Macroeconomic data show that the U.S. did not enter a sharp, economy‑wide recession starting in late 2022.

• Output kept growing instead of contracting. Revised BEA figures show real U.S. GDP grew 2.5% in 2022, 2.9% in 2023, and about 2.8% in 2024, rather than falling or stagnating as in a deep recession. (apps.bea.gov) Quarterly data likewise show solid positive growth in late 2022 and strong growth in 2023 Q3 (5.2% annualized). (bea.gov)
• No official recession was dated after the COVID slump. The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee identifies the most recent trough as April 2020 and continues to classify the period since May 2020 as an expansion, with no later recession episode designated through 2025. (nber.org)
• The labor market stayed historically tight. The unemployment rate hovered around 3.5–3.9% in 2022–23 and only gradually rose to roughly 4.0–4.2% in 2024–early 2025, still low by historical standards and inconsistent with a "significant" recession and economy "off a cliff." (federalreserve.gov)
• Contemporary analyses described a soft landing, not a deep downturn. Major forecasters and media noted that the U.S. avoided the widely expected 2023 recession and was on track for, or had largely achieved, a soft landing—inflation falling while growth and employment remained resilient. (cnbc.com)
• Forward-looking forecasts still show modest growth, not a slump. BEA data into 2025 and OECD projections for 2025–26 point to slowing but positive GDP growth, not the aftermath of a deep, economy‑wide contraction. (bea.gov)

Some sectors—especially tech—did experience pronounced layoffs and a cyclical cooldown, which matches the sectoral mood in late 2022. But at the whole‑economy level the U.S. experienced a slowdown from the post‑COVID boom, not the severe, broad recession implied by “headed off a cliff” and a deep, economy‑wide slump. Therefore, the prediction is wrong.