Evidence since 2022 strongly supports Sacks’ prediction that Western policy over the Ukraine war has pushed Russia into a durable strategic alignment with China and made a near‑term re‑alignment with the West unlikely.

1. Sharp, sanctions‑driven pivot toward China

   • After the invasion and sweeping US/EU/Japan sanctions, China refused to join Western sanctions and instead expanded trade; China accounted for about 40% of Russia’s imports and bilateral trade hit a record $190B in 2022, then $240B in 2023 and about $245B in 2024, more than double 2020 levels. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Analyses describe Russia’s economic dependence on China as “deep” and possibly irreversible, explicitly tying this shift to Western sanctions and the 2014–2022 escalation over Ukraine. (worldcrunch.com)
   • Because sanctions largely cut Russia off from dollar/euro finance, Moscow reoriented its financial system toward the yuan: by 2024–2025, yuan dominated FX trading in Russia and roughly 90%+ of Russia‑China trade was settled in rubles and yuan. (sldinfo.com)
     These sources explicitly frame the dependence on China as an unintended consequence of Western sanctions, matching Sacks’ causal claim that Western policy is what “pushes” Russia into China’s arms.

2. Deepening, explicitly framed long‑term strategic partnership

   • Even before the full invasion, Russia and China announced a “no limits” partnership on 4 February 2022, pledging that their relationship was “superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era.” (china.usc.edu)
   • Since then, Xi and Putin have repeatedly upgraded and reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era,” signing joint statements and a pre‑2030 economic cooperation plan, and describing the relationship as “strategic, reliable and stable” and “not an ally but better than an ally.” (en.cppcc.gov.cn)
   • Xi’s high‑profile 2023 state visit to Moscow and Putin’s 2024 state visit to China, followed by Xi’s 2025 Victory Day visit to Russia, all highlighted that both sides see the partnership as long‑term and central to their foreign policy. (eng.chinamil.com.cn)
   • European and US officials now routinely refer to a China‑Russia “axis” or strategic alignment as one of the greatest global challenges, underlining that outside observers see a durable bloc, not a tactical fling. (eutoday.net)
     While the relationship is asymmetric and China has sometimes pulled back (e.g., some banks limiting transactions under secondary sanctions), expert work still characterizes it as a consolidated strategic alignment with Russia increasingly the junior partner rather than an autonomous pole. (eurasiaprospective.net)

3. Russia–West re‑alignment looks very unlikely in the ‘foreseeable future’

   • NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept formally designates Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security, signaling a structural adversarial posture rather than a temporary dispute. (nato.int)
   • The EU has adopted an ever‑expanding series of sanctions packages (now approaching 19 by late 2025), with stated long‑term aims to degrade Russia’s military capacity and permanently reduce its role in Europe’s energy system, including a phased LNG ban through 2027. (eeas.europa.eu)
   • Senior EU and NATO officials in 2025 describe Russia as planning for long‑term confrontation with Europe, reinforcing the view that political normalization is not on the horizon. (apnews.com)
   • The rare Western leaders who talk about eventual “re‑integration” of Russia (e.g., Hungary’s Viktor Orbán) frame it as contingent on a peace deal and major changes in behavior, conditions far from being met. (reuters.com)
     Combined, this suggests that a meaningful Russia‑West re‑alignment in the medium term is improbable, while Russia’s dependence on and coordination with China are already entrenched.

4. Caveats and why they don’t overturn the prediction

   • The partnership stops short of a formal mutual‑defense alliance, and China has tried to avoid overtly violating Western sanctions or providing acknowledged lethal aid, indicating some limits and hedging. (cnbc.com)
   • The asymmetry means Russia is a junior, dependent partner, and there are frictions over pricing and project terms (e.g., delays over the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline), but this still fits Sacks’ broader claim of a “durable strategic alignment,” just on terms increasingly set by Beijing. (cfr.org)

Overall, nearly four years after the prediction, the observable trajectory matches it well: Western sanctions and broader policy over the Ukraine war have made Russia heavily and structurally dependent on China, both governments describe their ties as a long‑term strategic partnership, and Russia’s re‑alignment with the West looks implausible for at least the rest of this decade. That justifies classifying the prediction as right rather than ambiguous or premature.