Summary The core scenario—ubiquitous rapid antigen entry testing at stores and restaurants, with a de facto recent-test “receipt/voucher” system—did not materialize in the U.S. in the months after September 2020, even though rapid antigen tests themselves did become available.

What did happen

• The FDA authorized multiple rapid antigen tests for home use starting in December 2020 (e.g., Ellume’s fully over‑the‑counter test and Abbott’s at‑home BinaxNOW), and manufacturers ramped up production through 2021. (fda.gov)
• Abbott’s BinaxNOW card test and NAVICA app were marketed with the idea of a digital health pass for negative results, showing that some tech to generate test-based passes existed. (abbott.mediaroom.com)
• However, policy analyses at the time describe no coherent national strategy to use rapid antigen tests for broad routine screening; states mainly used them for diagnosing symptomatic people or targeted high‑risk settings (prisons, clinics, certain workplaces), not as universal entrance checks at retail or dining. (stateline.org)

What did not happen (contradicting the prediction)

• No widespread entrance testing at stores/restaurants. In practice, U.S. mitigation for everyday venues centered on masks and capacity limits early on, and later shifted to proof of vaccination, not point-of-entry rapid testing. Major cities (e.g., New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans) required proof of vaccination—and only occasionally allowed a recent negative test as an alternative—for indoor dining, gyms, and entertainment, but did not implement routine on‑site swab-and-read testing for every customer. (en.wikipedia.org)
• No ubiquitous “test receipt/voucher” norm for daily life. While apps like NAVICA or various travel/event apps could display negative test results, there is no evidence that a general, society‑wide system emerged where ordinary shoppers or diners routinely presented a same‑day rapid test receipt in lieu of being swabbed at each door. Such passes were niche (e.g., some travel and special events), not the standard mechanism for entering most private businesses.
• Rapid tests were not cheap or abundant enough for mass daily screening. Analyses noted limited federal up‑front investment and relatively high per-test costs in the U.S., which hindered mass, frequent screening compared with some European countries that offered very cheap or free rapid tests. (kff.org)

Evaluation against the specific claims

• "They will be everywhere" / used broadly at entry to stores and restaurants: Did not occur. Rapid tests became widely sold but were not a routine gatekeeping step for most retail or dining venues.
• "Not ... government mandated" but driven by private early adopters: Federal government did not build a unified rapid-testing entrance system, but private adoption at doors remained rare, confined mostly to select workplaces, travel-related contexts, or special events.
• "Receipt or voucher" so people don’t get swabbed multiple times per day: Although some apps could show test results, the envisioned daily-life ecosystem of negative-test vouchers as a common alternative to repeated swabbing at multiple venues never became standard practice.

Because the key, distinctive elements of the prediction—ubiquitous point-of-entry rapid testing at everyday businesses and a de facto recent-test pass system—did not come true, the prediction is best classified as wrong.