The prediction’s time window is 2022–2032, so as of 30 November 2025 we are only about three years into a ten‑year horizon.

Evidence about the underlying trend:

• Non‑state actors (e.g., ISIS, Mexican cartels, Yemen’s Houthis, Ukraine’s volunteer units) have already used weaponized commercial drones with GPS‑based autopilots and improvised munitions, demonstrating that relatively sophisticated precision‑style attacks are possible without being a state military.
• Consumer and DIY platforms like DJI drones and open‑source autopilot stacks (e.g., ArduPilot, PX4) support waypoint navigation using GPS coordinates out of the box; adding an explosive payload is technically straightforward for a determined group, though still non‑trivial and illegal.
• However, the specific scenario Sacks describes—that continuously publishing an individual’s precise GPS coordinates would make it “pretty easy” for non‑state actors to use precision GPS‑guided weapons for assassination—is not clearly documented as a demonstrated or widely accessible capability. The risk is widely discussed in security circles, but it remains more of a plausible threat model than a routinely observed or clearly commoditized capability.

Because:

1. The deadline (2032) has not yet arrived, and
2. The claim is about future feasibility and ease, not a clearly falsifiable event that has either happened or not,

we cannot definitively say the prediction is right or wrong at this point. It is still developing and depends on subjective judgments about what counts as “pretty easy” and “feasible” for non‑state actors.

Therefore the appropriate classification is "inconclusive" (too early to tell).