Why this prediction is rated “wrong”

1. How TikTok’s U.S. status has actually been handled

   • In August 2020, Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13942 targeting TikTok/ByteDance under U.S. national‑security and ICT‑supply‑chain authorities, handled as a unilateral U.S. executive action rather than part of a broader trade bargain with China. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • In 2024, Congress passed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, explicitly aimed at TikTok and other ByteDance apps. It conditions TikTok’s continued U.S. operation on divestiture from its China‑based parent, again on national‑security grounds, not as a negotiated trade concession with Beijing. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Federal courts later upheld this law as constitutional, emphasizing its national‑security purpose (Chinese government access to data and influence), and framing the issue as sale or ban, not as an element in a reciprocal U.S.–China commercial deal. (apnews.com)
   • Subsequent U.S. executive orders in 2025 implement and sequence enforcement and potential divestiture under this statute; they continue to treat TikTok as a regulated “foreign adversary controlled application,” not as a chip in a broader market‑access swap. (whitehouse.gov)

   Across this timeline, the formal resolution path for TikTok in the U.S. has been: targeted legislation, CFIUS/national‑security review, and court challenges—domestic legal/regulatory processes, not a quid‑pro‑quo trade negotiation with China over unrelated U.S. firms.

2. Tesla’s China access was established independently and earlier

   • Tesla’s Shanghai Gigafactory was agreed with local government in July 2018, ground was broken in January 2019, and production began in late 2019, making it China’s first wholly foreign‑owned auto plant—well before the May 2020 podcast and before TikTok became a major U.S. political issue. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Chinese policy changes allowing 100% foreign ownership for EV makers, plus local tax breaks and subsidies, explain Tesla’s market access and favorable treatment; these are documented as part of China’s industrial strategy to promote EVs, not as a concession traded for U.S. treatment of TikTok. (appen.media.gov.cn)

3. No evidence of the specific quid‑pro‑quo mechanism Sacks described

   • Sacks predicted TikTok’s ability to operate in the U.S. would “probably” be resolved inside a larger U.S.–China negotiation, where TikTok’s U.S. market access is swapped for something like Tesla’s right to sell cars in China.
   • Public reporting and official documents on both TikTok policy and Tesla’s China operations contain no indication that TikTok’s U.S. status has been explicitly bargained against reciprocal commercial access for Tesla (or a similar single firm) in China. Instead, they are treated as separate issues: TikTok as a national‑security/ownership problem; Tesla as a beneficiary of China’s EV‑industrial policy.

Because TikTok’s U.S. fate has been driven by unilateral U.S. national‑security law and litigation rather than a documented U.S.–China quid‑pro‑quo trading it against Tesla’s China access (which was already secured before the prediction), the specific mechanism Sacks described did not occur.

Conclusion: The prediction about how TikTok’s U.S. access would be resolved—via a Tesla‑style quid‑pro‑quo negotiation with China—has not come true; it is therefore wrong.