The prediction was that starting in late 2023, American Jews would begin a measurable political pilgrimage toward the right, with more identifying with or voting Republican than in the past.

1. Party identification data so far
Recent large‑N surveys still show Jews as one of the most strongly Democratic religious groups:

• Pew’s 2023 data (published April 2024) finds about 69% of Jewish voters aligning with or leaning Democratic and 29% Republican, and notes that the Democratic share is up 8 points compared with 2020, i.e., if anything Jews became more—not less—Democratic over that period. (pewresearch.org)
• A 2024 Manhattan Institute survey of the Jewish electorate similarly reports 60% of Jewish voters identifying as Democrats and 23% as Republicans. (manhattan.institute)
• An April 2024 Jewish Electorate Institute (JEI) poll finds 57% self‑described Democrats, 27% independents, and only 14% Republicans. (jewishelectorateinstitute.org)
• A Jewish Virtual Library synthesis shows Jews by party ID at roughly 60% Democrat and 23% Republican in 2024, broadly consistent with these other sources. (jewishvirtuallibrary.org)
  For context, Gallup’s 2014 data already had about 61% of Jews identifying as Democrats and 29% as Republicans. (news.gallup.com) Overall, the aggregate Republican share in 2023–24 looks similar to, or slightly lower than, the last 10–15 years, not the start of a dramatic new rightward realignment.

2. 2024 presidential vote among Jews
The first post–Oct. 7 election cycle we can measure is the 2024 presidential race. Here too, data show continuity more than a break:

• Multiple exit‑poll summaries (CNN/NBC as reported by Anadolu Agency; Edison‑based coverage; JTA) indicate that Kamala Harris won roughly 78–79% of the Jewish vote nationwide, versus about 21–22% for Donald Trump—very close to the classic 70–30 type splits seen in recent decades. (aa.com.tr)
• A post‑election survey by the Jewish Electorate Institute finds 71% of Jewish voters backed Harris vs 26% for Trump—still overwhelmingly Democratic, and described as within the recent historical range. (jewishelectorateinstitute.org)
• A quantitative analysis by Split Ticket, averaging 2024 exit polls, estimates about a 6‑point swing toward Republicans relative to 2020 (they infer a true rightward shift on the order of 5–10 points), but emphasize that Jewish voters remain overwhelmingly Democratic. (split-ticket.org)

In other words, there is some evidence of a modest rightward movement compared with the unusually Democratic 2020 election, but GOP vote shares in 2024 are still broadly within the long‑standing 20–30% range for Republicans among Jewish voters.

3. Subgroup and local shifts
There are clearer rightward shifts in particular segments:

• Orthodox Jews have become heavily Republican over the last decade (a trend that predates 2023), while non‑Orthodox Jews remain overwhelmingly Democratic. (jewishvirtuallibrary.org)
• In some geographies, especially New York, Trump’s Jewish support rose notably in 2024—one exit‑poll‑based report suggests he climbed from about 30% of New York’s Jewish vote in 2020 to roughly 45% in 2024. (nypost.com)
• A Combat Antisemitism Movement poll ahead of 2024 found a non‑trivial minority of typically Democratic Jewish voters saying antisemitism might push them to vote Republican, but the net effect in that survey was only a few percentage points. (israelhayom.com)
  Complementing this, a 2025 analysis by the Jewish Voters Resource Center concludes that non‑Orthodox Jews supported Democrats in 2024 at higher levels than in 2012 and 2016, while 2020 remains a special high‑water mark driven by Trump’s unpopularity. (jewishvoters.org)

So there is some movement to the right in specific sub‑groups and locales, but at the national aggregate level Jews are still heavily clustered on the left.

4. Why the verdict is “inconclusive”
Sacks’ normalized prediction wasn’t just about a one‑off bump; it foresaw a broader, durable realignment beginning in late 2023 and playing out over multiple election cycles. As of late 2025, we have only one national cycle (2024) plus a year or so of polling to examine:

• Current evidence mostly contradicts a large‑scale “pilgrimage” to the right: party‑ID data from Pew, JEI, and the Manhattan Institute show Jews still strongly Democratic, with no clear uptick in Republican identification relative to the 2010s; in Pew’s series, the Democratic share actually increased since 2020. (pewresearch.org)
• Voting behavior in 2024 stayed within the historical band of about 70–80% Democratic vs 20–30% Republican, with several sources explicitly saying patterns were largely unchanged. (aa.com.tr)
• At the same time, there are hints of incremental rightward movement (e.g., Split Ticket’s estimated R+5–10 swing vs 2020 and state‑level gains like New York), which could, in principle, be the start of the trend Sacks described—but they are not yet outside prior historical variation. (split-ticket.org)

Because Sacks framed this as a multi‑cycle realignment and we have observed only the first cycle—with mixed but mostly continuity‑oriented evidence—it is too early to say definitively that the prediction has either clearly succeeded or definitively failed. On the balance of current data, the strong version of his claim (a marked, obvious pilgrimage to the right) has not materialized yet, but the long‑term trajectory he speculated about cannot be ruled out. Hence the verdict: inconclusive at this point in time.