Evidence since 2022 indicates that the U.S. did not enter an official recession following the Russia‑Ukraine war, even though the war did worsen inflation and weigh on growth, and economic discontent clearly hurt Biden and Democrats with voters.

1. No post‑2020 U.S. recession (official data):
   The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the standard arbiter of U.S. recessions, lists the most recent peak as February 2020 and trough as April 2020, with no subsequent peak or trough announced through 2025. That implies the economy remained in expansion after mid‑2020, i.e., no officially dated recession in 2022–2024. (nber.org)

2. First‑half 2022 “technical recession” wasn’t broadly accepted as a real recession:
   Real GDP did contract in Q1 and Q2 2022, leading some commentators to say the U.S. was in a “technical recession.” (steelmarketupdate.com) But many analyses noted that this downturn was driven heavily by inventories and trade, while employment and income remained strong, and stressed that two quarters of negative GDP are not the official definition of a recession. (aneconomicsense.org) Both the White House and many economists therefore argued that the U.S. was slowing but not in recession, a view reinforced by continued job growth and later descriptions of the period as a near‑miss “soft landing.” (en.wikipedia.org)

3. War‑related shocks raised inflation and lowered growth, but forecasts and data showed a slowdown, not a U.S. crash:
   International institutions analyzing the economic impact of the Russo‑Ukrainian war concluded that the conflict would raise global energy and food prices and push up inflation, while trimming U.S. growth forecasts (for example, to about 3.3% in 2022), but did not project an outright U.S. recession in the near term. (euromonitor.com) The World Bank and IMF likewise framed the war as a major commodity shock heightening inflation risks and slowing growth, not as a trigger that had already pushed the U.S. into recession. (weforum.org)

4. Economic pain did hurt Biden’s standing and shape elections—but without a clear war‑induced recession:
   Throughout 2022, inflation and the economy were consistently at or near the top of voters’ concerns. Pre‑midterm polling found the economy/inflation was the most important issue for large shares of voters, and nearly half of voters in AP VoteCast/exit‑poll data named “the economy and jobs” as the biggest issue facing the country; those voters backed Republicans by roughly 2‑to‑1. (washingtonpost.com) Biden’s handling of the economy and inflation polled poorly (e.g., majorities disapproving of his performance on inflation and the economy), giving Republicans a clear opening to attack him on cost‑of‑living issues. (foxnews.com) Republicans did win the House in 2022, consistent with economic dissatisfaction weighing on Biden, but this occurred in a high‑inflation slowdown rather than a formally recognized recession.

5. Why the prediction is ultimately judged wrong:
   Sacks’s prediction, as normalized, has two key claims:

   • (a) that fallout from the Russia‑Ukraine war and related policies would help push the U.S. economy into a recession, and
   • (b) that that recession would sour voter sentiment toward Biden in subsequent elections.

   While (b) is directionally consistent with what happened—economic pain and high prices clearly hurt Biden and Democrats with voters—the critical antecedent (a) did not occur by standard economic dating: there has been no post‑2020 U.S. recession officially recognized by NBER, and the episode is increasingly described as a soft‑landing/near‑miss rather than a war‑induced recession. (nber.org) Because the prediction hinges on a war‑driven recession triggering voter backlash, and that recession never clearly materialized, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong, albeit partially right about economic discontent hurting Biden politically.