Evidence from 2024–25 lines up with Sacks’ core claim that the Yemen/Houthi and broader Middle East crises did not give Biden a durable political boost and instead became a liability by late 2024.

• Conflict was still active by November 2024. The U.S.-led Red Sea protection mission, Operation Prosperity Guardian, began in December 2023 and continued into 2025, with ongoing Houthi attacks on shipping and repeated U.S. and allied strikes through 2024, well past the November 5, 2024 election date. (en.wikipedia.org)
• No meaningful ‘rally around the flag’ for Biden. Public polling during the Israel–Hamas and related Red Sea crises showed Biden’s approval on foreign policy and the Middle East at or near record lows, not higher. An NBC/ CNBC summary in November 2023 already found his overall approval and foreign-policy approval falling amid the Gaza war. (cnbc.com) Gallup later measured his approval on the Middle East in the high 20s to low 30s—well below even his weak overall job rating—indicating that these conflicts were a drag, not a boost. (news.gallup.com) That is consistent with Sacks’ claim that “wagging the dog” would not work and that any rally would be minimal/short‑lived.
• Middle East policy clearly hurt Biden within his own coalition. Gallup, Pew, AP–NORC and others documented deep and growing disapproval of Biden’s handling of the Israel–Hamas war, especially among Democrats, younger voters, and non‑white voters. (en.wikipedia.org) A Reuters/Ipsos poll in May 2024 explicitly warned that Democratic divisions over Gaza and associated campus protests were “hurting Biden” and posed a serious threat to his re‑election prospects, particularly in swing states like Michigan with large Arab‑American populations. (reuters.com)
• By mid‑2024, Biden’s political standing had clearly weakened. Gallup reports his overall approval fell to an all‑time low of 36% by July 2024, after months of controversy over the Gaza war and Red Sea/Houthi strikes. (en.wikipedia.org) He then withdrew from the 2024 race on July 21, 2024, with analysts and contemporaneous reporting citing his age, debate performance, and sustained unpopularity—including on foreign policy—as key reasons. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The end result was a weakened Democratic position going into the election. Democrats went into November 2024 with an unpopular lame‑duck president presiding over an ongoing Middle East/Red Sea conflict, and with his vice president as a replacement nominee. Republicans ended up winning the presidency and taking unified control of the federal government. (en.wikipedia.org) While multiple factors contributed (economy, age concerns, debate performance), polling and analysis consistently show the Middle East crises were one of the issues undermining Biden’s perceived control and competence.

Because the Red Sea/Houthi conflict was still active by November 2024 and the broader Middle East situation clearly coincided with, and contributed to, a deterioration in Biden’s political standing rather than a durable rally, Sacks’ conditional prediction—that the conflict would at best yield a short‑lived bump and would ultimately weaken Biden if it dragged on into the election period—is best classified as right.