Evidence since the DSA came into force is mixed and does not clearly show a simple “one global DSA-style rulebook” outcome, but it also does not clearly refute the possibility of DSA-driven global convergence.

On the segmentation / non‑convergence side:

• The DSA’s legal scope is explicitly limited to services offered to users in the EU; it does not require platforms to apply its standards globally, only to EU users.(commission.europa.eu)
• Platforms have rolled out clearly EU‑only features to meet DSA obligations. TikTok, for example, allows users in the EU/EEA to turn off personalised “For You” recommendations and use a non‑personalised search feed, and to restrict personalised ads for teens, specifically to comply with the DSA, while explicitly not offering the same option in non‑EU markets like the UK.(geekculture.co) This shows they are willing to maintain different moderation/recommendation regimes by region rather than standardise globally.
• TikTok’s withdrawal of the TikTok Lite rewards programme applies only in the EU in response to a DSA investigation, not worldwide.(reuters.com)
• Meta and Google’s decisions to halt or limit political ads are being taken specifically for the EU in response to the separate EU political‑ads transparency regulation, rather than exported to the US market, again indicating distinct regional rule sets.(ft.com)

On the convergence / Brussels‑effect side:

• Some policy and think‑tank analyses argue that, because it is operationally simpler, platforms may choose to apply DSA‑driven standards more broadly than required, and warn that this risks imposing EU speech rules outside Europe.(itif.org) This supports Sacks’s logic (the risk that global companies will standardise on the strictest regime), but these pieces mainly describe incentives and possibilities, not clear proof that US services now fully run on a DSA‑style model.
• A U.S. House Judiciary Committee Republican report, citing non‑public materials, claims the DSA is “forcing companies to change their global content moderation policies” and that EU regulators expect platforms to modify worldwide terms and conditions to satisfy DSA obligations.(judiciary.house.gov) However, this is an adversarial interpretation based on limited evidence; it is not independently corroborated by platform announcements that they have simply adopted EU rules as their default everywhere.
• Major platforms have introduced some globally uniform safety features that are clearly responsive to regulatory and political pressure, including from the EU. Meta’s “Teen Accounts,” with stricter defaults and controls for minors, are being rolled out worldwide across Instagram, Facebook and Messenger, not just in the EU.(about.fb.com) Likewise, Facebook’s global “Feeds” tab offering a chronological, less‑personalised feed makes it easier to satisfy the DSA’s requirement that EU users can opt out of algorithmic personalisation, while also being available to users in other regions.(in.investing.com) These moves are consistent with a partial Brussels effect, but they are also driven by lawsuits, youth‑safety scrutiny, and political pressure in the US and elsewhere, so causality is not clean.

Netting this out: by late 2025, platforms do sometimes export DSA‑aligned features globally, but they also clearly maintain EU‑specific restrictions and US‑specific practices, and in some cases roll out more invasive data uses outside the EU (for example, using Meta AI chat data for ad personalisation globally except in the EU, UK and South Korea).(reddit.com) That pattern does not cleanly match a world where companies simply adopt a single DSA‑style moderation/compliance model everywhere.

Because there is credible evidence in both directions—regional differentiation in some areas, partial globalisation of DSA‑aligned protections in others—and no clear, widely acknowledged shift to a unified DSA‑style regime for U.S. users, the prediction that platforms would standardise on DSA rules globally is neither clearly confirmed nor clearly falsified. The outcome is therefore best classified as ambiguous.