Assessment of the prediction
Chamath predicted in September 2020 that, after an initial boom, the SPAC market would consolidate so that his SPAC platform and at most “one or two other people” would dominate the space in terms of deal volume/importance.

From 2020–2025, the data show the opposite pattern:

1. The SPAC boom was large and highly fragmented, not quickly consolidated.

   • In 2020 there were 248 SPAC IPOs raising about $83–$84 billion, followed by 613 SPAC IPOs in 2021 raising about $162 billion—roughly 861 SPAC IPOs over those two years alone. (ru.wikipedia.org)
   • An industry article notes that in 2020 there were 223 SPAC sponsors and that by early 2021 “SPACs are all over the place,” with hundreds of sponsors jumping in (including politicians, celebrities, and many funds), underscoring how dispersed sponsorship was rather than concentrated in a few platforms. (investmentnews.com)
     Given this scale, Chamath’s Social Capital vehicles represented only a small single‑digit share of overall SPAC deal count.

2. Chamath’s own SPAC platform did not become a consolidating winner.

   • Chamath’s Social Capital Hedosophia SPACs took Virgin Galactic, Opendoor, Clover Health, SoFi and a couple of biotech companies public, but in total he sponsored on the order of a dozen SPACs—significant in profile but still a tiny slice of the ~860 SPAC IPOs of 2020–2021. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • By September 2022, he shut down and liquidated his remaining tech SPACs (IPOD and IPOF) after failing to find suitable targets, with coverage explicitly describing him as “throwing in the towel” and returning $1.6 billion to investors. (axios.com)
   • That wind‑down marked a retreat rather than the emergence of a durable, dominant SPAC “platform” that others would have to reckon with.

3. The market shrank instead of consolidating around a few dominant sponsors.

   • After the 2021 peak, new SPAC IPOs plunged to 86 in 2022 and 31 in 2023 as rising rates, poor post‑merger performance and tougher regulation hit the sector. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • A 2025 Reuters analysis sums up the boom‑and‑bust: around $250 billion across 860 SPAC IPOs in 2020–2021, with roughly half the vehicles later liquidated and over 90% of de‑SPACed companies trading below their $10 issue price. This is described as a classic speculative cycle rather than a normal, consolidated industry structure. (reuters.com)
   • This is not the pattern of a mature market dominated by one or two sponsor platforms; it is a boom followed by a collapse and partial reset.

4. In the later mini‑resurgence, leadership lies with various banks and sponsors—not with Chamath’s platform.

   • In the 2025 SPAC comeback, coverage highlights Cohen & Company and Cantor Fitzgerald as leading SPAC IPO underwriters, and notes a mix of experienced sponsors like Michael Klein, Alec Gores and Betsy Cohen re‑entering the field—again indicating a plural, competitive sponsor landscape. (ft.com)
   • Axios in mid‑2025 reports 74 SPACs year‑to‑date with 80% of sponsors being “experienced”, but does not identify any one sponsor platform as dominating SPAC volume or importance; Chamath appears as one high‑profile participant among many, not the central consolidator. (axios.com)

Conclusion
By late 2025, enough time has passed to evaluate “the coming years” after 2020. The empirical record shows:

• A huge, fragmented boom with hundreds of sponsors and no quick consolidation around a few players.
• Chamath’s own SPAC platform remained a minority share of deal flow, then wound down key vehicles in 2022 instead of emerging as a durable consolidator.
• The post‑bust environment features a smaller but still multi‑sponsor market, with leadership spread across different banks and sponsors rather than concentrated in Chamath plus one or two others.

Given these facts, the prediction that his platform and at most one or two other sponsors would “really dominate the space” in SPACs has not come true.

Verdict: his prediction was wrong.