The prediction hinged on three concrete claims about early April 2020:

1. Dramatic decline in West Coast COVID metrics by early April 2020
   While the Seattle area’s growth rate of new cases had begun to slow by late March, it was still among the metros with the highest incidence, and King County hospitals were described as under “significant pressures” as of March 29, not in a state of dramatic relief. (cityobservatory.org) In California, large counties such as Los Angeles continued to see rising cumulative cases and deaths through the first half of April, indicating continued spread rather than a sharp drop in burden. (en.wikipedia.org) This contradicts the idea that ICU use, ER strain, and new cases had dramatically declined by April 7–8 across the U.S. West Coast.

2. West Coast “reopen for business” around April 7–8, 2020
   Policy actions directly oppose this.

   • Washington: The statewide “Stay Home – Stay Healthy” order issued March 23 initially ran to April 6, but on April 2 it was formally extended to May 4, and later to May 31 with a phased reopening plan. (housedemocrats.wa.gov)
   • California: A mandatory statewide stay‑at‑home order began March 19 and remained in effect with no early‑April end date; as of late April, counties were still under extended or indefinite stay‑home orders, with only very limited easing (e.g., curbside retail) starting in May. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Oregon: Issued a stay‑at‑home order in late March and, together with California and Washington, formed the Western States Pact on April 13 explicitly to coordinate a gradual, data‑driven reopening later; Oregon’s order was extended into summer with phased county reopenings beginning mid‑May. (en.wikipedia.org)
     In reality, none of the major West Coast states “reopened for business” around April 7–8; all were still under stringent stay‑at‑home regimes and planning extended shutdowns.

3. Infection fatality rate (IFR) would prove materially lower than prevailing projections by that time
   Early public numbers in February–March 2020 often cited crude case‑fatality rates around 3–4% from China, which were clearly overestimates of IFR. (pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) However, more sophisticated models emerging in March 2020 (e.g., Imperial College) were already assuming an IFR around 0.9–1% for high‑income countries. (brownstone.org) Later meta‑analyses and modeling work converged on an overall IFR in the roughly 0.5–1% range in high‑income settings, consistent with those early model‑based projections rather than “materially lower” than them. (imperial.ac.uk) Moreover, by early April 2020 there simply wasn’t enough serological data from the U.S. West Coast to demonstrate a clearly lower IFR at that time.

4. New York “two weeks behind” and under strain longer
   New York state did become the U.S. epicenter, with daily new cases peaking in early April and enormously stressed hospitals and excess mortality through that month. The statewide NY PAUSE order, initially effective from March 22, was extended on April 6 to April 29 and again on April 16 to May 15, confirming severe, prolonged strain well beyond early April. (en.wikipedia.org) This relative comparison (NY worse and later) was broadly accurate, but it was tied to the incorrect premise that the West Coast would already be in a position to reopen by April 7–8.

Net evaluation
The core actionable part of the prediction—that West Coast metrics would dramatically improve by early April 2020, allowing the region to reopen around April 7–8 while New York lagged—conflicts with both epidemiological data and actual policy. Stay‑at‑home orders on the West Coast were extended well past that date, cases and deaths were still accumulating, and the IFR ultimately aligned with serious early model‑based projections rather than being clearly and materially below them.

Therefore, the prediction as stated is best judged: wrong.