Evidence from 2023 indicates both parts of the conditional prediction came true in the real-world scenario that actually unfolded.

1. The 2023 counteroffensive led to a de facto stalemate, not a rollback to pre‑Feb. 24, 2022 lines.
   Ukraine’s much‑anticipated 2023 offensive, launched in June, recaptured about 370 km² and a small number of villages but failed to reach key objectives like Tokmak or the Sea of Azov. By early December, multiple outlets and analysts assessed the offensive as stalled or failed, and in November 2023 Ukraine’s commander‑in‑chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi publicly described the war as a “stalemate.” (en.wikipedia.org) This matches the stalemate branch of the predictor’s conditional.

2. By mid‑to‑late 2023, U.S. and Ukrainian strategic interests and preferred war end‑states were visibly diverging.

   • Different war aims and risk tolerances:
     – An April 2023 analysis from the Towson University Journal of International Affairs explicitly argued that the United States and Ukraine already had different ideas of what “winning” meant: Kyiv sought full liberation including Crimea, while Washington was more focused on avoiding escalation and broader confrontation with Russia. (wp.towson.edu)
     – Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba repeatedly insisted that any peace initiative must restore territorial integrity and reject both territorial cession and a “frozen” conflict, underscoring Kyiv’s maximalist territorial aims. (en.wikipedia.org)

   • Operational and escalation disagreements:
     – U.S. officials were clearly uncomfortable with Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. In May 2023, after drone attacks in the Moscow area, the White House press secretary said the United States did not support attacks inside Russia, even as Ukrainian officials publicly welcomed bringing the war home to Russia and Ukrainian intelligence pursued deep‑strike operations. (washingtonpost.com)

   • Divergent strategic concepts after the failed offensive:
     – A December 11, 2023 New York Times piece (widely discussed and summarized by secondary sources) reported that many U.S. officials wanted Ukraine to adopt a conservative “hold what you have and build up over 2024” strategy aimed at sustainability and eventually creating conditions for negotiations, while Ukrainian leaders still pushed for renewed offensive action and more long‑range strikes to regain territory and keep global attention. (reddit.com) That is a clear example of diverging strategic preferences rather than a fully shared theory of victory.

   • Security architecture and NATO friction:
     – Ahead of the July 2023 Vilnius NATO summit, Kyiv hoped for a concrete pathway or invitation toward NATO membership. The U.S. position—articulated by President Biden—was that Ukraine was “not ready” and that immediate membership was off the table, despite strong support for Ukrainian membership from many allies. This gap over long‑term security guarantees and alliance status became a public point of tension between Kyiv and Washington (and some European capitals). (en.wikipedia.org)

Taken together, by late 2023 there was an openly discussed gap between U.S. and Ukrainian strategic interests and aims: the U.S. increasingly prioritized escalation management, resource limits, and a sustainable defensive posture likely leading toward negotiations, while Ukraine prioritized complete territorial restoration, aggressive operations (including inside Russia), and faster, more extensive Western support. That is a noticeable divergence of strategic interests within the 2023 timeframe the prediction specified.

Because (a) the actual counteroffensive outcome matched the stalemate branch, and (b) a clear and widely reported divergence in strategic interests did in fact emerge during 2023, the prediction is best classified as right.