Jason’s prediction had two key parts: (1) that, within roughly 90 days of late May 2021, the U.S. government would already know that COVID-19 came from a Wuhan lab, and (2) that after the 90‑day review it would then begin concrete policies to become more economically independent from China, triggered by that knowledge.

1. U.S. government “already knows” it was a lab leak
   • President Biden ordered a 90‑day intelligence review of COVID‑19’s origins on May 26, 2021; the report was delivered August 24 and a declassified summary released August 27, 2021. The assessment explicitly stated that the U.S. Intelligence Community was divided and reached no definitive conclusion on whether the virus came from natural spillover or a lab incident. Four agencies plus the National Intelligence Council, all with low confidence, leaned toward a natural zoonotic origin; one agency (the FBI) assessed with moderate confidence that it was most likely a lab‑related incident; others remained undecided. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Even years later, U.S. agencies remain split. In 2023 the Department of Energy shifted to a low‑confidence assessment favoring a lab‑related incident, and in 2025 the CIA reportedly judged a lab origin “more likely” but still with low confidence—while other agencies still favor zoonosis. (en.wikipedia.org) There is still no government‑wide, high‑confidence finding that the virus leaked from a lab.
   • WHO‑convened studies and much of the scientific literature continue to view zoonotic spillover as the more likely pathway and describe a lab leak as “extremely unlikely” or at least unproven, underscoring that origins remain unresolved. (en.wikipedia.org)
   Given the official, declassified record and subsequent updates, the claim that the U.S. government already knew the lab‑leak theory was true within that 90‑day window is not supported; at most, one agency leaned that way with moderate confidence while others did not.

2. Post‑review economic “independence from China” starting then
   • Major U.S. efforts to reduce supply‑chain dependence on China were already underway before the May 31, 2021 episode and before the 90‑day origins review concluded. Biden signed Executive Order 14005 ("Buy American") on January 25, 2021 to strengthen domestic sourcing for federal procurement. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • On February 24, 2021, he signed Executive Order 14017 on America’s Supply Chains, launching a 100‑day review of critical supply chains (semiconductors, large‑capacity batteries, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals) aimed at strengthening U.S. manufacturing, diversifying sources, and reducing vulnerabilities from concentrated foreign supply—with China repeatedly cited as a dominant, risky supplier in follow‑on reports. (cisa.gov) Those reviews and recommended actions were announced June 8, 2021, still before the COVID‑origins intel report was completed.
   • In parallel, Congress was already moving on the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA)—later folded into the CHIPS and Science Act—which explicitly aimed to reshore semiconductor production, bolster supply‑chain resilience, and “counter China.” The Senate passed USICA on June 8, 2021, again predating the August 2021 origins assessment. The final CHIPS Act, signed in August 2022, is framed as strengthening U.S. supply chains and competing with China, but it was the continuation of this pre‑existing trajectory, not a new turn taken right after the 90‑day review. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Later initiatives (e.g. Indo‑Pacific Economic Framework, export controls on advanced chips, further tariff measures) also stress supply‑chain security and competition with China, but they are not tied by the administration to any definitive finding that COVID‑19 leaked from a lab; they reflect a broader, ongoing strategic shift that began earlier.

Taken together, the best available public evidence shows:

• The 90‑day intelligence review did not conclude that COVID‑19 definitively came from a Wuhan lab; the U.S. government still does not “know” this with high confidence.
• Policy moves to reshore manufacturing and reduce dependence on China were already in motion before May–August 2021 and were not newly initiated after the 90‑day review on the basis of a confirmed lab‑leak finding.

Because both central components of Jason’s prediction (government already secretly knowing lab leak, and a subsequent, causally linked policy shift starting after the 90‑day review) are contradicted by the observable record, the prediction is best classified as wrong.