There is clear evidence both for and against Sachs’s prediction, so the overall judgment is mixed rather than definitively right or wrong.

Evidence consistent with the prediction (punishment in contested states):

• In Michigan’s 2022 governor race, Republican Tudor Dixon explicitly opposed abortion exceptions for rape and incest, saying her only exception was to save the mother’s life. She lost to Democratic Gov. Gretchen Whitmer by a wide margin at the same time Michigan voters passed Proposal 3, a constitutional amendment protecting abortion rights, by roughly 57–43%. Analysts explicitly link Dixon’s defeat to her hard‑line abortion position. (en.wikipedia.org)

• In Pennsylvania’s 2022 governor race, Republican Doug Mastriano supported a ban from conception with no exceptions for rape, incest, or even the mother’s life. He lost to Democrat Josh Shapiro by about 15 points in a swing state where the race had been expected to be closer; coverage repeatedly flagged his extreme abortion stance as part of his broader far‑right profile. (en.wikipedia.org)

• In Arizona’s 2022 Senate race, Republican Blake Masters backed a 15‑week ban with no rape or incest exceptions and supported a broad federal “personhood” law. Mark Kelly defeated him 51.4%–46.5%; post‑election analysis notes that Kelly heavily attacked Masters over abortion and that Masters’s stance hurt him, especially with women. (politifact.com)

• In Georgia’s 2022 Senate race, Herschel Walker repeatedly said there was “no exception” in his mind for abortion bans, before trying to walk that back later. He underperformed the more conventional anti‑abortion Republican governor Brian Kemp and ultimately lost the runoff to Raphael Warnock, even as Kemp was easily re‑elected—suggesting voters were less willing to back the more absolutist candidate. (washingtonpost.com)

• Voters also repeatedly rejected very restrictive abortion positions via statewide ballot measures: Kansas (a red state) defeated an anti‑abortion constitutional amendment 59–41 in August 2022; Kentucky voters rejected Amendment 2, which would have declared no state constitutional right to abortion; Michigan, Vermont, and California all voted to enshrine abortion protections; and in 2023, Ohio voters (in a Trump‑leaning state) adopted a constitutional amendment guaranteeing broad reproductive rights. These outcomes are widely interpreted as backlash against abortion bans and particularly against extreme or no‑exception policies. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Polling shows that rape and incest exceptions are overwhelmingly popular, with around 77–79% of Americans supporting legal abortion in those circumstances, underscoring why no‑exception positions are politically vulnerable in competitive environments. (poynter.org)

Taken together, these cases show that in a number of high‑profile, genuinely contested states and races, politicians or campaigns associated with bans lacking rape/incest exceptions either lost badly or saw their positions repudiated at the ballot box—very much in line with Sachs’s expectation about electoral punishment.

Evidence against the prediction (no clear punishment in many states):

• At the same time, many states have enacted or maintained bans with no rape/incest exceptions, and the politicians responsible have largely not been removed from office. Fact‑checking and policy reviews in 2022–23 found that roughly 15 states with new or impending strict abortion laws offered no exceptions for rape or incest (including Alabama, Missouri, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and others), and these bans largely remain in force. (politifact.com)

• Texas is a particularly important counterexample. The state implemented a six‑week “heartbeat” ban and then a near‑total ban that explicitly excludes rape and incest exceptions. Gov. Greg Abbott has publicly defended these laws and rejected adding such exceptions, yet he was re‑elected governor in 2022 by about 11 points. Reporting after the election noted that, despite broad public opposition to Texas’s near‑total ban, outrage over abortion access “didn’t translate into enough votes” to stop Republicans from sweeping statewide races—directly contradicting the idea that such politicians are reliably punished even where the policy is hotly contested. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Similar patterns exist in other deep‑red states like Tennessee, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Kentucky, where near‑total bans without rape/incest exceptions (or with extremely narrow, hard‑to‑use exceptions) have taken effect and Republican trifectas have remained intact, with no large‑scale electoral backlash sufficient to change party control. (en.wikipedia.org)

• In some cases, Republican politicians have responded not by being voted out but by moderating their rhetoric. For example, J.D. Vance initially compared abortion to slavery and questioned rape/incest exceptions, then later explicitly endorsed those exceptions while emphasizing that states should set their own rules—suggesting perceived electoral costs for hard‑line positions, but also that politicians can adapt and remain viable rather than simply being "punished" at the polls. (washingtonpost.com)

• Broad 2022 midterm analyses generally agree that Dobbs and abortion rights hurt Republicans overall and helped Democrats avoid a “red wave,” especially in swing states, but they also note that in strongly Republican states such as Texas, the same issue did not prevent GOP victories, even where the underlying policies were highly controversial. (theguardian.com)

Why the outcome is ambiguous:

Sachs framed his claim in general terms—“if the pro‑life side refuses to make compromises for, say, rape and incest, they’re going to be punished by voters in those states.” What we actually see is:

• In competitive or purple states and in direct statewide referenda, no‑exception or very hard‑line abortion positions have often been punished: candidates with such stances have lost major races, and restrictive measures have been defeated.
• In many deep‑red states where abortion is nevertheless intensely contested in public opinion and activism, politicians backing bans with no rape/incest exceptions have so far avoided serious electoral punishment and continue to govern under those laws.

Because significant real‑world evidence points in both directions, and because key terms like “states where abortion policy becomes contested” and “punished” are imprecise (does it mean losing any one race, losing control of state government, or simply facing public disapproval?), the overall verdict on the prediction can’t be cleanly labeled as simply correct or incorrect. The pattern is partially validating Sachs’s logic in swing contexts but clearly not universal, which makes the outcome best characterized as ambiguous.