Evidence points in two different directions:

1. Agencies did use January 6 as a justification to seek more power and resources.

• The Biden administration’s National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (June 2021) was explicitly “galvanized” by the January 6 attack and frames domestic extremism—especially white supremacist and anti‑government extremists—as the country’s most urgent terrorism threat, calling for enhanced analysis and information‑sharing across agencies. (csis.org)
• DHS responded by expanding its monitoring of online activity and creating a new domestic‑terrorism intelligence branch to track platforms and “narratives known to provoke violence,” steps civil‑liberties groups describe as expanded surveillance after January 6. (theguardian.com)
• DOJ’s National Security Division announced a new domestic‑terrorism unit in a January 2022 Senate hearing titled “The Domestic Terrorism Threat One Year After Jan. 6,” focused on racially/ethnically motivated and anti‑government/anti‑authority extremists—again, explicitly tied to the Capitol attack. (congress.gov)
• In Congress, the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2022 (DTPA), introduced shortly after January 6 and passed by the House, would have authorized dedicated domestic‑terrorism offices within DHS, DOJ, and FBI to monitor, analyze, investigate, and prosecute domestic terrorism. It advanced politically in direct response to domestic extremism concerns, including January 6. (en.wikipedia.org) Civil‑liberties organizations warned lawmakers not to use the Capitol assault as a pretext to expand surveillance authorities or create a new “domestic terrorism” crime. (brennancenter.org) All of this supports the “used the hysteria to demand more powers” part of the prediction.

2. But major new statutory surveillance/charging powers were not actually enacted.

• The DTPA failed in the Senate; it never became law, so the new domestic‑terrorism offices and explicit monitoring/analysis mandates it contained were not codified as additional authorities. (cbsnews.com)
• Congressional and CRS analyses note that, even after January 6, there is still no standalone federal domestic‑terrorism offense; the FBI and DOJ charge domestic extremists (including January 6 defendants) under existing criminal statutes rather than any new domestic‑terrorism law. (everycrsreport.com) This contrasts with the post‑9/11 period, when Congress enacted sweeping new surveillance and terrorism authorities.
• Civil‑rights coalitions repeatedly urged Congress not to expand surveillance powers in response to January 6, explicitly warning against using the attack as justification for broader domestic‑terrorism authorities. Their lobbying, combined with Senate opposition, helped prevent major new statutory powers from passing. (brennancenter.org)

How this maps to the prediction:

• The prediction (normalized) has two key elements: (a) use public/political hysteria around January 6 to justify demands for expanded law‑enforcement/surveillance powers, and (b) obtain such expanded powers over U.S. citizens.
• Element (a) is well supported: January 6 is repeatedly invoked in official strategies, hearings, and proposed legislation as the central rationale for more domestic‑terrorism focus, new units, and broader online monitoring.
• Element (b) is only partially true: agencies have expanded programs, reoriented resources, and built new analytic/surveillance units under existing law, but there has been no major, clearly new statutory grant of surveillance or domestic‑terrorism authority akin to the post‑9/11 Patriot Act. The biggest legislative vehicle (DTPA) failed.

Because the prediction ties those two parts together—asserting both that hysteria would be exploited and that this would lead to actually obtaining expanded powers over citizens—the outcome is mixed. Agencies clearly used January 6 to push for more authority and infrastructure, and they did expand some practices within existing law, but they have not secured the kind of sweeping new legal surveillance powers the wording implies.

Given that tension, the fairest overall judgment is ambiguous rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.