Chamath’s prediction tied several concrete downstream effects to Trump’s COVID‑19 case; those effects largely did not occur.

1. Trump’s case did not yield uniquely “transparent data” on effective treatments

   • Coverage of Trump’s hospitalization repeatedly emphasized confusion and lack of transparency, not clarity. White House physician Sean Conley and other officials gave incomplete and even misleading information about Trump’s oxygen levels, imaging, and timeline, which major outlets described as “falsehoods, obfuscation, [and] evasion.” (washingtonpost.com)
   • The main therapies he received (Regeneron’s monoclonal antibody cocktail, remdesivir, dexamethasone) were evaluated primarily through randomized clinical trials and then FDA Emergency Use Authorizations, not through any special dataset from Trump’s case. The EUA for casirivimab/imdevimab on Nov. 21, 2020, explicitly rested on trial data, not on his treatment. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • In other words, his illness was not the source of “all of the most transparent data” about coronavirus care.

2. Public demand and actual access to the same treatment did not explode

   • Trump heavily promoted Regeneron’s antibody cocktail after his discharge, saying he wanted “everybody to be given the same treatment as your president,” and portraying it as a near‑miracle. (militarytimes.com)
   • However, once monoclonal antibodies from Regeneron and Eli Lilly received EUAs in November 2020, utilization was low, not sky‑high. By late 2020 and January 2021, federal officials reported that only about 20–25% of distributed antibody courses were being used, with some areas as low as 5%; HHS and the Surgeon General publicly urged hospitals to use them more. (cnbc.com)
   • A Washington Post report noted that the much‑anticipated demand surge—fueled by Trump’s glowing video about the Regeneron drug—never materialized; many patients and clinicians either didn’t know about the therapies or weren’t asking for them. (washingtonpost.com)
   • Access also remained constrained by practical barriers: the drugs required rapid administration early in illness, IV infusion capacity, and specialized centers; states repeatedly had to set up or reopen dedicated infusion facilities, and access varied by geography and eligibility. (cnbc.com)
   • So it did not become “hard for everybody to then not get some version” of Trump’s therapy; instead, supply often exceeded utilization, and many eligible people never received it.

3. Mask and testing “de‑escalation” in the ensuing months did not follow from his treatment

   • Through fall 2020 and winter 2020–21, U.S. public‑health policy continued to lean heavily on masks and other non‑pharmaceutical interventions, especially during a large winter surge. CDC mask recommendations remained in force, and on Jan. 20, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 13991, strengthening mask requirements on federal property and calling for maximizing public compliance with masks and distancing—this is the opposite of a treatment‑driven de‑emphasis on masking. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • CDC did not significantly relax mask guidance for the general (vaccinated) public until May 13, 2021, and that change was explicitly tied to vaccination progress, not to monoclonal antibody availability or Trump’s recovery. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Testing volumes increased into late 2020, peaking around Jan. 15, 2021 at more than 2 million tests per day nationwide. Later declines in testing were attributed to falling case counts, harsh winter weather, vaccination rollout, and “testing fatigue,” not to any new clarity about curative therapies. (medicalxpress.com)
   • There remained substantial uncertainty and debate among experts about the role and indications of monoclonal antibodies; Trump’s unusual triple‑drug regimen was widely noted as unrepresentative of standard care and even as an example of “VIP syndrome,” not a template that resolved “what the right course of care is.” (abc7chicago.com)

Bottom line:
While Trump received an aggressive combination of leading‑edge treatments and then publicly hyped monoclonal antibodies, his case did not (a) generate uniquely transparent treatment data, (b) trigger broad, unavoidable access to “what the president got,” or (c) clearly lead to a rapid de‑emphasis of masks, testing, or uncertainty about care. The empirical record from late 2020 through mid‑2021 points in the opposite direction on all three counts, so Chamath’s prediction is wrong overall.