Phase 1 of Sacks’s scenario (the 2023 banking turmoil driven by bond losses) clearly happened and was already underway when he spoke: several U.S. regional banks including Silicon Valley Bank, Signature, and First Republic failed in March–May 2023, prompting a brief banking crisis that regulators largely contained rather than it evolving into a continuing systemic meltdown.【⁠cite⁠⁢turn0search13⁠⁠】

However, the subsequent phases he described have not unfolded as predicted within the “next couple of years” (roughly 2023–2025):

1. Commercial real estate (CRE) “major, deflationary crisis”

   • The office/CRE market has suffered a serious downturn: office values are estimated to have lost hundreds of billions of dollars since 2019, with national office vacancy rates around 20%, and office CMBS delinquencies near prior crisis peaks.【⁠cite⁠⁢turn0news18⁢turn1news13⁢turn1search5⁠⁠】
   • But major banks and regulators generally frame this as a contained but serious headwind, not a systemic financial crisis. Analyses from large banks and policy research argue that while CRE losses will pressure earnings—especially at regional banks—they are unlikely by themselves to trigger a broad banking collapse; Fed stress tests and regulatory guidance similarly see CRE as a key risk but not a system‑wide breaking point.【⁠cite⁠⁢turn1search3⁢turn1search8⁠⁠】
   • So far, we see a slow‑moving, sector‑specific downturn rather than the clearly identifiable second “phase” of a multi‑stage financial crisis that Sacks forecast.

2. Government/sovereign debt crisis causing renewed, high inflation via debt monetization

   • While public debt levels and interest costs in advanced economies (including the U.S.) have become a growing concern, mainstream assessments emphasize rising fiscal pressure and political risk—not an actual sovereign debt crisis or loss of market access in the U.S., euro area, or other major developed economies. Credit ratings for these countries remain investment‑grade, and commentary talks about the risk of a future spiral rather than a crisis that has already arrived.【⁠cite⁠⁢turn1news14⁢turn2search22⁠⁠】
   • At the same time, inflation has mostly fallen from its 2022 peak. U.S. inflation dropped from around 9% in mid‑2022 to roughly 2–3.5% in 2023–2025, as the Fed’s preferred PCE index and CPI both moved much closer to the 2% target before edging slightly higher again; this pattern reflects disinflation and modest above‑target inflation, not a new “highly inflationary” episode driven by explicit monetization of a sovereign debt crisis.【⁠cite⁠⁢turn2search21⁢turn2news14⁠⁠】

Because by late 2025 we have: (a) a contained post‑2023 banking episode rather than a rolling multi‑year crisis, (b) a severe but so far non‑systemic CRE slump, and (c) no realized government/sovereign debt crisis or inflationary debt monetization in major economies, Sacks’s specific three‑phase, “next couple of years” crisis roadmap has not materialized. The core multi‑phase prediction, including its implied timeline and inflationary endgame, is therefore best judged as wrong on the evidence available so far.