Interpreting Sacks’s claim as a directional prediction—that the mid‑2010s shift away from “Davos‑style” globalist elites toward more nationalist / anti‑globalist leaders would keep strengthening after 2023—the available evidence up to late 2025 shows that pattern has generally continued, though unevenly and with important counter‑examples.

Evidence that the nationalist / anti‑globalist trend continued after Jan 2023

• European far‑right and nationalist breakthroughs:

  • Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ), a hard‑right nationalist party, won the 2024 legislative election, the first time a far‑right party topped a national vote there since WWII.【0search14】
  • Germany’s AfD moved from pariah status toward the mainstream: it won a plurality in Thuringia’s 2024 state election and then took 20.8% nationally and second place in the February 2025 federal election, the strongest far‑right showing in modern German history.【3search22】【0news15】
  • Portugal’s far‑right Chega surged in the 2025 snap election, becoming the main opposition party in parliament and displacing the long‑dominant Socialists.【0news12】
  • North Macedonia’s 2024 election produced a landslide for the national‑conservative VMRO‑DPMNE‑led bloc, explicitly framed around national interests and EU‑accession fatigue.【0search17】
  • Romania’s ultranationalist AUR and allied far‑right forces jumped from single‑digits in 2020 to roughly 18% and second place in the 2024 parliamentary vote, with around a third of voters backing anti‑EU or pro‑Russian parties.【2news14】【3news13】

• Europe‑wide assessments of a continuing far‑right / nationalist surge:

  • Academic work on European party systems concludes that support for far‑right parties has been rising across most European states over the past 15 years, turning previously marginal actors into significant political players.【3search5】
  • Analyses of the 2024 European Parliament elections describe “big gains” and a “wave” of right‑wing support, with far‑right and hard‑right parties increasing their seat share and topping the polls in several EU countries, even though they did not win control of the Parliament.【3search0】【3search3】

• United States: clear return to an explicitly nationalist presidency:

  • In 2024, Donald Trump—whose brand is explicitly “America First” and anti‑globalist—regained the U.S. presidency, defeating Kamala Harris and bringing back a leader who openly attacks multilateral institutions and globalist elites.【1search14】【3search20】 This is a major data point in favor of Sacks’s forecast that electorates would keep favoring nationalist over Davos‑style leaders.

• Latin America and other regions:

  • Argentina elected Javier Milei in 2023, widely described as a far‑right populist / radical libertarian who rails against globalist institutions and proposes severing or downgrading ties with China and Brazil while aligning more tightly with the U.S.【6search0】【6search20】 His win was seen by regional observers as part of a broader right‑populist wave.【6search1】【6search2】
  • In South Africa’s 2024 election, the long‑dominant ANC lost its majority for the first time; one of the main new forces, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), campaigned on nationalist and anti‑establishment themes, contributing to a more fractured, sovereignty‑centric politics.【2search17】

• Media and expert framing of a broader populist / nationalist wave:

  • Analyses of Poland’s 2025 presidential election explicitly cast Karol Nawrocki’s MAGA‑aligned victory as evidence of the “strength of MAGA‑style populism across Europe,” citing concurrent far‑right advances in Austria, Portugal, and Germany.【3news15】
  • Other commentary describes a “far‑right surge” strengthening across Europe and notes that anger at globalization and elites is a key fuel for these movements.【3news14】【3search3】

Taken together, these developments are consistent with Sacks’s directional claim that the anti‑globalist / nationalist trend would not fade after 2023 but would keep expressing itself in major elections and leadership choices.

Countervailing evidence and why the trend is not absolute

• Centrist and pro‑EU wins in key countries:

  • Spain’s July 2023 election ultimately resulted in the re‑election of Pedro Sánchez and another left‑of‑centre, pro‑EU coalition government, after right‑of‑centre PP and far‑right Vox failed to assemble a majority.【4search0】【4search3】
  • The 2024 European Parliament elections left the mainstream pro‑integration parties (EPP, Socialists, liberals) still firmly in control; far‑right parties grew from about 20% to roughly 24% of seats—an increase, but explicitly “not an electoral revolution,” according to post‑election analysis.【3search2】【0search19】
  • In the 2024 UK general election, voters ousted the Conservative Party (which had embraced a nationalist, Brexit‑driven agenda) and handed a landslide to Keir Starmer’s Labour, a more technocratic, broadly pro‑alliance government.【5search12】【5search0】
  • In the 2025 Dutch election, early results and exit polling showed the liberal‑centrist D66 overtaking Geert Wilders’ far‑right PVV, with commentary casting this as a pushback against divisive populism and a preference for pro‑European stability.【0news13】

• Mass mobilization against far‑right extremism:
  Germany, for example, saw huge anti‑AfD, pro‑democracy protests in 2024–25, explicitly opposing far‑right “remigration” schemes and calling for investigation or even banning of AfD.【0search22】 This doesn’t negate AfD’s electoral gains, but it does show robust public resistance rather than a simple, linear march toward nationalism.

• Conceptual fuzziness of “Davos‑style globalists” vs. “nationalists”:
  Some leaders who are hostile to neoliberal globalization in rhetoric (e.g., parts of the Latin American left) still participate in multilateral institutions, attend elite forums, and support aspects of global cooperation, making classification subjective. Likewise, several conservative or centrist governments that displaced previous elites mix nationalist rhetoric with broadly globalist economic policy.

Why the prediction is classified as ‘right’ rather than ‘ambiguous’

Even allowing for those counter‑trends and definitional fuzziness, the net post‑2023 trajectory in many large and symbolically important democracies has been:

• continued or intensified electoral strength for nationalist / anti‑globalist or far‑right parties (Europe, parts of Latin America),
• the return of a strongly nationalist U.S. president,【1search14】 and
• widespread expert and media characterization of this as a sustained wave of populist, anti‑globalist politics rather than a spent force.【3search3】【3search5】

Sacks did not claim that nationalist leaders would entirely replace globalist ones everywhere, only that the political current favoring such leaders would keep building beyond 2023. On the balance of observable outcomes by late 2025, that directional forecast has broadly held, so the most reasonable evaluation is “right,” with the caveat that the trend is contested rather than universal.