Evidence since 2020 shows some movement toward reciprocity-based arrangements in U.S.–China and related commerce, but not clearly enough to say Sacks’ vision has broadly materialized, nor clearly failed.

Points suggesting the prediction is at least partly on track

• U.S. policymakers have elevated “reciprocity” to a formal organizing idea. The True Reciprocity Act of 2023 declares it U.S. policy that any trade or investment negotiations with China should address non‑reciprocal arrangements and secure structural changes in China’s trade practices. (congress.gov)
• The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission explicitly recommends that Congress adopt reciprocity as a “foundational” principle in all U.S.–China legislation, covering market access and regulatory parity. (uscc.gov)
• The draft EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) was framed by the EU as rebalancing asymmetries and increasing reciprocity of market access and a level playing field for EU firms in China. (policy.trade.ec.europa.eu)
• A 2025 White House proclamation on the Kuala Lumpur Joint Arrangement with China openly links tariff changes to addressing a “lack of trade reciprocity” and ties U.S. concessions (e.g., tariff modifications) to Chinese commitments on export controls and purchases—an explicitly quid‑pro‑quo structure. (whitehouse.gov)

Points cutting the other way

• The dominant U.S. approach to China under Biden has been framed as “small yard, high fence”: targeted export controls and investment restrictions on sensitive technologies for national security, not a general reciprocity‑for‑access bargain. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Business and policy analyses still describe the relationship as non‑reciprocal and deteriorating; U.S. firms cite tariffs and export controls plus continuing market-access barriers in China, rather than a new stable reciprocity regime. (apnews.com)
• The flagship EU reciprocity project (CAI) remains stalled and, as of 2025, senior EU trade officials say the EU has “no interest” in reviving it, citing worsening market barriers in China. (scmp.com)

Netting this out, reciprocity has clearly become a more explicit goal and features in some specific deals, but the overall structure of U.S.–China and allied commerce is better described as fragmented, security‑driven, and only selectively reciprocal. That mixed, qualitative reality makes the prediction neither clearly fulfilled nor clearly falsified, hence “ambiguous.”