Evidence from winter 2022–2023 shows that, despite intense energy stress and political wrangling, the Western alliance did not significantly fracture over Ukraine or Russia sanctions, and no major European country (Germany, France, UK, Italy, etc.) openly broke with the U.S.-led policy line.

1. EU and G7 unity through winter 2022–23

   • The EU did not roll back sanctions in winter; instead, it expanded them. The 8th sanctions package was adopted on 6 October 2022, and a 9th package was agreed and formally adopted on 16–17 December 2022, right at the start of winter, adding further trade and financial restrictions on Russia and coming on top of the full EU ban on seaborne Russian crude and the G7/EU oil price cap. (consilium.europa.eu)
   • G7 leaders’ statements around the one‑year mark of the invasion (24 February 2023) explicitly stress that they “remain united and resolute” in support for Ukraine and in imposing coordinated sanctions on Russia, reinforcing that Western governments were still acting as a bloc after the winter. (consilium.europa.eu)

2. Analytical retrospectives describe unity, not a fracture

   • A 2023 assessment by the Centre for European Reform characterises EU unity on Ukraine as both its “biggest challenge and also its biggest success,” highlighting that member states repeatedly found consensus on strong sanctions, refugee protection, and Ukraine’s EU‑candidate status during the first year of war—which covers the 2022–23 winter. (cer.eu)
   • A separate review of the first year of war notes “a year of growing western unity and Russian isolation,” again indicating that Russia’s hoped‑for collapse of Western resolve through the winter did not materialise. (globalgovernmentforum.com)

3. Disputes and hold‑outs fell short of a real “fracture”

   • There were intra‑EU disputes—e.g., delays and bargaining over elements of the 9th sanctions package, and persistent objections and carve‑outs demanded by Hungary on energy measures—but these were resolved through compromise inside the EU framework, culminating in unanimous adoption of new sanctions packages rather than open defection from the sanctions regime. (news.cgtn.com)
   • Crucially, the large, gas‑dependent economies that the prediction singled out (notably Germany) did not break with the U.S. line: they maintained sanctions and continued, and in some areas increased, financial and military support to Ukraine through and after the winter. (taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu)

Given that the alliance stayed institutionally intact, continued to pass new coordinated sanctions packages, and publicly emphasized unity—while no major Western European government openly defected from the basic Ukraine/sanctions policy—the prediction that the Western alliance would "fracture" by winter 2022–2023 is best judged wrong.