietnam and Mexico, with some stages of production moving back upstream (consistent with partial reshoring) rather than a simple reversion to pre‑2020 patterns. (nber.org)
• Policy has reinforced this shift: the CHIPS and Science Act, Inflation Reduction Act, and infrastructure legislation together catalyzed roughly $1 trillion in U.S. private investment by late 2024, with nearly $800 billion in announced manufacturing projects aimed at semiconductors, batteries/EVs, clean energy and related advanced manufacturing—explicitly framed around domestic capacity and resilient supply chains. (en.wikipedia.org)
• U.S. data show an extraordinary boom in manufacturing‑facility construction since 2021, led by chip fabs and green‑energy plants, which Treasury and Federal Reserve analyses link directly to these policies and the broader resilience/onshoring push. (home.treasury.gov)

So, the directional macro theme Chamath identified—greater emphasis on resiliency, regionalization, and strategic onshoring with very large associated capital spending—has clearly materialized. In that narrow sense, his “macro investing theme” exists in a meaningful way.

3. Evidence for outright reshoring and for quantifying “trillions of dollars of opportunity” is mixed and hard to pin down.

• Academic and policy work stresses that hard evidence of broad‑based reshoring is still limited; value chains are “sticky,” and firms often prefer nearshoring or friendshoring over full onshoring, especially outside a few strategic sectors. (paperity.org)
• Global trade and global value‑chain participation remain very high by historical standards, and bodies like the OECD and WTO emphasize diversification and regulatory changes rather than wholesale retreat from globalization. (oecd.org)
• On the other hand, when you aggregate:
  • the ~$1 trillion in U.S. private manufacturing/clean‑tech/semiconductor investment tied to resilience and domestic capacity;
  • similar—but harder‑to‑quantify—friendshoring and industrial‑policy waves in Europe and Asia;
  • plus the market capitalization and revenue growth of firms building chips, grids, automation, logistics, and other resilience infrastructure, it is plausible that the “opportunity set” associated with this theme runs into the low trillions of dollars globally. But this is an inference, not something cleanly documented in official statistics.

Because the prediction combines:

• a strong, falsifiable claim (that the old era of globalization/JIT is effectively over) that current data contradict; and
• a broader thematic claim (that there will be a long‑lasting, trillion‑dollar shift toward resilience, onshoring and related businesses) that is directionally supported but hard to measure precisely,

the overall forecast defies a binary right/wrong judgment. The macro trend he pointed to is real and very large, but globalization has not ended, and the exact magnitude and attribution of “trillions” in opportunity cannot be rigorously confirmed.

Given this mixture of confirming and disconfirming evidence plus fuzzy definitions, the fairest rating is “ambiguous.”