Sacks argued that after the March 2023 banking turmoil, the next shoe to drop would be a second, more serious phase of banking crisis centered on large unrealized losses and defaults in commercial real estate (CRE) loan portfolios.

What actually happened through late 2025:

• CRE has been a serious, but mostly chronic problem, not a new acute systemic crisis. Office and some retail properties have seen sharp value declines and rising delinquencies, and analysts routinely describe CRE as a “slow‑moving train wreck.” Regional and smaller banks, which hold the bulk of CRE loans, have faced mounting stress and rising non‑performing office loans.(reuters.com)
• Several individual regional banks were hit hard by CRE exposure, most prominently New York Community Bancorp, whose stock fell over 80%, required a $1 billion capital injection, and underwent restructuring after large CRE‑related losses.(apnews.com) A few other small/regional banks have failed or been seized, but these were limited in scale (e.g., Republic First) and not described by regulators as a system‑wide crisis.(wsj.com)
• System‑wide U.S. banking indicators, however, show resilience rather than a second, more severe crisis. The FDIC’s 2024 Risk Review (covering 2023) characterized the industry as having high net income, generally favorable asset quality, and a very low share of “problem banks” (~1.1% of all banks), even while flagging CRE—especially office and malls—as a key risk area.(bankingjournal.aba.com) By Q3 2025, FDIC data show U.S. banks’ net profits rising 13.5% year‑over‑year to about $79.3 billion, with overall past‑due loan rates below pre‑pandemic norms and only 57 problem banks, though CRE past‑dues are elevated.(reuters.com)
• Large banks continue to pass stringent stress tests that explicitly model big CRE shocks. In 2025, all 22 major U.S. banks passed the Federal Reserve stress tests, which included a scenario with a 30% drop in CRE prices, while remaining above regulatory capital minimums—evidence that, at least for large institutions, CRE distress is not pushing the system toward insolvency.(apnews.com)
• Global watchdogs (IMF, FSB) highlight a subset of vulnerable banks combining CRE exposure, unrealized bond losses, and fragile funding, but they describe the post‑2023 global and U.S. banking system as broadly stabilized, with risks needing monitoring rather than an ongoing new crisis.(reuters.com)

In other words, Sacks was directionally right that CRE would become a major pressure point and that stresses there were only beginning to show in early 2023. But his stronger version of the prediction—that this would manifest as a distinct, more serious follow‑on banking crisis for the U.S. financial system, worse than the March 2023 episode—has not materialized by late 2025. The outcome so far is elevated CRE stress, localized bank troubles and some failures, but a still‑profitable, well‑capitalized banking system rather than a second systemic meltdown.

On that basis, the prediction as normalized—a more serious second‑phase crisis centered on CRE loan losses—is best judged wrong given the evidence to date.