Summary: From mid‑2020 through late 2025, U.S. policy toward China has clearly become more hawkish and competitive and has remained broadly bipartisan, matching the direction of the prediction. However, the prediction explicitly concerns a durable multi‑decade strategic stance, and only ~5 years have passed. That is not enough time to judge whether this will truly be a long‑term, Cold‑War‑style framework. Therefore the correct status is inconclusive (too early), even though evidence so far is supportive.

Evidence that U.S. policy since 2020 has been hawkish and bipartisan

1. Trump‑era trade and tech restrictions continued under Biden

   • The Biden administration has largely kept in place Trump‑era tariffs on Chinese goods rather than rolling them back, signaling continuity in a tougher economic stance.
   • Biden officials have repeatedly framed the U.S.–China relationship as one of strategic competition, not partnership, and pursued industrial and technology policy with China explicitly in mind.

2. CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (bipartisan industrial policy aimed at competing with China)

   • The CHIPS and Science Act, passed in 2022 with bipartisan support, provides large subsidies to domestic semiconductor manufacturing and research, explicitly justified in part as necessary to compete with China and reduce dependence on Chinese‑linked supply chains.

3. Sweeping export controls on advanced chips to China (2022–2023)

   • In October 2022 (and tightened in 2023), the U.S. imposed far‑reaching export controls on advanced semiconductors and chipmaking equipment to China, with the explicit goal of slowing China’s military‑relevant technological development. This is widely described by analysts as one of the most significant escalations in tech‑related containment policy since the end of the Cold War.

4. Congressional actions on security, Taiwan, and tech platforms

   • Congress has passed or advanced numerous bipartisan measures critical of China, on issues such as human rights (Xinjiang, Hong Kong), Taiwan security support, and restricting Chinese technology platforms (e.g., legislation targeting TikTok’s ownership structure drew substantial bipartisan support in 2023–2024).
   • Hearings and committees (such as the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party) have been explicitly framed around long‑term strategic competition with the CCP, with participation from both parties.

5. Rhetoric from both parties framing China as the primary long‑term rival

   • Official national security documents under the Biden administration describe China as “the pacing challenge” and the primary long‑term strategic competitor, and leading Republicans generally argue for an even tougher stance. The disagreement is over how hawkish to be, not whether to treat China as a rival.

Taken together, these actions and documents show that from 2020 to 2025 the U.S. has indeed maintained a broadly hawkish, competitive, and bipartisan strategic orientation toward China.

Why the prediction is still too early to fully judge

The normalized prediction is:

From 2020 onward, US policy toward China will remain broadly hawkish and competitive on a bipartisan basis, forming a durable long‑term (multi‑decade) strategic stance similar in continuity to US containment policy toward the Soviet Union during the original Cold War.

Key elements that require more time to assess:

1. “Durable long‑term (multi‑decade)”: Only about five years (2020–2025) have elapsed. Cold War containment lasted roughly four decades. Whether today’s bipartisan consensus persists through multiple changes of administration and evolving economic/strategic conditions is inherently unknowable this early.

2. “Similar in continuity to US containment policy toward the Soviet Union”: To evaluate that analogy, we would need to see whether the U.S. maintains a relatively stable strategic line over at least several successive presidential terms and major geopolitical shocks. That standard cannot be met with current data.

3. Possibility of future shocks or realignments: Domestic political changes in the U.S., changes in Chinese behavior, major conflicts/crises, or economic shifts could all push policy toward either renewed engagement or more radical confrontation. With such path‑dependent uncertainty, assessing a multi‑decade forecast after just a few years would be premature.

Because the core of the prediction is about enduring, decades‑long continuity, and we are only partway into that horizon, the fairest and most accurate classification is “inconclusive (too early)”, albeit with current evidence indicating that the forecast has been directionally accurate so far.