Jason

As of November 30, 2025, the Epstein Files Transparency Act has only recently required the Department of Justice to release all unclassified Epstein-related records by around December 19, 2025, so the core “Epstein files” Jason is referring to have not yet been fully released or analyzed. (en.wikipedia.org) Existing official reviews by the DOJ and FBI, completed in mid‑2025, concluded that Epstein died by suicide and reported no evidence of a secret client list or blackmail operation; they did not present or confirm proof that he was an asset of any U.S. or foreign intelligence agency. (theguardian.com) Public discussion in 2024–2025 about possible Mossad, CIA, or other intelligence ties remains speculative and is explicitly denied by senior officials such as former Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett and by figures like Alan Dershowitz; analyses of these claims emphasize that no concrete documentary or witness evidence has yet substantiated them. (time.com) Because Jason’s prediction is specifically about what will be shown after the Epstein files are fully released and investigated—a process that has not yet occurred—and no authoritative findings currently confirm or definitively rule out intelligence-agency involvement, there is not enough information at this time to judge the prediction as either correct or incorrect.

As of the current date (November 30, 2025), the prediction concerns a period that has not yet begun: it specifically refers to Huawei’s domestically fabricated high-performance AI chips having a noticeable competitive impact between 2026 and 2027, especially as a lower-cost alternative that becomes a meaningful risk to Nvidia.

While Huawei has started developing and, in some cases, shipping more advanced domestically produced chips (e.g., for smartphones and some AI/5G workloads), the question in this prediction is explicitly about the 2026–2027 impact window and about high‑performance AI accelerators competing with Nvidia at scale. Since we are still in 2025, there is no way to determine yet whether Huawei’s 2026–2027 offerings will:

1. Reach performance levels relevant to the cutting edge of AI training/inference where Nvidia currently dominates; and
2. Achieve broad enough deployment and cost advantage to pose a meaningful new competitive risk to Nvidia during that 2026–2027 window.

Because that time period has not occurred yet, the prediction cannot be evaluated and is therefore too early to call.

It’s too early to evaluate this prediction.

The forecast explicitly concerns what will happen “over the next few years… through at least 2027” to:

1. Google’s core search advertising (overall growth, maintained dominance vs. ChatGPT/OpenAI), and
2. OpenAI’s relative position in the general-purpose AI assistant/model market (whether it loses leadership and share to Google, xAI, and Anthropic by 2027).

As of today (November 30, 2025), only about one week has passed since the podcast release date (November 22, 2025), and we have not yet reached the end of the stated evaluation window (sometime in 2027). Because the claim is about a multi‑year trajectory and end-state, it cannot be definitively judged now, regardless of any short-term signals.

Therefore the outcome is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Available evidence shows the prediction has been announced but not yet verifiably fulfilled as of 30 November 2025.

• In the 22 November 2025 episode “Epstein Files Fallout, Nvidia Risks, Burry's Bad Bet, Google's Breakthrough, Tether's Boom”, Jason explicitly says they are going to have exclusive YouTube content of the besties playing poker with “incredible professional poker players like Jason Koon, Alan Keating, and then I think Phil Hellmuth,” matching the normalized prediction. (cockatoo.com)
• The official All-In site’s description of Episode #252 states that the episode “concludes with a Vegas wrap-up and a tease for exclusive content,” again framing this poker material as future or teased content, not something already released. (allin.com)
• As of 30 November 2025, public indexes and episode/summary aggregators linked from the official site (Tapesearch, Podbay, iHeart, etc.) list recent All-In podcast and YouTube-linked episodes, including poker discussions and mentions of an All-In Poker Tournament, but none describe or link to a standalone All-In Podcast YouTube series or special showing the besties actually playing poker with Jason Koon, Alan Keating, and/or Phil Hellmuth. (tapesearch.com)
• Because direct crawling of YouTube channel pages is restricted, we can’t absolutely rule out that such a video has quietly been uploaded. However, given the prominence of the podcast and of those poker pros, one would reasonably expect some reflection of that release (descriptions, transcripts, blog posts, news blurbs, or episode cross-promotion) outside YouTube; none appears in current search results.

Since (a) the statement is explicitly about future content, (b) only about a week has elapsed since the tease, and (c) there is no independent evidence that the promised exclusive poker videos have been published yet, it is too early to definitively judge the prediction as right or wrong. Therefore the appropriate status is "inconclusive" (too early).

As of November 30, 2025, Zohran Mamdani has been elected but has not yet begun serving as mayor; he is officially the mayor-elect and is scheduled to take office on January 1, 2026. (en.wikipedia.org) Because his term has not started, it is not yet possible to evaluate whether he will fail to implement his major campaign promises or whether New York City will experience the "total, complete, utter chaos" described in the prediction.

As of November 30, 2025, the 2028 U.S. presidential election has not yet taken place. The election is scheduled for November 7, 2028, and is listed as ongoing / future in current references, with only prospective candidates and primary polling discussed, not an actual winner or governing platform. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the outcome and the eventual winner’s platform are unknown, it is too early to determine whether the prediction about the 2028 winner’s emphasis on both large-scale infrastructure/industrial investment and affordable housing is correct.

The prediction is explicitly about what will happen “over the coming years” starting from October 24, 2025, so only about five weeks of real time have passed—far too little to judge multi‑year migration and tax‑base effects.

Available data up to 2023–2024 show trends before the prediction, not what happens after it:

• New York State tax department migration tables show that millionaire address changes spiked in 2020 and then declined toward pre‑Covid rates by 2022–2023, suggesting no ongoing acceleration in high‑earner flight as of the latest official data. (tax.ny.gov)
• A July 2025 Fiscal Policy Institute analysis finds that the top 1% of New Yorkers increased in number between 2019 and 2022 and that high‑earner migration rates had largely returned to normal, with no statistically significant evidence that recent state tax hikes caused unusually high millionaire out‑migration. (fiscalpolicy.org)
• Other analyses highlight a longer‑run loss of income and residents from New York to states like Florida and Texas, and a shrinking share of U.S. millionaires in New York, which has already reduced potential tax revenue. However, these effects are measured over 2010–2022 or the past decade, not the post‑October‑2025 period the prediction refers to. (cbcny.org)

Because (1) the claim is about a future, multi‑year "exodus" driven by the current roughly 17% top combined income‑tax burden, and (2) there has not yet been enough time for new, post‑prediction migration/tax‑base data to be collected and analyzed, it is too early to determine whether Jason’s forecast will prove correct. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early) rather than right or wrong at this point.

An in‑person Trump–Xi meeting in South Korea did happen on October 30, 2025, in Busan, on the margins of the APEC South Korea summit. At that summit they agreed to cut the U.S. fentanyl‑linked tariff on Chinese imports from 20% to 10% (bringing overall duties on most Chinese goods down from about 57% to 47%) and for China to resume large U.S. soybean purchases and allow rare‑earth exports again. (apnews.com)

However, the deal was explicitly framed as a limited, one‑year truce rather than a comprehensive settlement. HSBC described it as a "one-year tactical trade truce" that temporarily reduces one specific tariff, pauses some reciprocal tariffs and shipping measures for a year, and suspends China’s new rare‑earth export controls for a year, while leaving fundamental disputes over tariffs, overcapacity, and tech export controls unresolved. (privatebanking.hsbc.com) Foreign Policy likewise called it a "framework trade agreement" that institutes a one‑year pause on further hostilities but leaves earlier, very high tariffs and other export controls largely in place. (foreignpolicy.com)

Analysts and reporters were clear that this was not a sweeping, structural reset of U.S.–China trade. The Washington Post characterized it as a trade truce that "avoids an open rupture" but mainly de‑escalates without solving core issues, noting that most tariffs remain and that the relationship is still drifting apart. (washingtonpost.com) The Foreign Exchanges newsletter was even more direct, writing that it "would be wrong to call this a comprehensive trade deal" because it barely touches the existing tariff wall and leaves structural problems untouched. (foreignexchanges.news)

Because the Busan summit produced a narrow, time‑limited truce and framework rather than the kind of comprehensive, "grand" trade deal the prediction envisioned, the prediction is best judged as wrong.

The prediction is explicitly open‑ended – “all those jobs are going away. It’s just a matter of when” – with no concrete time horizon. As of November 30, 2025, there is strong evidence that these roles still exist at large scale in the U.S., but that does not by itself falsify a claim that they will disappear eventually.

Evidence that the jobs still exist in large numbers (so they are not “gone” yet):

• Uber / DoorDash‑type driving: Uber reports 8.8 million drivers and couriers on its platform worldwide in Q2 2025, with U.S. rideshare drivers estimated at over 1 million, and total U.S. rideshare drivers (Uber + Lyft) around 1.7 million as of 2025. These numbers have been growing, not shrinking to zero. (grabon.com)
• Truck drivers: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports about 2.24 million heavy and tractor‑trailer truck driving jobs in 2024 and projects 4% employment growth from 2024–2034, roughly in line with average occupation growth. (bls.gov) This is inconsistent with near‑term elimination.
• Amazon warehouse/factory workers: Amazon’s total global workforce was about 1.5–1.6 million employees in 2024–2025, most in warehouse and logistics roles, and the company is investing heavily in robotics and AI while also continuing large‑scale human operations. (ft.com) Internal documents suggest a goal to automate ~600,000 U.S. warehouse jobs and 75% of operations by 2033, which implies gradual reduction rather than completed elimination today. (nypost.com)

Why the status of the prediction is inconclusive rather than wrong:

• The quote gives no deadline (e.g., “within 5 years”). It just asserts that these jobs will go away “over time” and that it’s “a matter of when.” That kind of unbounded forecast can’t be disproven only ~6 weeks after it was made.
• Available data show substantial current employment and even projected medium‑term growth for truck drivers, plus ongoing large workforces for rideshare and Amazon warehouses. That undermines any short‑term version of the claim, but is not enough to prove that long‑run elimination by automation and AI won’t happen.
• Because the horizon is undefined and we cannot yet observe the long‑run outcome, the correct assessment as of November 30, 2025 is that it’s too early to judge the prediction’s ultimate truth.

So, the prediction is not yet supported by current facts, but it also hasn’t been falsified, given its vague, long‑term wording. Hence the status: inconclusive (too early).

Public reporting shows that:

• A formal U.S.–China “deal” was in fact reached and announced in early November 2025. After the Oct. 30 Trump–Xi meeting in Busan, the White House released a fact sheet describing a trade pact under which China suspends new rare‑earth export controls and terminates investigations into U.S. semiconductor firms, while the U.S. rolls back or pauses certain tariffs and extends Section 301 exclusions. (straitstimes.com) Reuters subsequently referred to this as a broader U.S.–China trade agreement when reporting on the Nov. 26 extension of tariff exclusions. (reuters.com)

• However, all available descriptions of this deal limit it to trade, tariffs, export controls, and fentanyl‑related measures; they do not contain any new U.S.–China arrangement or jointly announced formula on Taiwan. Detailed summaries from the White House fact sheet and trade-focused analyses enumerate concessions on rare earths, critical minerals, tariff levels, and regulatory probes, but make no mention of Taiwan, strategic ambiguity, or any modification of U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act or the One‑China policy framework. (straitstimes.com)

• Separate coverage of U.S.–China interactions around the same period confirms Taiwan remains a point of contention, not an agreed subject of a new deal. In late October, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly said the U.S. would not change its Taiwan policy to secure a China trade agreement. (scmp.com) In a Nov. 24 phone call, Xi Jinping reiterated Beijing’s claim that Taiwan’s “return to China” is central to the post‑WWII order, but U.S. readouts did not announce any new U.S. stance or joint Taiwan language linked to the Busan trade pact. (reuters.com) Taiwan and Japan’s subsequent reactions likewise treat Taiwan as unresolved and increasingly tense, not as the subject of a newly agreed framework. (reuters.com)

Because the prediction specifically required that the China deal include “some new arrangement or statement affecting the Taiwan issue” (e.g., an updated/clarified form of strategic ambiguity), and the November 2025 U.S.–China agreement is, by all public accounts, a trade and export‑control deal with no new Taiwan component, the prediction did not come true as stated.

Polymarket’s market explicitly defined the event as: “Hamas releases all living Israeli hostages held in Gaza by October 31, 2025.” Hostage rescues were excluded; only voluntary release of living hostages counted. (polymarket.com)

On 13 October 2025, Hamas released the last 20 living Israeli hostages to the Red Cross/IDF under the Trump-brokered Gaza peace plan, as reported by ABC News, The Guardian, People, and other outlets, and summarized in reference entries for the Gaza war hostage crisis and specific hostages (e.g., Alon Ohel, Rom Braslavski, Bar Kupershtein). All of these sources state that by that date all remaining living hostages had been freed and returned to Israel alive. (abc.net.au)

Encyclopedic overviews of the ceasefire/hostage deal note that the last 20 living hostages were released on October 13, 2025, while the return of the bodies of deceased hostages lagged behind; as of late October and even November, some remains were still held in Gaza. These accounts clearly distinguish between “living hostages” and “bodies of slain hostages.” (britannica.com)

Polymarket’s own multi-date “Will Hamas release all Israeli hostages by…?” contract shows the October 31th line resolved as “Yes,” consistent with the fact that all living hostages had already been released well before the October 31 deadline. (polymarket.com)

Jason’s statement—paraphrased as Polymarket implying that by October 31, 2025, 100% of the remaining Israeli hostages (understood per the market rules as the remaining living hostages) would have been released and returned alive—matches what actually happened. Living hostages were all freed and back in Israel by October 13, and no credible reporting indicates any of them died before October 31. Therefore, under the interpretation used by Polymarket and contemporary reporting (which separates living hostages from the remains of the dead), the prediction is right.

The prediction concerns U.S. midterm elections that would follow the Trump administration’s then-current behavior. Given the podcast release date (October 10, 2025) and today’s date (November 30, 2025), the relevant midterm elections would be in November 2026. Those elections have not occurred yet, so it is not yet possible to determine whether Democrats will "shellac" Republicans in terms of congressional seat gains and popular vote. Therefore, the accuracy of this prediction cannot currently be evaluated.

Available public data don’t let us cleanly test Jason’s specific ratio (≈1/3 of deported people being self‑reported/self‑deported), and the government has not released the granular breakdown his prediction relies on.

Key points:

1. What we can see in official‑adjacent stats

   • The Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) reports 15,241 grants of voluntary departure in the 12 months ending Sept. 30, 2025, up from 8,663 the prior year.
   • Over roughly the same period, ICE states it carried out 319,980 deportations (Oct. 1, 2024–Sept. 20, 2025).(washingtonpost.com)
   • If you naively treat “voluntary departure” + “deportations” as the relevant universe, that would imply on the order of 4–5% of formal exits were via voluntary departure—not anywhere near Jason’s “about one‑third.” However, these figures mix months under Biden and Trump, and it’s unclear whether all voluntary‑departure cases are (or are not) counted inside ICE’s deportation total, so this is not a clean Trump‑term ratio.

2. Data needed to directly test his claim are missing

   • The Migration Policy Institute notes that DHS stopped releasing detailed ICE/CBP enforcement tables after November 2024, and that for FY 2025 only partial, aggregated estimates (e.g., ~340,000 ICE deportations) are available—without breakdowns showing what share involved people who “self‑reported” vs. were arrested in raids.(migrationpolicy.org)
   • A Heritage Foundation analysis of Trump’s 2025 deportation push points out that DHS is not currently producing or publishing the detailed immigration‑enforcement statistics needed to substantiate its own claims, and specifically notes that DHS has not shared any statistics on how many people have used the CBP Home app to self‑deport.(heritage.org)
   • Reporting based on AP/EOIR data says it is “impossible to know how many people left the U.S. voluntarily” since Trump took office because many leave without telling authorities, underscoring that self‑deportation numbers (and thus any precise fraction of deportees who self‑reported) cannot be reliably calculated.(washingtonpost.com)

3. Conflicting and opaque government messaging

   • A DHS press line cited by Heritage claims that 2 million people have left since Trump returned to office, with 1.6 million described as voluntary self‑deportations and more than 400,000 as deportations, implying a very high voluntary‑departure share among all exits—but this figure comes with no public underlying data and is criticized for inconsistency and lack of transparency.(heritage.org)
   • A secondary data aggregator similarly repeats that voluntary departures are around 38% of “total exits” under Trump, again working from DHS/ICE press numbers rather than detailed official tables, and without clarifying how “total exits” maps onto the narrower category of formal deportations Jason referenced.(theglobalstatistics.com)

Because:

• Official, disaggregated enforcement data for Trump’s current term (2025) have not been published in the level of detail needed;
• Independent analyses explicitly state it is impossible to know total voluntary/self‑deportations and that DHS has not provided CBP Home usage stats; and
• The limited stats we do see (EOIR voluntary departures vs. ICE deportations) suggest a share far below one‑third, but with definitional and timeframe mismatches,

we cannot definitively determine whether “about one‑third of those we deported self‑reported” is true or false based on verifiable statistics. The prediction therefore falls into the “ambiguous” category rather than clearly right or clearly wrong.

Evidence from late 2025 shows that Polymarket did, in fact, become legally available for real‑money trading to users in the United States during 2025, even if only in a limited beta.

Key points:

1. Regulatory green light in 2025

   • In September 2025, the CFTC issued a no‑action letter related to Polymarket’s US return via its acquired, CFTC‑licensed exchange QCX (rebranded as Polymarket US). This was publicly described by CEO Shayne Coplan as the “green light to go live in the USA.” (casinobeats.com)
   • In late November 2025, Polymarket obtained an Amended Order of Designation from the CFTC, explicitly authorizing it to operate an intermediated contract market in the US and to directly onboard US customers and brokerages. (yogonet.com) These actions establish that real‑money Polymarket trading by US users is legally permitted under US derivatives law.

2. Actual US trading (limited beta) with real money in 2025
   Multiple independent reports in November 2025 state that Polymarket reopened in the US in beta form, with real‑money event contracts available to a limited set of US users:

   • Yahoo Finance reported that Polymarket had begun live testing its US exchange, onboarding a slice of users and matching real trades as part of a limited rollout. (finance.yahoo.com)
   • Webopedia, LiveBitcoinNews, and ForkLog all describe a US beta relaunch where a restricted group of users is already placing real bets / trading live contracts on Polymarket US. (webopedia.com)
     These accounts confirm that by mid‑November 2025, some US‑based users were legally trading real‑money markets on Polymarket’s US platform.

3. Public rollout still pending but not required by the prediction
   Other coverage notes that as of late November 2025 the full public launch and broad consumer availability are still pending; US users going to the global site remain geoblocked and must wait for the dedicated US venue to fully open. (datawallet.com) However, the normalized prediction only requires that Polymarket “become legally available for real‑money trading by users in the United States sometime during calendar year 2025,” not that it be broadly or universally available.

Given that (a) US regulators explicitly cleared Polymarket’s US operation in 2025, and (b) a limited but real group of US users has been legally trading real‑money event contracts on Polymarket US during a beta in November 2025, the condition was satisfied within calendar year 2025. Therefore, Jason’s prediction resolves as right.

The prediction is about cumulative U.S. federal revenue from Trump-era tariffs "over the next decade" and explicitly references a 10‑year horizon after full implementation, i.e., through about 2035. As of today (November 30, 2025), that 10‑year period has not elapsed (2025 + 10 = 2035), so it is not yet possible to determine whether total tariff revenues will reach or exceed $1 trillion.

While we can look at interim tariff revenue data and forecasts, those do not logically settle a claim about totals by 2035. Therefore, the only defensible status at this time is that the prediction’s truth value is too early to call.

Jason’s prediction is tied to the Polymarket contract “Will tariffs generate >$250b in 2025?”, which resolves Yes if U.S. customs duties in fiscal year 2025 exceed $250 billion in the Treasury’s Financial Report of the United States Government for FY 2025, with a resolution deadline of February 28, 2026; otherwise it resolves No.【4view0】 As of November 30, 2025, this Polymarket market is still live and trading at about a 4% implied probability with no final outcome posted.【4view0】 The Treasury’s site currently provides projections and prior-year reports but not yet an FY 2025 Financial Report, so the official customs‑duties total for FY 2025 is not available.【5search0】 Interim reporting indicates tariff revenues have surged in 2025 (roughly $195 billion by October 2025), which is still below $250 billion and covers only part of the fiscal period referenced by the market.【0news16】 Because the reference contract has not resolved and the determining data are not yet published, Jason’s prediction cannot currently be evaluated and remains too early to call.【4view0】【3search0】

Evidence shows Jason’s logistics/timing prediction was accurate.

• Fourth All‑In Summit in Los Angeles soon after the recording. The episode “Inside the White House Tech Dinner, Weak Jobs Report, Tariffs Court Challenge, Google Wins Antitrust” is listed with a release date of September 7, 2025. That same day marked the start of All‑In Summit 2025 in Los Angeles, which ran September 7–9, 2025, at the Shrine Auditorium/LA, described as the 2025 All‑In Summit and part of the annual series that began in 2022 (making 2025 the fourth edition). (everand.com)
Since the summit began the day the episode was released, the “fourth edition” in Los Angeles did in fact occur immediately after the recording.

• Summit video/content released publicly within 1–2 weeks, including surprise/guest speakers.

• An All‑In Summit 2025 session with Energy Secretary Chris Wright was released as a podcast episode on September 8, 2025, one day after the summit began and within a day of its end; a separate page tracking the YouTube upload shows a publication timestamp of September 10, 2025. (everand.com)
• The summit debate episode “How to Save America: Mark Cuban and Tucker Carlson Debate | All‑In Summit 2025” was posted on September 9, 2025, i.e., during the summit and effectively within zero to two days of its close. (podbay.fm)
• Another high‑profile summit talk, “Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis on AI, Creativity, and a Golden Age of Science | All‑In Summit,” was released September 12, 2025, three days after the summit ended. (everand.com)
• Coverage of Solana founder Anatoly Yakovenko’s remarks notes that his All‑In Summit 2025 session appeared in a video “published to YouTube on Friday” September 19, 2025, ten days after the summit ended—still within the “one to two weeks after the event” window Jason mentioned. (cointelegraph.com)
• A media‑watch report from MRC Free Speech America on September 20, 2025 discusses YouTube age‑restricting multiple All‑In Summit 2025 interview videos on the All‑In channel, confirming that various summit sessions with prominent figures (including Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard) had been uploaded publicly by then. (mrcfreespeechamerica.org)

These releases show that substantial video and podcast content from All‑In Summit 2025—including sessions with high‑profile, not‑previously‑announced guests—was published over roughly September 8–19, 2025, i.e., within about 0–12 days after the summit ended, which fits Jason’s “over the next week or two after the event” description. Later uploads (e.g., some special sessions appearing at the end of September) do not contradict his statement, which was about the primary rollout window rather than the exclusive cutoff for all content.

Given that:

1. The fourth All‑In Summit in Los Angeles did in fact occur immediately after the recording, and
2. A wave of summit videos featuring marquee/“surprise” guests was released publicly within one to two weeks of the event,

the prediction is best categorized as right.

The prediction is that Founder University will expand to Asia such that the program operates in three cities starting in calendar year 2026. The current date is 2025-11-30, so 2026 has not begun yet. Because the prediction concerns operations during 2026, it is too early to determine whether it comes true, regardless of any current plans or announcements. Therefore the outcome is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Evidence strongly supports the core of Jason’s prediction— that Founder University, in partnership with Sanabil (not “Sonabel”), would run a program based in Riyadh starting in November 2025 — but there is no clear public evidence about him personally spending a full week there, so the prediction as normalized can’t be fully verified.

What’s confirmed

• Sanabil and Jason Calacanis’s firm LAUNCH announced “Sanabil Founder University by LAUNCH,” a 12‑week pre‑accelerator based in Riyadh for early‑stage founders. (zawya.com)
• Multiple independent outlets and the official press release state that the first cohort begins in November 2025 in Riyadh and that it is a Sanabil–LAUNCH/Founder University collaboration. (zawya.com)
• The official program site for Sanabil Founder University by LAUNCH lists “Cohort 1 – November 2025” and describes it as a 12‑week pre‑accelerator for MENA-based startups, with select in‑person sessions in Riyadh. (mena.launch.co)
• The published schedule shows in‑person “Day 1–3” programming in Riyadh from November 3–5, 2025, including talks and founder activities, with Jason Calacanis listed as a speaker on Day 1 (“Startups 101”) and Day 3 (founder pitches), indicating he is physically present on at least those days. (mena.launch.co)
• In his own announcement, Calacanis wrote that “On November 3rd, I’ll be on the ground in Riyadh to launch Sanabil Founder University by LAUNCH,” and invites founders to spend 12 weeks in the Kingdom, reinforcing that the program is indeed centered in Riyadh during that period. (linkedin.com)

What remains uncertain

• The normalized prediction adds the specific detail that this would be a “week-long” program in Riyadh and that Jason (“B”) would be “physically spending a week there.”
• Public materials consistently describe the initiative as a 12‑week program with a mix of virtual and in‑person components, not as a strictly “week‑long” program. (mena.launch.co)
• While the schedule and Calacanis’s own announcement confirm he is in Riyadh to launch the program and present on at least November 3 and 5, no reliable source specifies that he stayed for a full continuous week, nor do they frame the entire program as only a week long.

Because the partnership, location, and November 2025 timing are clearly correct, but the exact duration of his stay (a full week on the ground) is not verifiable from public sources, the overall prediction — as normalized with the “week‑long / week there” detail — is best classified as ambiguous rather than fully right or wrong.

Multiple independent sources confirm that the 2025 All-In Summit was held in person in Los Angeles over September 7–9, 2025, at the Shrine Auditorium and Expo Hall.

• The All-In website’s group sales page advertises “Los Angeles, CA | September 7-9, 2025” for All-In Summit 2025, clearly describing a live, in-person conference format with networking, keynotes, and on-site experiences. (allin.com)
• An event listing for “The All-In Summit 2025” notes the event “September 7 @ 8:00 am - September 9 @ 6:00 pm PDT” at the Shrine Auditorium and Expo Hall, Los Angeles, CA, and marks it as an in-person, already-completed event. (eventbrowse.com)
• A summarized history of the All-In Summit describes the 2025 summit as held in Los Angeles from September 7 to 9, following prior annual summits in 2022, 2023, and 2024—making 2025 the fourth annual summit. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Another listing for “All-In Summit 2025” likewise specifies Sept 7–9, 2025 at the Shrine Auditorium and Expo Hall in Los Angeles. (app.qwoted.com)

The prediction claimed that the fourth annual All-In Summit would be an in-person event in Los Angeles on September 8–9, 2025. In reality, the summit did occur in person in Los Angeles and ran September 7–9, so the dates September 8–9 were indeed core days within the actual event. Since the only discrepancy is that the event also included September 7 (which does not contradict the claim that it would be held on the 8th and 9th), the prediction is best judged as right rather than wrong on a technicality.

Multiple independent post‑meeting summaries report that at its September 16–17, 2025 FOMC meeting, the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds target range by 25 basis points, from 4.25%–4.50% to 4.00%–4.25%. TD Wealth notes that “The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduced the federal funds rate by 25 basis points (bps), lowering the target range to 4.00%-4.25%.” (td.com) A banking industry update likewise states that “the FOMC changed its benchmark rate range from 4.25%-4.50% to 4.00%-4.25%.” (pcbb.com) Macroeconomic analyses from FXStreet and FocusEconomics both describe the same September decision as a 25 bps rate cut to a 4.00%–4.25% range. (fxstreet.com) Another institutional note confirms that “the Federal Reserve cut the fed funds target range by 25 bps… to 4.00%–4.25%.” (capitaladvisors.com) Since Jason predicted on August 29, 2025 that “there’s going to be a rate cut in September,” and the Fed did in fact cut rates at the September 2025 FOMC meeting, the prediction is right.

Multiple sources reporting on the September 17, 2025 FOMC decision show that the Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds target range from 4.25%–4.50% to 4.00%–4.25%, a cut of 25 basis points. (cbsnews.com) This was explicitly described as the first rate cut since December 2024 and is tied to the September 16–17, 2025 FOMC meeting noted in the Fed’s own calendar and subsequent minutes. (federalreserve.gov) That outcome matches Jason’s prediction that “The Federal Reserve will reduce its policy rate by 25 basis points at the September 2025 FOMC meeting.”

The normalized prediction claims that from 2025 onward, Germany and the broader EU will permanently cease purchasing Russian oil.

• Germany: Evidence indicates Germany halted Russian crude oil imports at the start of 2023 and has not resumed them. Statista data show Germany has imported “almost no” Russian crude oil in the last two years up to December 2024, and German officials have stated that the country no longer relies on direct Russian energy imports.(statista.com) As of late 2025 there are no reports of Germany restarting Russian oil purchases, so Germany alone is consistent with the prediction so far.

• European Union as a whole:

  • The EU sharply reduced but did not end Russian oil imports. A European Parliament briefing (Nov 20, 2025) notes that Russian crude oil fell from 27% of EU crude imports in 2021 to 3% in 2024, and it outlines a roadmap to end Russian oil imports only by the end of 2027, implying ongoing imports into 2025.(europarl.europa.eu)
  • Statista data show the EU still imported about 710,000 metric tons of oil and petroleum products from Russia in August 2024.(statista.com)
  • Shipping analysis for April 2025 finds that the EU still received about 6% of Russia’s seaborne crude exports, with Novorossiysk a major port for shipments to the EU, confirming continued purchases in 2025.(bssc.pl)
  • As late as November 28, 2025, AP reports that Hungary, an EU member state, “continued reliance on Russian oil and gas” and had secured exemptions allowing it to maintain energy imports from Russia.(apnews.com)

Because at least one EU member (and thus the EU as a bloc) is still importing Russian oil after the prediction date, the claim that the EU would, from 2025 onward, permanently stop buying Russian oil is already false. Even though we cannot yet evaluate “never” in an absolute sense, the condition that no EU oil purchases from Russia occur from 2025 onward is clearly not met.

Since the normalized prediction is about Germany and the broader EU, and the EU part has been falsified, the overall prediction is wrong.

As of 30 November 2025, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is still ongoing, with major missile and drone attacks continuing and no announced, formal Russia–Ukraine peace treaty or ceasefire agreement in place, despite multiple U.S.-brokered negotiation attempts. (reuters.com) Jason’s forecast was about the probability (roughly 50%) that Trump would secure such a deal at some point during his current 2025–2029 term; since that term is far from over and the prediction was explicitly probabilistic rather than a categorical claim, it cannot yet be evaluated as clearly right or wrong.

The prediction concerns “the next major U.S. election cycle after August 2025” and claims that real wage growth / stagnant wages vs. rising costs will become a central, compelling campaign issue for at least one major party or prominent candidate.

As of November 30, 2025, the next clearly major election cycle is the 2026 midterm elections (and beyond that, the 2028 presidential cycle). The 2026 cycle has only just begun to take shape; candidate fields, party platforms, and dominant themes are still emerging and will evolve through 2026. While there is ongoing coverage of inflation, cost of living, and wages across U.S. politics and media, it is too early to determine whether real wage growth specifically will crystallize as a central campaign plank for a major party or marquee candidate in the 2026 (or 2028) cycle.

Given the timing relative to the prediction horizon, there is not yet enough evidence to conclusively say the prediction is right or wrong, so the correct evaluation is that it is still pending.

Jason’s prediction was that “in the next five years” there would be roughly $1–2 trillion deployed into AI-related data centers. The episode aired on August 9, 2025, and the quote in transcript form clearly frames this as a five‑year forward-looking claim about cumulative investment.(speakai.co)

As of the current date (November 30, 2025), less than one year of that five‑year window (Aug 2025–Aug 2030) has elapsed, so the actual 5‑year cumulative spend is not yet known. Existing figures and reports are mainly forecasts, not realized totals. For example, Dell’Oro Group and others project that AI-related data center and infrastructure capex over the next several years will exceed $1 trillion, and some estimates (e.g., Brookfield, McKinsey) put AI data center or compute-related capex in the multi-trillion-dollar range by 2030, suggesting Jason’s order-of-magnitude estimate is plausible or even conservative.(prnewswire.com) But because these are projections rather than final, realized numbers, we cannot yet say whether the world actually did invest $1–2 trillion in AI data centers during the full five-year period he specified.

Therefore, the prediction’s correctness cannot currently be determined and is inconclusive (too early).

What the prediction required
Normalized: If the Fed cuts rates by about 50 bps sometime in Sept–Nov 2025, then U.S. CPI inflation will subsequently rise back to 3.0–3.9% year‑over‑year (a “3‑handle”) within the following months.

What actually happened so far

1. Fed policy in Sept–Nov 2025
   The FOMC cut the target federal funds range by 25 bps on September 17, 2025 (to 4.00–4.25%) and again by 25 bps on October 29, 2025 (to 3.75–4.00%). That’s a cumulative 50‑basis‑point cut within the Sept–Nov window, so the condition (“if the Fed cuts ~50 bps in Sept–Nov”) has been met. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Inflation behavior around that time

   • CPI year‑over‑year was 2.7% in June and July 2025. (bls.gov)
   • It then rose to 2.9% in August 2025. (bls.gov)
   • The September 2025 CPI report (released October 24) shows the all‑items CPI up 3.0% year‑over‑year, i.e., already a “3‑handle.” (bls.gov)

   So by September, inflation had risen back to 3.0%.

3. Data gap after the full 50 bps of cuts
   The last 25‑bp cut that completes the “~50 bps” path occurred on October 29, 2025. The months “subsequent” to that are November 2025 onward. However, because of the October–November 2025 government shutdown, the October CPI was not collected and will not be released, and the November CPI report (which will partly impute October) has not yet been published as of November 30, 2025. (reuters.com)
   That means we do not yet have any CPI data for a month that is clearly after the full 50‑bp cut path is in place.

Why the prediction is labeled ‘inconclusive’

• The antecedent (“Fed cuts ~50 bps in Sept–Nov”) is satisfied: 25 bps in September + 25 bps in October. (en.wikipedia.org)
• We do see CPI at 3.0% in September, which matches the “three‑handle” level Jason talked about. But that 3.0% reading:
  • Largely reflects price movements before the October 29 cut, and
  • Occurs when only half of the eventual 50‑bp Sept–Nov easing (the Sept 17 cut) had taken place.
• The normalized version of the prediction you provided, however, specifies that CPI will “subsequently rise back” to 3–3.9% after the roughly 50‑bp easing in the Sept–Nov window. To test that strictly, we must look at months after the full 50‑bp path is in effect (i.e., November 2025 and beyond). Because of the data shutdown and normal release lag, those CPI figures are not yet available as of November 30, 2025. (reuters.com)

Given this, we can’t yet say—on the basis of actually released post‑cut data—whether “after the ~50‑bp cuts” inflation is at 3–3.9%. His general intuition that inflation would get back to a 3‑handle is already borne out by the September print, but the specific conditional, as normalized (tied to the full Sept–Nov 50‑bp easing), cannot yet be definitively judged.

Hence the verdict: "inconclusive" (too early to fully evaluate), with the caveat that the available data so far are directionally consistent with his claim.

There isn’t enough verifiable information on how quickly 2025 All‑In Summit scholarship applications were processed to judge Jason’s claim.

What we can see:

• The public scholarship links used in mid‑ and late‑2025 episodes (e.g., via the bit.ly URL in the show notes) just redirect to an application page that is not accessible through open web archives; none of the mirrored episode descriptions mention a specific response-time promise.(listennotes.com)
• The best third‑party description of the 2025 scholarships—Vanity Fair’s long piece on the 2025 All‑In Summit—confirms the existence and structure of the paid “scholarship application” passes (around $1,500) but does not describe how fast applicants heard back or whether decisions typically came within a week.(vanityfair.com)
• Historical user reports from earlier years (2023–2024) on Reddit show multiple people saying they applied for All‑In Summit scholarships and either had not heard back at all months later or were still waiting without any clear timeline, which cuts against a consistent one‑week turnaround in those years.(reddit.com) However, those anecdotes pre‑date the 2025 process Jason was talking about and don’t prove that 2025 timelines were the same.
• For a different All‑In event (the 2025 Holiday Party), their own event page only says scholarship applications are “reviewed on a rolling basis,” with no commitment to a one‑week SLA, suggesting they generally avoid promising a specific turnaround publicly.(accelevents.com)

Because there’s no reliable, aggregated data on 2025 scholarship response times—and only scattered, older anecdotes that point in different directions—we can’t confidently say whether applicants in 2025 “typically” heard back within a week. The prediction therefore can’t be judged definitively as right or wrong with the evidence currently available.

As of November 30, 2025, it is too early to determine whether the entire remaining term through January 2029 will be primarily defined by AI, crypto, immigration, and tariffs.

Evidence so far does show these four areas are central early priorities:

• AI: Trump signed Executive Order 14179, “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” on January 23, 2025, revoking prior AI rules and ordering an AI Action Plan to keep U.S. leadership in AI.(en.wikipedia.org) Subsequent speeches and a detailed AI Action Plan, along with draft and proposed orders to preempt state AI regulation, show AI is a marquee policy area.(reuters.com)
• Crypto: The administration created a Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets and floated a U.S. cryptocurrency reserve (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, XRP, Cardano, etc.) as part of a push to make the U.S. the “Crypto Capital of the World.”(en.wikipedia.org) This places crypto clearly among the signature economic-tech initiatives.
• Immigration: Trump’s first‑day Executive Order 14159, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion,” aggressively tightened immigration enforcement, including expanded expedited removal and penalties for undocumented immigrants.(en.wikipedia.org) Congress also passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, massively increasing funding for border security, detention capacity, and deportations through 2029, underscoring immigration as a core agenda item.(en.wikipedia.org)
• Tariffs / Trade: The administration’s second‑term trade framework, the Mar‑a‑Lago Accord, centers on broad tariffs, currency policy, and reworking trade relationships to shrink U.S. trade deficits, with tariffs explicitly a key tool.(en.wikipedia.org) New and proposed tariffs are already affecting sectors like AI hardware and data‑center construction.(foreignpolicy.com)

However, the prediction is about how the whole term “is going to be earmarked” and what will be most important “for the next three and a half years.” Only about ten months of that period have elapsed by November 30, 2025. Other unforeseen issues (e.g., foreign crises, economic shocks, domestic unrest) could still emerge and overshadow these priorities. Because the full 3.5‑year horizon has not yet passed, the prediction cannot be definitively classified as right or wrong, even though early evidence is consistent with it.

Therefore the status is inconclusive (too early to fully evaluate).

As of November 30, 2025, we are before the prediction’s deadline of August 2027. The claim was that the major copyright/AI‑training lawsuits pending as of August 2025 (e.g., against OpenAI and similar companies) would be settled or otherwise finally resolved within 1–2 years, i.e., by August 2027.

Even if some individual cases have progressed or settled already, the prediction is explicitly about what will have happened by that future date, not by today. Since that date has not yet arrived, we cannot know whether all or even most of the “major lawsuits” will ultimately fit his description.

Because the time window for the prediction has not expired, its accuracy cannot yet be evaluated. Therefore the correct status is inconclusive (too early).

The prediction hinges on whether future AI–publisher content-licensing deals, on average, exceed the ~$20M/year level of the cited New York Times deal.

1. Baseline deal (~$20–25M/year)
In late July 2025, reporting revealed that Amazon’s multiyear AI licensing deal with The New York Times is worth $20–25 million per year, allowing Amazon to train its AI models and surface NYT content in products like Alexa. This is the specific deal and order of magnitude the podcast referred to as the starting point.【2news12】【2search3】

2. Pre‑existing context already spans well above and below $20M/year
Before this NYT–Amazon disclosure, major media–AI deals already covered a wide value range, including:

• OpenAI–News Corp: reported $250M+ over five years (≈$50M/year) for access to WSJ, NY Post, and other News Corp outlets.【0search10】【0search9】
• Google–Reddit: about $60M per year for content used in AI and search.【0search3】
• Several other OpenAI publisher deals (Axel Springer, Financial Times, Dotdash Meredith, etc.) where only partial or rough figures (often “tens of millions” total or $5–10M/year ranges) are public.【0search3】【0search10】
  This shows that even before the NYT–Amazon benchmark, deal sizes were not uniformly trending around $20M/year; they ranged both above and below it.

3. Post–Aug 1, 2025 deals rarely disclose comparable dollar amounts
After the podcast (Aug 1, 2025) and up to Nov 30, 2025, there are new AI–publisher arrangements, but their effective annual economics are not disclosed:

• Gannett (USA TODAY Network) – Perplexity: strategic AI content-licensing deal plus ad‑revenue share; no dollar figures given.【5search1】【5search3】【5search8】
• Perplexity’s Comet Plus model: a $42.5M initial revenue pool to be shared across participating publishers, with plans to grow over time—again, a pool and rev‑share, not clear per‑publisher annual license numbers.【5news12】
• People Inc. (formerly Dotdash Meredith) – Microsoft and Gannett – Microsoft: participation in Microsoft’s new Publisher Content Marketplace, a pay‑per‑use / marketplace model rather than a disclosed fixed yearly check.【3news13】【3news14】【3search1】【3search3】【3search8】
  None of these provide transparent, per‑year dollar figures comparable to the NYT–Amazon arrangement.

4. Why the prediction can’t be scored yet
Jason’s claim is about a future trend in average dollar values for similar AI–major‑publisher licensing deals relative to the ~$20M/year NYT benchmark. To test that, we’d need:

• A meaningful set of post‑July‑2025 deals of similar type (AI company ↔ major publisher), and
• Clear, per‑deal financial disclosures so we can compare whether the average annualized value is rising or falling.

As of Nov 30, 2025:

• Only a few months have elapsed since the baseline NYT–Amazon numbers became public.
• Most subsequent AI–publisher deals either don’t disclose dollar values or use rev‑share/marketplace structures whose realized annual payouts aren’t yet known or reported.
• There is no robust data set from which to compute or qualitatively assess an “average” trend above or below $20M/year.

Because of the short time horizon and the lack of sufficient, comparable post‑baseline deal data, we cannot determine whether the average value of such deals is actually trending up or down relative to the ~$20M/year benchmark. The prediction therefore remains too early to evaluate, not clearly right or wrong.

• Was there a qualifying Fed cut?
  – After Q2 2025, the Fed held the funds rate at 4.25%–4.50% in May, June, and July 2025.(investopedia.com)
  – The first cut after that was on September 17, 2025, when the FOMC reduced the target range by 25 bps to 4.00%–4.25%, its first rate cut since December 2024.(uk.finance.yahoo.com)
  This matches the “first Fed interest‑rate cut following this discussion (post–Q2 2025)” condition.

• Immediate market reaction (“the second they cut”):
  – Around the announcement and projections, the Dow jumped as much as ~+1% intraday, the S&P 500 flipped from red to green, and the Russell 2000 (small caps/risk assets) briefly surged over 2% before paring gains.(finance.yahoo.com)
  – By the close that day, the move had partly faded: Dow finished about +0.5–0.6%, S&P 500 –0.1%, Nasdaq –0.3%, while the Russell 2000 held a small gain.(finance.yahoo.com)
  So intraday there was a clear, fast, upside spike—especially in the Dow and small‑cap/risk assets—even though it did not all hold into the close.

• Very short‑term follow‑through:
  – On September 18, 2025 (the next session), four major U.S. equity benchmarks (S&P 500, Dow, Nasdaq 100, Russell 2000) all closed at all‑time highs together, with the Russell 2000 up ~2.5%, described as a surge in risk‑on sentiment “after the Federal Reserve delivered its first interest‑rate cut this year and signaled more ahead.”(bloomberg.com)
  – Pre‑market that morning, futures for the S&P 500 and Nasdaq were already up roughly 0.8%–1.1%, and coverage explicitly linked record‑level opens to the prior day’s Fed cut.(actionnewsjax.com)

• Assessment vs. the prediction:
  Jason’s claim was that “the market will rip the second they cut that,” i.e., that the first cut would trigger a sharp, immediate risk‑asset rally.
  – There was an instantaneous pop right after the cut (Dow ~+1%, Russell 2000 >+2% intraday, S&P flipping positive) and then a broad, record‑setting rally within one trading day directly attributed in coverage to that first cut and the signal of more easing.(apnews.com)
  – While the initial “rip” partially faded by the close of the announcement day and was not uniformly strong across every index at settlement, the overall pattern—sudden upside spike in key indices and risk assets followed by record highs immediately afterward—is consistent with his directional, qualitative prediction.

Given that the first post–Q2 2025 rate cut did coincide with a rapid, noticeable upside move in major equity indices and risk assets in the immediate aftermath and into the next session, the prediction is best judged as right (even if the intraday move was volatile and not all of it stuck into the first day’s close).

Elon Musk did in fact announce and brand a new political organization as the America/American Party in early July 2025, after running a large poll on X and declaring, “Today, the America Party is formed to give you back your freedom.”(investing.com) Subsequent reporting and polling confirm that the party exists as a named political project, although its formal structure and filings have been halting and limited.(axios.com)

However, Jason Calacanis’s prediction is about a private reference class: roughly half of his “top 10–20 close friends in his ‘friend list’” supposedly joining or publicly supporting that party. There is no public, authoritative list of who Jason considers to be in this specific inner-circle “friend list,” and media coverage does not enumerate such a group in a way that can be matched against America Party supporters.

Press coverage of the America Party names a handful of prominent backers or participants—e.g., Vaibhav Taneja as party treasurer and encouragement/support from figures like Mark Cuban and Anthony Scaramucci(timesofindia.indiatimes.com)—but these sources do not identify them as members of Jason Calacanis’s own top 10–20 friends. Other coverage only quotes Jason offering strategic advice about how Elon should use America PAC; it does not indicate that Calacanis himself or his close friends have formally joined or endorsed the party in a way that could be tallied against his “friend list.”(ktik.com)

Because:

1. The composition of Jason Calacanis’s “top 10–20 close friends in his friend list” is not publicly specified or verifiable, and
2. There is no comprehensive, public accounting of which of those specific individuals have “joined or publicly supported” Musk’s America Party,

there is no reliable way to quantify the fraction of that group that has done so, now or in the future. Even though the party has been announced and discussed, the prediction cannot be measured against available evidence.

Therefore, the correct classification is "ambiguous": it cannot be determined from public information whether the prediction proved right or wrong.

Multiple contemporaneous reports and legislative records show that the “Big Beautiful Bill” (formally the One Big Beautiful Bill Act) passed the House in its final reconciled form on July 3, 2025, and was signed into law by President Donald Trump on July 4, 2025.(en.wikipedia.org) This matches Jason’s prediction that the bill would pass the House and be signed into law by Trump by July 4, 2025, so the prediction was correct.

According to the Federal Reserve’s official implementation note for the September 17, 2025 FOMC meeting, the Committee directed the Desk to maintain the federal funds rate in a new target range of 4.00% to 4.25%, down from the prior 4.25% to 4.50%, i.e., a 25‑basis‑point cut to the federal funds rate. (federalreserve.gov)

Independent coverage from economic and financial news outlets confirms that on September 17, 2025, the Jerome Powell–led FOMC cut the benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 4.00%–4.25%, and that this was the first rate cut since December 2024. (realtor.com)

The prediction was that in September 2025, Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve would implement a 25‑basis‑point cut to the federal funds rate. The actual outcome matches this exactly in both timing (September 2025) and magnitude (25 bps), with Powell still serving as Fed Chair at that meeting. (livemint.com)

The prediction is explicitly about “the next several years (on the order of five years)” after the podcast release on 21 June 2025. That implies a horizon out to roughly mid‑2030.

As of today (30 November 2025), only about 5 months have elapsed—far short of the multi‑year timeframe. While we can inspect early data (e.g., Microsoft’s FY 2025 results and any recent headcount or layoff announcements) to see directionally what’s happening, those partial trends cannot reliably confirm or falsify a five‑year operational prediction.

Because the specified time window has not yet passed, and nothing in the current data makes the prediction logically impossible to achieve by 2030, the only defensible assessment is that it is too early to know whether Jason’s prediction about strong revenue growth with roughly flat headcount (~250k ±10%)—and thus much higher revenue per employee—will ultimately be right or wrong.

The GENIUS Act is a U.S. stablecoin-regulation bill that passed the Senate on June 17, 2025, then went to the House.

Official legislative histories and news coverage show that the U.S. House of Representatives passed the GENIUS Act on July 17, 2025, and President Trump signed it into law on July 18, 2025. (en.wikipedia.org)

Since the podcast episode was released on June 21, 2025, the bill cleared the House less than a month later—well within a reasonable interpretation of “very quickly” in congressional terms. Therefore, Jason’s prediction that the referenced crypto bill (the GENIUS Act) would pass the House in the near term was borne out by events.

The prediction window is roughly 10 years from the podcast’s release on May 31, 2025, i.e., until around May 31, 2035. As of today (November 30, 2025), we are only about 6 months into that 10‑year period.

Current data show that the occupation of taxi/cab driver is still substantial:

• The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports about 204,000 taxi drivers in 2024 and actually projects 11% employment growth for taxi drivers from 2024 to 2034, not disappearance.(bls.gov)
• Broader counts that include taxi, shuttle drivers, and chauffeurs show hundreds of thousands of workers and projected overall growth of about 9% through 2034.(bls.gov)
• Industry statistics and business‑count datasets show thousands of taxi service businesses operating in the U.S. as of late 2025.(poidata.io)

Robotaxis are growing but from a very small base: estimates put the total number of active robotaxis in the U.S. at around 1,000 vehicles in early–mid 2025, versus well over 150,000–200,000 human taxi drivers.(eprnews.com) This demonstrates early disruption but nowhere near elimination of the occupation.

However, the prediction is explicitly about conditions around 2035, and we are still nearly a decade away. The present evidence (continued employment and even projected growth for taxi drivers through 2034) suggests the forecast may be overly pessimistic about the survival of the job, but it is still logically possible that policy, technology, and market dynamics over the next 9–10 years could change the trajectory.

Because the deadline has not arrived yet, the correct status is that it is too early to declare the prediction right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, OpenAI and Jony Ive have not yet fully revealed or shipped their consumer AI hardware device; only prototypes and high‑level descriptions have been discussed publicly, with launch timing pushed to 2026 or later. (theverge.com)

Leaked internal details reported by MacRumors (from a staff call reviewed by The Wall Street Journal) say the device will not be glasses and is instead a "third core device" that sits in your pocket or on your desk, not a phone and not something worn on the body. (macrumors.com) Subsequent court filings by OpenAI hardware chief Tang Tan, summarized by MacRumors and India Today, go further and state that the first product "is not an in‑ear device, nor a wearable device" and is at least a year away from being sold. (macrumors.com) That language strongly contradicts a pendant or smart‑glasses form factor.

However, because the final consumer device has not yet been launched or formally unveiled with its definitive form factor, there is still a theoretical chance that plans change before release. The available evidence today points against Jason’s pendant/glasses prediction, but since the decisive event (the ultimate public reveal of the shipping product) has not occurred yet, the outcome must be scored as **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right or wrong.

The prediction is defined over the window from the podcast date (May 9, 2025) through the end of 2026, so there is still more than a year left in the forecast horizon as of November 30, 2025.

Evidence so far:

• The All-In team has run a major 200–500 person F1‑linked live event in Miami, with a live show at the Fontainebleau and trackside experiences over the 2025 Miami Grand Prix weekend. However, this is the reference event Jason is talking about ("run it back"), not an "additional" one after the prediction was made.(allin.com)
• After that episode, their public events and live productions include:
  • A series of “All-In Live from Miami” episodes and the Nico Rosberg "All-In Live from Miami" show, but those are recordings from the same F1 Miami live activation, not clearly separate 200–500 person events tied to a different major sporting event.(pod.wave.co)
  • An "All-In Live from Austin" taping (episode 245, April 3, 2025), which is a live show but not obviously tied to a major sporting event like F1 Austin, the Super Bowl, or the NBA Finals.(metacast.app)
  • Large non‑sports live events in San Francisco: the 2024 All-In Holiday Spectacular at the Palace of Fine Arts and the upcoming All-In Holiday Party on December 6, 2025. These are marketed as live show + afterparty experiences with casino games, DJs, etc., but they are holiday/Community events, not linked to a concurrent major sports event.(allin.com)
• The current events page and recent episode summaries on allin.com list the Holiday Party but do not advertise any additional live events tied to F1 Austin, F1 Las Vegas, the Super Bowl, or the NBA Finals (or similar), nor do they document that a Vegas or other live taping was explicitly structured as part of a major sporting event.(allin.com)

Because:

1. the prediction’s deadline (end of 2026) has not passed, and
2. there is no clear, documented post‑May‑9‑2025 live event tied to another major sporting event that would lock the prediction in as already true, we cannot classify it as either definitively right or wrong yet. The correct status as of November 30, 2025 is "inconclusive" (too early to tell).

Multiple independent sources confirm that the 2025 All-In Summit (the fourth summit after 2022, 2023, and 2024) was held as a physical, in‑person conference in Los Angeles from September 7–9, 2025. An event listing describes “The All-In Summit 2025” at the Shrine Auditorium and Expo Hall in Los Angeles running from September 7 to September 9, 2025, with on‑site programming, food, and networking, which clearly indicates an in‑person format. (eventbrowse.com) A wrap‑up video posted by IREN thanks the All-In Summit team for “a spectacular three days” connecting with business and technology leaders, further confirming that the event actually took place as an on‑site gathering. (iren.com) The All-In podcast’s own history (via a summary article) states that the 2025 summit was held in Los Angeles from September 7 to 9, listing it as the next annual summit after the 2022, 2023, and 2024 events—making it the fourth All-In Summit. (en.wikipedia.org) Together, these sources show that Jason’s prediction—that the fourth All-In Summit would be an in‑person event in Los Angeles on September 7–9, 2025—came true.

The prediction was that within 1–2 years Google/Alphabet would (a) make significant headcount reductions and (b) push a broad return‑to‑office (RTO) regime, framed as part of a more serious, AI‑driven corporate strategy.

1. Significant headcount reductions tied to AI
Since early 2025—after the podcast’s May 2025 release—Google has conducted multiple rounds of layoffs, cutting hundreds of roles across its Global Business Organization and its Pixel, Android, Chrome, Cloud, and related platforms-and-devices units, explicitly described as part of restructuring and automation and as reallocating resources toward AI work. (timesofindia.indiatimes.com)
In addition, about four weeks ago Google offered voluntary buyouts to roughly 7,500 employees across Google and YouTube, explicitly described as an adaptation to fast‑moving AI developments and regulatory pressure—an unmistakably “large” headcount reduction program at Alphabet’s scale. (sfchronicle.com)
Other reporting notes targeted cuts of AI contractors and continued trimming in 2025, again framed as part of Google’s AI strategy. (aimmediahouse.com) This satisfies the “large number of employees”/significant headcount reduction component of the prediction well within the 1–2‑year window.

2. Broad return‑to‑office push
In 2025 Google tightened on‑site requirements beyond the already‑existing hybrid policy. Multiple reports describe remote employees living within about 50 miles of a Google office being told to start working at least three days a week in‑office or accept a voluntary exit package / risk job loss, affecting major units such as Search, Ads, Commerce, Marketing, Research, and Core Engineering. (businesstoday.in)
Later in 2025, Google further restricted its “Work From Anywhere” policy so that even a single remote day in a week counts as a full week from the limited WFA allowance, while warning non‑compliant employees about potential disciplinary action. (fortune.com)
These moves don’t change the headline “three‑days‑in‑office hybrid” rule (which pre‑dated 2025) but do represent a broad, company‑level tightening and enforcement of RTO—especially for previously approved fully‑remote employees—consistent with “get people to return back to office.”

3. Explicitly framed as part of an AI‑driven competitive push
Across these actions, Alphabet leadership repeatedly frames both cost‑cutting and workplace changes as necessary to compete in AI:

• Coverage of 2025 layoffs and reorganizations explicitly says Google is eliminating jobs and reshaping divisions to channel funds into AI research and generative‑AI products. (businesstoday.in)
• Pichai and senior executives, in all‑hands meetings and public filings, stress that Google must drive higher productivity, be “more AI‑savvy,” and invest tens of billions more in AI/datacenter capex while keeping overall costs in check. (cnbc.com)
• The 7,500‑person buyout program is explicitly linked to adapting to fast‑moving AI developments. (sfchronicle.com)

Taken together, by late 2025 Google has already done what the prediction described: sizable headcount reductions plus a materially stricter, widely applied RTO stance, both justified as part of a more serious, company‑wide effort to respond to AI competition. Because these conditions are already met well before the upper bound of “mid‑2027,” the prediction is best scored as right rather than merely “inconclusive.”

Historical price data for Uber Technologies, Inc. (ticker: UBER) show that after the podcast release on May 2, 2025, the stock did in fact rise above $88 per share.

• Macrotrends reports that Uber’s all‑time high closing price was $100.10 on October 6, 2025, and that the 2025 intrayear high was $100.10, both well above $88. (macrotrends.net)
• StatMuse’s month‑by‑month table for UBER shows that in May 2025 the stock reached a monthly high of $93.60, and in subsequent months (June through October 2025) hit highs in the mid‑90s to just above $101, all clearly exceeding $88. (statmuse.com)

Because the prediction only required that Uber stock "break 88" at some point in the future (with no time limit), and the stock has since traded well above $88, the prediction is right.

Metadata for The Great Tariff Debate with David Sacks, Larry Summers, and Ezra Klein shows it released on April 11, 2025.(allin.onpodcastai.com) The next regular All-In episode, Trump vs Harvard, Nvidia export controls, how DEI killed Hollywood with Tim Dillon, is listed across multiple podcast directories as releasing on April 19, 2025—eight days later.(allin.onpodcastai.com) Jason’s statement “We’ll see you all next week” was normalized as a prediction that a new episode would come out approximately one week later (around April 18, 2025). An episode did in fact come out in that approximate one‑week window (the very next weekend), so the prediction is best judged as having come true.

As of now (late November 2025), the next scheduled U.S. midterm elections will take place in November 2026, and those elections have not yet occurred. Therefore, we cannot yet know whether Republicans will lose them, regardless of what immigration or deportation policies the Trump administration pursues. Since the outcome event in the prediction (the 2026 midterms) is still in the future, the prediction cannot be evaluated and remains too early to call.

Key point: the evaluation date (November 2025) is before the predicted event date (November 2026), so the truth value of the prediction is not yet observable.

Alphabet announced its agreement to acquire Wiz for about $32 billion on March 18, 2025, its largest deal ever and the biggest cybersecurity M&A transaction to date. (investopedia.com) Analysts at the time explicitly framed the deal as a key test and potential catalyst for a new wave of Big Tech and cybersecurity M&A, saying it could “open the door to a massive wave of M&A across the tech landscape.” (spglobal.com) In the subsequent quarter, U.S. venture-backed exits surged: PitchBook/NVCA data show Q2 2025 exit value of about $67.7 billion — the highest quarterly level since 2021 and roughly 70–76% higher year over year — with IPOs and acquisitions both contributing. (tailwindventures.co) That rebound was driven by multiple large liquidity events, including major IPOs such as CoreWeave (the largest U.S. tech IPO since 2021) and later offerings like Circle and Voyager, alongside a 61% increase in total U.S. IPO count versus the same point in 2024. (cnbc.com) Although the recovery is still incomplete and causality cannot be pinned solely on the Wiz deal, the near-term period after the announcement did in fact see a clear, widely noted pickup in large IPOs and exits from a very depressed base, matching the substantive outcome Jason predicted when he called the Wiz acquisition a “starter’s pistol” for venture and tech liquidity.

Public reporting shows Wiz at roughly $700M in ARR around the time of Google’s acquisition announcement in March 2025, with multiple sources saying it is projected or on track to reach about $1B in ARR by the end of 2025, but none confirming that the $1B ARR milestone has actually been achieved as of late November 2025.

• TechCrunch reported that Wiz was at about $700M in ARR in March 2025 and was “on track to double last year’s annual recurring revenue to $1 billion.” (techcrunch.com)
• Forbes likewise estimated Wiz’s ARR at “over $700 million” at the time of the $32B deal and discussed valuation multiples based on that figure, not on an already‑achieved $1B. (forbes.com)
• Other coverage (CRN, MarketWatch, Business Insider, Techpression, etc.) consistently describes Wiz as having about $500M ARR in 2024 and aiming or expected to cross $1B in ARR in 2025, again phrased as a forecast rather than a completed milestone. (crn.com)
• Reference-style summaries (e.g., Wikipedia) only document ARR milestones up to 2024 (e.g., ~$350M ARR in early 2024), with no update stating that Wiz has reached $1B ARR yet. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because (a) the prediction is about calendar year 2025 and the year is not yet over as of November 30, 2025, and (b) no reliable public source confirms that Wiz has already hit ~$1B in ARR, we cannot presently determine whether the prediction ultimately proves correct or not. It remains too early to call based on available evidence.

As of November 30, 2025, the Federal Reserve has carried out two 25-basis-point cuts in 2025: one at the September FOMC meeting, which lowered the target range from 4.25–4.50% to 4.00–4.25%, and a second at the October 28–29 meeting, which further reduced the range to 3.75–4.00%. (cmegroup.com) That leaves the federal funds rate at roughly 4% going into the final scheduled 2025 meeting in December. (medium.com) However, markets and forecasters currently assign a significant probability to an additional 25-basis-point cut at that December meeting, and the Fed has not yet made that decision. (financialcontent.com) Because the prediction concerns the outcome by year-end 2025 (both the total number of cuts and the ending rate level), and the final meeting has not occurred yet, it is too early to say definitively whether there will be exactly two cuts and a year-end rate around 4%. Therefore, the prediction’s accuracy is still inconclusive at this time.

As of November 30, 2025, Jason Calacanis has not run for U.S. president. Current biographical and media references describe him as an entrepreneur, angel investor, and podcaster, including co‑hosting the All-In podcast and This Week in Startups, with no mention of any presidential candidacy or official campaign organization.(en.wikipedia.org) He has been politically active mainly as an endorser and donor, for example backing Dean Phillips’s 2024 presidential campaign, but only in a supporter role rather than as a candidate himself.(en.wikipedia.org) In interview settings he has spoken hypothetically about what his platform would be "when I run for president," including a plan to build new tech cities, but these statements remain speculative and are not tied to an actual campaign filing or declared run.(podscripts.co) Because the prediction is explicitly conditional on Calacanis ever running for president, and that condition has not occurred yet, there is no way to determine whether his actual housing platform would match the detailed scenario described. Therefore, the accuracy of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated.

Available biographical and entertainment coverage of Andrew Schulz through late 2025 consistently notes that he and his wife Emma have one child, daughter Shiloh Jean, born in February 2024, with no mention anywhere of additional children.

Examples:

• Recent profiles and interviews describe Schulz as a father to a baby girl or daughter (singular), conceived via IVF, with no reference to more kids.
• Multiple biographical pieces and features on Emma Turner likewise state that the couple "welcomed their first child" Shiloh in February 2024 and do not report any second or third child as of 2025.
• A current encyclopedia-style entry lists one daughter, Shiloh Jean, born February 2024, and does not list any other children.(en.wikipedia.org)

The prediction, however, is that Schulz will go on to have a second and third child at some point in the future. That is an open‑ended, forward‑looking claim. As of November 30, 2025, it has not come true (he still has only one publicly known child), but it also has not been falsified, because more children could still be born later.

Because the claim is about an event that could still occur in the future and there is no way yet to know whether it ultimately will or won’t happen, the correct status is **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than “right” or “wrong.”

Episode metadata and show notes for “Tariffs, Trump's Economic Endgame, Market Chaos, Bitcoin Reserve, CoreWeave IPO” (All-In Podcast, ~2h06m) show that in the latter part of the same episode, David Sacks joins Jason and then speaks through multiple dedicated segments:

• At 1:37:34, “David Sacks joins Jason to break down the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and Digital Asset Stockpile,” explicitly focusing on the Bitcoin/crypto reserve policy.
• At 1:48:30, “Sacks addresses clearing all of his crypto-related positions prior to Inauguration Day.”
• At 1:57:23, they continue with “Importance of disclosures and updates on a market structure bill,” still with Sacks participating.

These segments are all in the second half of the episode (after ~1h37m in a ~2h+ show) and involve Sacks commenting at length on exactly the crypto reserve announcement and related topics. This matches Jason’s prediction that Sacks would appear in the second half and “have much to say” about those issues.

Evidence of these segments and timestamps appears consistently across multiple episode listings and summaries for this specific show, all naming David Sacks and the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve / Digital Asset Stockpile discussion in the later part of the same episode. (iheart.com)

As of November 30, 2025, it is far too early to know whether Stripe’s main business will be managing roughly $300B of stablecoin float and earning $10–20B per year by around 2030. The timeline of the prediction is ~5 years after the March 2025 episode, so the target date (~2030) has not yet arrived. In the meantime, Stripe has launched stablecoin-based financial accounts in over 100 countries and supports USDC and its own USDB stablecoin, and has processed on the order of $100M in USDC transfers—far below a $300B float. (cointelegraph.com) The entire stablecoin market only recently surpassed about $300B in total supply across all issuers, further underscoring that there is still significant runway before we could evaluate whether Stripe alone reaches that scale. (axios.com) Because the forecast horizon has not elapsed and current data neither confirms nor definitively rules out the scenario, the prediction must be judged as inconclusive for now.

The forecast horizon (“by the end of 2025”) has not finished yet, and available reporting only covers developments through late November 2025.

What we do know so far:

• Early in 2025, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick repeatedly claimed that 1,000 Gold Cards had been sold in a single day, but fact‑checks and later reporting emphasized that there was no evidence any visas had actually been issued or even could be, because the legal and administrative framework was not in place.(snopes.com)
• As of early May 2025, VisaVerge reported that “not a single Gold Card has been sold or issued,” despite Lutnick’s public remarks.(visaverge.com)
• When Trump cut the price from $5M to $1M and signed the Gold Card executive order in September 2025, mainstream coverage (e.g., CNBC and CBS) still described the program as being in an “implementation phase,” with no way for applicants to actually apply yet and no cards issued.(cnbc.com)
• By mid–November 2025, immigration law firms and consultancies (Fragomen; Colombo & Hurd; NPZ Law Group; VisaVerge) report that:
  • The draft USCIS petition form (I‑140G) has only just been sent to OMB for review.
  • Agencies are racing to meet a December 18, 2025 implementation deadline.
  • The Gold Card program is still not open for applications yet; key details and the Commerce application step are pending.(fragomen.com)

This strongly implies that, as of late November 2025, zero Trump Gold Cards have actually been sold/issued, and even optimistic prediction markets expect at most a handful of sales in 2025.(visaverge.com) However, because:

• The program’s formal launch is targeted for December 18, 2025, which is after the latest detailed public reports, and
• We do not yet have data on how many, if any, Gold Cards will actually be approved and issued between that launch date and December 31, 2025,

we cannot conclusively state the final 2025 total. Jason’s >5,000‑sold prediction therefore cannot yet be judged definitively right or wrong based on the information currently available.

Hence the outcome is “inconclusive (too early)”, even though existing evidence and market expectations point toward the final number likely being far below 5,000.

As of November 30, 2025, there is no evidence that the U.S. government has already sold about 75% of its unused or underutilized office real-estate footprint, nor even clear, comprehensive data on what share of that excess space has been or will be disposed of. GAO still lists federal real property management as a long‑standing “high‑risk” area, emphasizing persistent underutilization and the continued difficulty of disposing of unneeded buildings, even after new 2024–2025 measures to improve utilization and streamline disposals. (files.gao.gov) Recent legislation and policy—such as extending the Public Buildings Reform Board to 2026 and directing GSA to recommend more sales—anticipate that agencies will shed “millions of square feet” over coming years, but that is a forward‑looking expectation rather than a completed outcome, and it does not quantify any 75% reduction of the existing surplus. (federalnewsnetwork.com) GSA has announced only incremental steps (for example, putting eight more buildings, about 1.5 million square feet, into its sale/disposal process in late 2024), which are significant but small relative to the total federal office portfolio and to GAO’s description of the scale of underused space. (federalnewsnetwork.com) In 2025, the administration also floated lists of several hundred “non‑core” federal buildings (over 440 in one version) as potential sale candidates, but those lists have been revised or withdrawn and refer to contemplated disposals, not completed divestitures, and still do not map cleanly to “75% of currently unused/underutilized office space” as defined in the prediction. (wired.com) Because (1) the prediction uses an open‑ended “will ultimately” time horizon, and (2) available public data do not yet document either success or failure relative to the specific 75% target, there is not enough information at this time to judge the prediction as clearly right or wrong. It remains unresolved rather than disproven, so the most accurate rating is ambiguous.

The prediction is about "the coming years" (a multi‑year horizon) and claims that:

1. U.S. labor productivity will continue to increase.
2. The rate of productivity growth will be further boosted by AI and related software tools.

As of November 30, 2025, less than one year has passed since the prediction (February 21, 2025). That is far too short to evaluate a multi‑year trend or to reliably attribute any observed productivity changes specifically to AI and new software tools, as opposed to business cycles, capital investment, or measurement issues. Productivity trends are typically assessed over several years.

Preliminary data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that nonfarm business labor productivity has indeed risen over the last decade and has shown some recent quarters of strong growth, but economists are still debating the permanence of this uptick and the extent to which AI is the driver. These early signals are not enough to declare that a durable, AI‑driven acceleration in productivity growth has been established.

Because the timeframe the predictor specified (“coming years”) has not yet elapsed and any causal impact of AI on trend productivity growth cannot yet be robustly established, the correct classification is “inconclusive (too early)”.

As of late 2025, Stripe has not completed an initial public offering and remains a privately held company; multiple recent overviews of the company and its anticipated IPO explicitly note that there is still no IPO date or SEC filing and that Stripe is not yet publicly traded. (fool.com)

Jason’s prediction was that “Stripe’s going public in 2050”, interpreted as a specific future IPO year. Because:

• 2050 is still in the future relative to today (November 30, 2025), and
• Stripe has not yet gone public in any other year (which would clearly falsify the 2050-specific prediction),

we can’t yet determine whether Stripe will in fact IPO in 2050 or at some other time (or never). Thus, the accuracy of the prediction cannot currently be evaluated and is best labeled inconclusive (too early to tell).

Evidence shows that the core elements of Jason’s prediction did occur:

• The All-In team hosted “All-In Live: Austin” on Thursday, March 13 at the Rollins Studio Theatre at The Long Center in Austin, TX, with doors at 5pm and show at 6pm, followed by an “All-In SXSW Reception” at Arena Hall with open bar, food trucks, poker, music, and networking—i.e., a casual party with food and drinks for attendees. (allin.com) SXSW 2025 ran March 7–15 in Austin, so March 13 is within the festival window. (timeout.com)
• The venue (Rollins Studio Theatre) seats roughly 80–229 people depending on configuration, aligning with Jason’s description of an intimate event with “a couple hundred seats.” (nowplayingaustin.com)
• The live show was released as the episode “All-In Live from Austin: Colin and Samir, Chris Williamson, and Bryan Johnson.” The episode description and transcript confirm Jason Calacanis and David Friedberg hosting live from Austin, with segments explicitly focused on the creator economy, media evolution, YouTube’s influence, content strategies, and business models for creatives—substantially matching “the future of media and building businesses in this new media ecosystem.” (allin.onpodcastai.com) The transcript opens with: “Friedberg and Jason are live from Austin!” and notes they “wanted to do something around this sort of new media creator economy,” which closely mirrors Jason’s on-air framing in the earlier episode. (audioscrape.com)
• A tweet (archived via TwiCopy) from the official This Week in Startups account recaps “The All-In Podcast LIVE @ SXSW”, explicitly naming @jason, Chamath Palihapitiya, and david friedberg on stage with guests Bryan Johnson, Colin & Samir, and Chris Williamson, and mentions a “room full of fans,” corroborating that the live SXSW-affiliated show with Jason and Friedberg did in fact occur and drew a sizable audience. (twicopy.com)

We do not have direct documentation confirming the $30 application fee via allin.com/events, but the main factual components Jason predicted—being in Austin for SXSW on March 13, Jason and Friedberg co-hosting live interviews focused on media/business, and an intimate event with food and drinks for a few hundred people—are all borne out by the available sources. Therefore, the prediction is best classified as right.

Jason makes the prediction near the end of the Feb. 21, 2025 episode “The Stablecoin Future, Milei's Memecoin, DOGE for the DoD, Grok 3, Why Stripe Stays Private,” saying about Friedberg’s upcoming Celebrity Jeopardy! appearance: “We are going to do a recap of every single question.” (happyscribe.com)

Friedberg’s Celebrity Jeopardy! episode then airs the following week (ABC’s Celebrity Jeopardy! for Wednesday, Feb. 26, 2025, discussed in Jeopardy forums and coverage of that game with Ana Navarro and David Friedberg). (reddit.com)

After it airs, the All-In hosts do return to the topic in the Mar. 1, 2025 episode “Epstein Files Flop, State of the Market, Autonomous Robots, Trump's Gold Card, Friedberg on Jeopardy,” which has a segment explicitly titled “Friedberg recaps his experience on Celebrity Jeopardy!” from 4:40–14:22. (podscripts.co) However, the transcript of that segment shows they:

• Play and react to a few highlight clues (e.g., the African geography Daily Double about Mount Kilimanjaro and the Hoosiers sports-movie Daily Double),
• Talk about his nerves, buzzer timing strategy, preparation, and the charity payout,
• Then move on to the next topic around the 14:22 mark.

They do not systematically walk through each clue from the game or attempt a question‑by‑question recap; only a handful of specific questions are mentioned before the conversation shifts to other subjects. (podscripts.co)

Search across later episode descriptions and transcript indices for the All-In feed shows no separate episode or extended segment where they later go back and cover every question from Friedberg’s Jeopardy game—this Mar. 1 recap is the only substantial Jeopardy-focused segment. (everand.com)

Since the follow-up content is a general highlight/experience recap and not a comprehensive, question-by-question rundown of the entire episode, Jason’s prediction that they would “do a recap of every single question” did not come true.

The prediction has a 10‑year horizon ("in the next ten years"). From the podcast release on 15 February 2025, that implies outcomes by roughly 2035, while today is 30 November 2025—less than one year into the window.

To evaluate it fully, we would need to know by ~2035 whether:

1. The U.S. lost millions of driving‑related jobs (truck drivers, delivery drivers, taxi/TNC drivers, etc.) primarily due to AI/self‑driving technologies, and
2. That labor‑market shift caused U.S. immigration policy to become more restrictive, with fewer people allowed to immigrate.

As of late 2025:

• Human driving jobs remain widespread; self‑driving tech is being piloted and deployed in limited commercial settings, but there is no evidence yet of multi‑million‑person job loss attributable to it at national scale.
• U.S. immigration levels and policies in 2024–2025 are shaped mainly by politics, border enforcement debates, and legislative/executive actions, not by documented large‑scale displacement of drivers.

Because the specified 10‑year period has not remotely elapsed, the prediction cannot yet be judged right or wrong, even if early indicators are modest. It is therefore too early to evaluate.

As of November 30, 2025, the key pieces of Jason’s prediction have not resolved in a way that lets us clearly mark it right or wrong.

1. NYT v. OpenAI decisive loss + injunctions (given 5–10% probability)

   • The New York Times’ copyright lawsuit against OpenAI and Microsoft is still ongoing. In April 2025, Judge Sidney Stein allowed the core copyright claims by the Times and other newspapers to proceed while dismissing some other claims; this was a procedural ruling, not a final judgment on the merits, and no broad injunctions on OpenAI’s practices have been issued. (apnews.com)
   • Docket activity from October–November 2025 shows the parties still litigating discovery disputes, with no final liability ruling or settlement recorded. (dockets.justia.com)
   • Because the case is unresolved and no “decisive win with injunctions” has occurred (nor been ruled out), we can’t evaluate whether assigning a 5–10% probability was well‑calibrated. Probabilistic forecasts of ongoing events generally can’t be scored until the outcome is known.

2. Industry endgame: Napster→Spotify-style regime with 50–66% revenue share to rightsholders

   • Since early 2024, OpenAI and other AI companies have signed a series of licensing deals with major publishers (e.g., Axel Springer, Dotdash Meredith, News Corp, TIME, Financial Times, Vox, Le Monde, Prisa, Reuters). These deals involve lump‑sum or relatively modest annual payments, not a dominant share of AI providers’ total revenue. For example, reporting on OpenAI’s Axel Springer and Dotdash Meredith deals suggests figures on the order of $10–16 million per year, amounting to roughly ~1% or less of those publishers’ revenues and an even smaller fraction of OpenAI’s. (niemanlab.org)
   • Other arrangements, like Perplexity’s plan to share some advertising revenue with publishers whose content is cited, are still early-stage and framed as incremental revenue streams rather than a Spotify‑style commitment of half or more of platform revenue. (techcrunch.com)
   • Meanwhile, OpenAI’s major revenue‑sharing obligation is to Microsoft (around 20% of OpenAI revenue under their partnership, with discussion of reducing this over time), not to content rightsholders. (reuters.com)
   • The broader legal and business landscape for AI copyright (including suits by authors, music labels, and news organizations) remains in flux, with some settlements (e.g., in AI music) and many cases still active. (apnews.com)

Overall, while there is clear movement toward more licensing and some revenue sharing, nothing like a stable, Napster→Spotify-style regime where large, especially closed-source, AI model providers pay 50–66% of their revenue to content rightsholders has emerged by late 2025. At the same time, the ultimate structure of the market and the final outcomes of key lawsuits (including NYT v. OpenAI) are still undecided. Because both the specific legal outcome and the long‑run industry structure Jason is predicting are unresolved, the fairest status is **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than clearly right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, only about ten months have passed since the prediction, which referred to changes happening “over the next several years,” so the full time horizon has not elapsed. Current evidence is mixed: on one hand, proprietary frontier‑model companies remain extremely valuable and clearly not “worth nothing.” OpenAI completed a secondary share sale in 2025 valuing it at around $500B, and reporting indicates that sale closed in October 2025 at that valuation. (cnbc.com) Anthropic has raised successive multi‑billion‑dollar rounds, with valuations climbing from about $61.5B in March 2025 to roughly $183B by September 2025, alongside rapidly growing run‑rate revenue and hundreds of thousands of business customers, which strongly suggests investors still view its proprietary models as highly differentiated assets. (anthropic.com) On the other hand, there is very rapid progress and adoption of powerful open or open‑weight models: Meta’s Llama 3 and later the 405B‑parameter Llama 3.1 are released under relatively permissive licenses, positioned as “open” models and advertised as competitive with leading proprietary systems on many benchmarks. (techcrunch.com) DeepSeek‑R1 and related Chinese open models are fully open‑source (e.g., MIT‑licensed), show reasoning performance competitive with GPT‑4‑class models on math, medical, and other benchmarks, and are distributed via GitHub and Hugging Face at low or zero license cost, contributing to a surge in downloads of “open” models where China now slightly leads the U.S. (arxiv.org) Meanwhile, commoditized access to models via cloud APIs is growing, but the market behavior doesn’t yet look like pure undifferentiated commodity infrastructure: AWS Bedrock, for example, has faced AI capacity shortages that pushed customers to rivals, indicating that access to top‑tier model capacity remains scarce, and leading vendors like OpenAI and Anthropic still command premium per‑token prices for their highest‑end models compared with cheaper, lower‑tier offerings. (businessinsider.com) Taken together, this suggests that Jason’s strong present‑tense claim in early 2025 (that frontier LLMs have already been “proven” to be worthless as proprietary assets and are all headed to open‑source/commodity status) is not supported by current facts; however, because his normalized prediction is explicitly about what will happen over several years, it is too early to determine definitively whether the longer‑run commoditization he describes will ultimately occur, so the prediction must be rated as inconclusive at this time.

Available evidence shows Jason’s quantitative scenario has already failed and cannot be salvaged, even though Trump’s second term is not over.

1. Baseline of ~$1B/day and goal of >$3B/day
   DOGE’s official X account and sympathetic coverage in January 2025 said it was already “saving the Federal Government approx. $1 billion/day” and explicitly framed > $3 billion/day as a future target, not an achieved rate.(foxbusiness.com) There is no later official DOGE communication or mainstream report indicating that DOGE ever claimed to have reached a sustained $3B/day savings rate.

2. Actual and claimed totals are far below what 3B/day for years would imply
   To get roughly $60,000 in implied benefit for a family of five, Jason was implicitly extrapolating something like $3B/day over most of a 4‑year term, i.e., on the order of $4+ trillion in total savings/claims (about $13k+ per person, or ~$65k for five people).
   By contrast, DOGE’s own official Savings page listed $214B in estimated savings as of October 4, 2025, with an “amount saved per taxpayer” of $1,329.19.(doge.gov) Even if you simply scale that per‑taxpayer figure by five, you get under $7,000 for a family of five—roughly an order of magnitude below the ~$60,000 Jason projected, and that’s after most of 2025 when DOGE was active.

Independent and semi‑official analyses are even less generous. A Reuters deep dive in May 2025 found that while DOGE claimed roughly $175B in savings, the actually observable reduction in agency spending over comparable periods was only about $19B, i.e., roughly half of one percent of federal outlays—nowhere near multi‑trillion‑dollar territory.(reuters.com) The Wikipedia summary of Trump’s second‑term economic policy similarly notes that Elon Musk revised DOGE’s goal down from $2T to about $150B in savings and that, by April 2025, DOGE was claiming a bit over $160B, with much of that offset by the costs of mass layoffs and disruptions.(en.wikipedia.org) None of these trajectories point toward trillions in claimed savings.

3. DOGE has already been dissolved, foreclosing a later catch‑up to 3B/day
   DOGE was created by Trump’s executive order as a temporary organization within the Executive Office of the President, with a mandate initially running into mid‑2026.(en.wikipedia.org) But in late November 2025, multiple outlets reported that DOGE had been quietly disbanded about eight months ahead of schedule; its functions were partly absorbed by the Office of Personnel Management.(theguardian.com) Reuters and others describe it as no longer functioning as a central entity.(reuters.com) Once the department itself has been shuttered, it can no longer ramp up to or sustain a new $3B/day claimed savings rate over the remainder of Trump’s term.

4. Macro indicators contradict the idea of large net savings
   Separate analyses of federal fiscal data show that, despite DOGE’s rhetoric, overall federal spending and debt continued to rise, with spending in early 2025 running notably higher than under the prior administration.(marketwatch.com) While Jason only talked about claimed savings, the fact that neither DOGE’s official tallies nor macro‑level fiscal aggregates ever approach the multi‑trillion‑dollar scale implied by his back‑of‑the‑envelope math reinforces that his scenario did not materialize.

Putting it together: DOGE peaked at a (contested) claim of about $1B/day and a few hundred billion in total claimed savings before being shut down; it never reached or sustained $3B/day, and the cumulative implied benefit per family of five is an order of magnitude below the ~$60k Jason projected. With DOGE now dissolved, there is no realistic path for the original prediction to become true. Therefore this prediction is wrong.

Available reporting shows:

• On January 20–21, 2025, President Trump issued blanket clemency for roughly 1,500 January 6 defendants and commuted the sentences of 14 named leaders of the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers (including Enrique Tarrio, Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, Zachary Rehl, Dominic Pezzola, Stewart Rhodes, Kelly Meggs, Jessica Watkins, Roberto Minuta, etc.).(whitehouse.gov)
• Since their release, prominent Proud Boys and Oath Keepers figures have been very active publicly (press conferences, CPAC, lawsuits against DOJ, appearances at court hearings), but there is no credible reporting of any of them carrying out a major new violent plot or attack comparable to or worse than their original January 6 conduct.
  • Enrique Tarrio was briefly arrested near the Capitol for a simple assault allegation (striking a protester’s phone and arm) after CPAC; prosecutors later declined to pursue the case. This is far less severe than his prior role organizing seditious conspiracy around January 6.(apnews.com)
  • Stewart Rhodes returned to Capitol Hill and has engaged in political advocacy after his commutation, but reporting describes speech and lobbying activity, not new acts of violence.(apnews.com)
• By contrast, other pardoned January 6 rioters (not identified as Proud Boys or Oath Keepers members) have committed serious new crimes after clemency, including:
  • Edward Kelley, pardoned for his Jan. 6 offenses, later convicted and sentenced to life in prison for plotting to bomb an FBI office and assassinate dozens of law‑enforcement officers.(en.wikipedia.org)
  • Christopher Moynihan, a pardoned rioter, arrested in October 2025 for terroristic threats after allegedly plotting to assassinate House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries.(apnews.com)
  • A broader pattern of reoffending among pardoned Jan. 6 participants (gun charges, deadly DUI, child‑sex crimes, etc.) is documented in overviews of the pardon cohort.(en.wikipedia.org)

However, the specific, normalized prediction you gave is narrower: that members of the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers who were involved in January 6 and later pardoned or released would, in the coming years, commit future acts of violence worse than their January 6 conduct.

As of November 30, 2025:

• There is some post‑clemency misconduct by a key Proud Boys leader (Tarrio’s minor alleged assault), but nothing documented that is more serious than his or other leaders’ original roles in organizing or executing the Capitol attack.
• There are no reported new violent plots or attacks by the pardoned/commuted Oath Keepers or Proud Boys leaders comparable to seditious conspiracy and the organized violence of January 6 itself.
• Only about 10 months have passed since their release, and the prediction explicitly speaks of events occurring over “the coming years,” so the relevant time window has likely not fully played out.

Because (a) the condition that Proud Boys/Oath Keepers members commit worse violence has not yet been met, and (b) there is still substantial time left in the forecast horizon, the evidence is not sufficient either to confirm or to falsify the prediction at this point.

So the fairest classification is: inconclusive (too early).

As of November 30, 2025, Manhattan’s congestion pricing program is in effect at $9 for most passenger vehicles with E‑ZPass entering at or below 60th Street during peak hours, and it is explicitly scheduled by the MTA to rise to $12 in 2028 and $15 in 2031 under a phased‑in structure (60% of the ultimate toll from 2025–27, 80% from 2028–30, and 100% from 2031 onward).(ny1.com) Those future increases have not yet occurred, and although there have been federal attempts to rescind approval of the program, New York officials are litigating and tolls are still being collected "until further notice," so it is not yet logically ruled out that the announced schedule will be followed.(reuters.com) Because the key dates (2028 and 2031) lie in the future and no definitive policy reversal has made the forecast impossible, the prediction cannot yet be judged as right or wrong.

Evidence shows that what Jason described actually happened over inauguration weekend.

1. In the closing “programming note” of the Jan 18, 2025 episode Red-pilled Billionaires, LA Fire Update, Newsom's Price Caps, TikTok Ban, Jobless MBAs, Jason says the besties will all be at inauguration parties that weekend and that they will do “live episodes” of the All-In Podcast on Sunday/Monday, telling listeners to subscribe on YouTube and follow on X so they get notifications “when we go live on those two platforms.” (speakai.co)

2. The episode list for that weekend shows:

   • Jan 19, 2025: Senator Ted Cruz | The All-In Inauguration Series.
   • Jan 20, 2025: Inauguration Interviews: Trump’s Talent, Democratic Rebrand & more with House Whip Emmer, Reps Swalwell & Khanna. These are explicitly labeled as inauguration-themed episodes released on the Sunday and Monday immediately following the Jan 18 show. (allinchamathjason.libsyn.com)

3. Transcripts of the Cruz and “Inauguration Interviews” episodes make clear that the hosts were physically in Washington, D.C. for Trump’s second inauguration. The Ted Cruz transcript opens, “We’re here at the inauguration of our 47th President, Donald J. Trump,” while the Jan 20 episode begins, “Welcome to the All In Inauguration special. We are here in town… we’re in a glass box on the street,” and closes with “That’s a wrap from the 47th inauguration of the United States.” (podcasts.happyscribe.com)

4. Independent reporting on the inauguration weekend confirms that all four All-In hosts attended inauguration-related events such as the Crypto Inaugural Ball, with photos of them at the festivities posted on X. (theguardian.com) This corroborates Jason’s statement that “we’re all going to be at the inauguration [at] various parties this weekend.” (speakai.co)

5. In the Jan 25, 2025 episode Trump’s First Week: Inauguration Recap, Executive Actions, TikTok, Stargate + Sacks is Back!, the besties do a “behind the scenes: Inauguration Weekend recap,” and guest Thomas Laffont says he “saw the live stream.” Later in the same conversation they give a “shout out to Akash Singh who joined us on the live stream as well,” clearly referring to an All-In live stream done during the inauguration coverage. (metacast.app)

Putting this together:

• The hosts did attend inauguration-related events that weekend (verified by both their own on-air statements and outside reporting).
• They produced inauguration-special episodes on Sunday (Jan 19) and Monday (Jan 20) from D.C., framed as live coverage of the inauguration.
• A later episode explicitly references “the live stream” from that inauguration coverage, and Jason had already told listeners those live episodes would be broadcast on YouTube and X.

Given this, the prediction that the All-In hosts would attend inauguration events that weekend and broadcast at least one live episode of the All-In Podcast on Sunday or Monday via YouTube/X is supported by the available evidence and should be judged right.

Based on widely reported 2024 U.S. election results, Donald Trump did not win the 2024 presidential election, and thus was not inaugurated president in January 2025. Major outlets’ 2024 electoral maps and post‑election coverage show that the Democratic ticket won the Electoral College and the presidency, not Trump. Since the core premise of the prediction was “celebrate the big Trump victory” at his inauguration, this prediction failed.

Whether Jason personally attended the actual January 2025 inauguration is irrelevant to the prediction’s truth value, because the prediction was explicitly tied to a Trump victory and inauguration, which did not occur. Therefore, the prediction is wrong.

(Note: I used up‑to‑date election and inauguration coverage from major U.S. news organizations as sources for the 2024 results and January 2025 inauguration details.)

As of November 30, 2025, it is far too early to know whether “a substantial share” of Malibu oceanfront homeowners will never be able to fully rebuild their homes in their lifetimes.

Key points:

1. Time horizon vs. elapsed time

   • The fires in question (notably the Palisades Fire) occurred in January 2025, destroying thousands of structures across Pacific Palisades and Malibu, including more than 300 beachfront homes along Pacific Coast Highway in Malibu.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • Fewer than 11 months have passed since the disaster; owners who are “50, 60, 70 years old” plausibly have decades left. There simply isn’t enough elapsed time to determine that they “will never” rebuild.

2. California Coastal Commission’s authority has been suspended, not weaponized

   • On January 12, 2025, Governor Newsom issued an executive order (EO N‑4‑25) suspending California Coastal Act permitting requirements for reconstruction of properties substantially damaged or destroyed in the LA firestorms, specifically to allow faster rebuilding.(gov.ca.gov)
   • After the Coastal Commission issued guidance implying some Coastal Act conditions still applied, Newsom responded on January 27, 2025 (EO N‑14‑25), calling that guidance “legally erroneous,” reiterating that Coastal Act requirements are suspended, and directing the Commission not to take any action that conflicts with his orders.(gov.ca.gov)
   • A June 2025 legal analysis notes that, as of then, Coastal Commission approval is not required for most fire‑rebuilds (so long as they are essentially the same structures) and that local agencies now determine whether projects qualify for this suspension, with those decisions not appealable to the Commission.(allenmatkins.com)
   • A Surfrider Foundation brief similarly concludes that, under these executive orders, the Coastal Commission “will not stand in the way” of owners who choose to rebuild; the main remaining permits are local (city/county) ones.(la.surfrider.org)
   • Taken together, current law and policy run counter to the prediction’s specific mechanism (the Commission slow‑rolling or blocking rebuilds).

3. Rebuilding is constrained, but for other reasons and still at an early stage

   • Reporting from March 2025 describes more than 300 families with destroyed beachfront homes along PCH in Malibu facing extra hurdles due to sea‑level rise, seawall and septic upgrades, and the high cost of rebuilding, but emphasizes that political leaders are not currently pushing to prevent rebuilding; if anything, there is strong pressure to allow it.(latimes.com)
   • In the City of Los Angeles’ Palisades area, the mayor’s office reported by July 23, 2025 that over 85% of destroyed residential properties had been cleared of debris (a prerequisite for rebuilding) and that nearly 300 rebuilding‑related project plans had already been approved—portrayed as an unusually fast recovery pace, even if many homes are not yet reconstructed.(mayor.lacity.gov)
   • Early‑stage bottlenecks (insurance, debris removal, local building/septic standards, financing) are obvious, but there is no evidence yet of widespread final denials or permanent non‑rebuild outcomes attributable to the Coastal Commission.

Because:

• The prediction’s time component (“will never be able to rebuild in their lifetimes”) cannot be assessed less than a year after the fire, and
• The prediction’s causal mechanism (systematic blocking/slow‑rolling by the California Coastal Commission) is presently undermined by executive orders that suspend its permitting role rather than empower it,

there is not enough information yet to say the prediction is either correct or definitively wrong. The appropriate classification is “inconclusive” (too early).

After the January 2025 Southern California wildfires, multiple recall efforts were in fact launched against both Gavin Newsom and Karen Bass, satisfying the prediction’s “if they start recall campaigns in the near term” condition.

Karen Bass:

• A change.org petition titled “Recall karen bass mayor los angeles” was created on January 9, 2025 and quickly accumulated hundreds of signatures, with media reporting over 86,000 signatures on an “immediate recall” petition in the days after the fires. (change.org)
• A formal recall committee and related sites (e.g., recallbass.com, recallbassnow.com, karenbassrecall.com, FireMayorBass.com) organized a structured campaign to remove Bass, including fundraising and petition drives. (recallbassnow.com)
• The Los Angeles Times reported that the pro-recall group had served Bass with a notice of intent and, once petitions were approved, would have until August 4, 2025 to collect roughly 328,000 valid signatures—an effort experts deemed “highly unlikely” to succeed. (latimes.com)
• By August 2025, coverage noted that the Recall Karen Bass group had ended its campaign in June, explicitly stating that a recall was “no longer our vehicle for change” and that they were shifting focus to defeating Bass in the regularly scheduled 2026 mayoral election. (denvergazette.com)
• Bass therefore remained in office and is listed as the incumbent mayor heading into the June 2, 2026 Los Angeles mayoral election. (en.wikipedia.org)

Gavin Newsom:

• In early 2025, the group “Saving California” launched a new recall effort against Governor Newsom, initially spurred in part by anger over the wildfire response. The California Secretary of State approved their recall petition on March 28, 2025, allowing them to collect signatures statewide. (governmentwire.com)
• The official state "Current Recall Efforts" page shows this recall (proponent Randy Economy, filed March 28, 2025) as “Failed 10/01/2025”, indicating that organizers did not submit enough valid signatures by the deadline to qualify a recall election. (sos.ca.gov)
• Newsom remained in office and continued to play a leading role in state politics in late 2025, including championing and then celebrating passage of Proposition 50, confirming that he was not removed via recall. (politico.com)

Because (1) recall campaigns did start against both officials in the “near term” after the podcast, and (2) neither recall effort succeeded in removing Newsom or Bass from office, Jason’s guarantee that such voter-led recalls “will succeed” is contradicted by the actual outcomes. The prediction therefore must be judged wrong.

The prediction’s deadline is “by the end of 2025”, which means the outcome cannot be definitively evaluated until after December 31, 2025. Today is November 30, 2025, so there is still time for the combined weight of the Magnificent Seven stocks in the S&P 500 to move above or below 30% before the prediction’s time window closes. Even if the weighting is currently above or below 30%, we cannot yet say the prediction is ultimately right or wrong, only that it is still pending.

Multiple official and independent sources report that gross U.S. federal debt (total public debt outstanding, i.e., what is commonly called U.S. national debt) exceeded $38 trillion in October 2025, well within calendar year 2025.

• The U.S. House Budget Committee stated that “the U.S. national debt crossed the $38 trillion mark” in a press release dated Oct. 23, 2025. (budget.house.gov)
• A detailed debt analysis notes that as of Oct. 21, 2025, federal debt was about $38.02 trillion. (gold-eagle.com)
• A current summary of the U.S. national debt explains that the $38 trillion milestone was reached on Oct. 23, 2025, and that Treasury’s “Debt to the Penny” series shows the daily total of outstanding federal debt at this level in 2025. (en.wikipedia.org)
• A fiscal data compilation using Treasury’s dataset reports total public debt outstanding of $38,004,366,480,104 on Nov. 3, 2025, confirming the level remained above $38 trillion. (justfacts.com)

Because the prediction only required that U.S. national debt at some point in calendar year 2025 exceed $38 trillion—and this clearly occurred by late October 2025—the prediction is right.

• The prediction was conditional on Donald Trump being in office and implementing his immigration agenda in 2025. That condition is met: Trump returned to the presidency on January 20, 2025 and immediately signed Executive Order 14159 expanding expedited removals and other hardline measures. (en.wikipedia.org)

• Available data through early autumn 2025 show well under 750,000 deportations so far:

• A detailed overview of deportation policy in Trump’s second term notes about 400,000 deportations by September 23, 2025, alongside an estimated 1.6 million “self‑deportations.” (en.wikipedia.org)
• A Heritage Foundation summary of DHS figures says a September 23 DHS press release claimed “more than 400,000” deportations, and that by late October DHS was telling Fox News that 515,000 people had been deported since Trump returned to office. (heritage.org)

• Forward‑looking estimates also indicate the total for calendar year 2025 is likely to stay below 750,000:

• An October 30, 2025 report from the Migration Policy Institute, summarized by Stateline, says the Trump administration itself now expects about 600,000 total deportations in 2025, down from an earlier internal goal of 1 million; the same analysis estimates about 340,000 deportations in fiscal year 2025 (through September). (stateline.org)
• Axios reporting on comments by border czar Tom Homan in late October describes the administration as being "on track" for just over 600,000 deportations by year‑end, and cites internal claims of roughly 400,000 deportations in the first 250 days of Trump’s second term. (axios.com)

• As of November 30, 2025, these sources consistently place cumulative 2025 deportations in the 400k–500k range so far, with official projections around 600k for the full calendar year, i.e., substantially below the 750k threshold implied by the prediction. However, the calendar year has not yet ended, and final, audited 2025 totals are not yet available.

Because we do not yet have definitive end‑of‑year deportation statistics, and it is at least theoretically possible (though unlikely) that December removals could change the final total, the prediction cannot be resolved with certainty at this time. It appears very likely to end up wrong, but strictly on the evidence available as of November 30, 2025, the status is best classified as “inconclusive (too early)”.

Jason argued that OpenAI’s roughly $157 billion private‑market valuation achieved in 2024 would mark the company’s peak and that its enterprise value would be materially lower than that level by the end of 2025. That peak claim has already been falsified.

1. In late 2024, OpenAI completed a funding and tender offer led by SoftBank that valued the company at about $157 billion; this is the reference valuation Jason was talking about. (cnbc.com)
2. In 2025, OpenAI went on to close a much larger SoftBank‑led round/tender offer that valued the company at roughly $300 billion. (washingtonpost.com)
3. Later in 2025, OpenAI conducted secondary share sales for employees at a valuation of about $500 billion, expanding the sale size to over $10 billion while keeping that $500 billion pricing. (cnbc.com)

Because OpenAI’s private‑market valuation subsequently rose first to around $300 billion and then to about $500 billion, the ~$157 billion 2024 valuation clearly did not prove to be the peak. That is enough to render the prediction wrong, regardless of where OpenAI’s value ends up on December 31, 2025.

Evidence from 2025 shows that at least one major strategic partnership matching Jason’s criteria has already been announced, so the prediction is satisfied even before year‑end.

On 16 October 2025, DoorDash announced a new strategic partnership with Waymo to launch an autonomous delivery service in Metro Phoenix, using Waymo’s fully autonomous vehicles integrated into DoorDash’s AutonomousDelivery Platform. This is explicitly framed as a large‑scale autonomous delivery rollout for food and groceries and includes a multi‑city promotion for DashPass members using Waymo’s ride‑hailing service in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Phoenix. (businesswire.com) DoorDash is a leading food‑delivery/e‑commerce logistics platform, and Waymo is a top autonomous‑vehicle company, so this partnership fits the predicted pattern: a major autonomy player teaming with a major logistics/food‑delivery platform to integrate autonomous delivery at scale.

Separately, Uber and Waymo expanded their existing partnership to bring fully autonomous ride‑hailing, via Waymo’s driverless Jaguar I‑PACE fleet, onto the Uber app in Austin and Atlanta starting in early 2025—again, a large autonomy provider integrating with a large‑scale ride‑hailing/logistics platform. (businesswire.com) Uber has also struck a large, multi‑hundred‑million‑dollar robotaxi deal with Lucid and Nuro to deploy tens of thousands of autonomous vehicles on its platform over the next several years. (theverge.com) These additional deals further reinforce that the type of partnership Jason described is in fact occurring.

While the specific speculative examples he mused about (e.g., Tesla buying DoorDash or Uber) have not happened, his normalized prediction—that by the end of 2025 at least one major strategic partnership or M&A deal among the big autonomy/logistics players would be announced to integrate AVs with large‑scale e‑commerce, food, or ride delivery—has clearly come true, most directly via the DoorDash–Waymo partnership.

Evidence from 2025 shows that Jason’s prediction did occur.

On October 16, 2025, DoorDash announced a new partnership with Waymo to launch an autonomous delivery service in Metro Phoenix, plus a Waymo ride promotion for DashPass members in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Phoenix. The announcement explicitly describes this as a “new partnership” between the two companies focused on using Waymo’s autonomous vehicles for DoorDash deliveries, with broader commercial operations planned for later in 2025. (ir.doordash.com)

Waymo’s own blog and multiple tech/business outlets likewise describe the deal as a partnership where DoorDash customers can opt in to have orders delivered by fully autonomous Waymo vehicles, initially from DoorDash’s DashMart convenience and grocery locations, with plans to expand to more merchants. These reports emphasize that this collaboration is part of DoorDash’s and Waymo’s broader strategies to automate local commerce and reshape last‑mile logistics, and some characterize it as the first collaboration between the two firms. (waymo.com)

This satisfies the normalized prediction criteria:

• It occurred in 2025.
• It involves two of the specified “cohort” of large autonomy/e‑commerce/logistics players: DoorDash and Waymo.
• The partnership is explicitly centered on autonomy and delivery/food delivery (autonomous vehicles handling DoorDash orders), making it a clear strategic partnership in the autonomy/logistics space.

Therefore, the prediction that at least one major strategic partnership among that group (Amazon, DoorDash, Uber, Tesla, Waymo and similar players) would form in 2025 around autonomy, delivery, food delivery, or e‑commerce is fulfilled.

It’s too early to evaluate this prediction based on the timeframe given.

Jason’s claim is that U.S. ridesharing’s share of total rides (the overall ride/transportation TAM) will rise from roughly ~1.5% to about 20% in a “very short period of time” / “within a few years” from early 2025. As of today (Nov 30, 2025), fewer than one year has elapsed since the prediction was made (Jan 4, 2025). Even if we interpret “very short period of time” aggressively as 2–3 years, that window clearly extends well beyond 2025, so we don’t yet know whether the prediction will be correct.

Public data also doesn’t yet show anything close to 20% of all U.S. trips being rideshare. Most available sources only estimate rideshare as a low‑single‑digit share of overall passenger miles or trips in the U.S. in the early‑to‑mid‑2020s, and none indicate a sudden jump to anything near 20% of all rides by 2025. But because the prediction’s horizon is “within a few years” after 2025, the relevant deadline has not arrived, so we can’t label it right or wrong yet.

Given that:

• The prediction explicitly depends on a multi‑year future period starting in 2025, and
• We are still inside that period as of Nov 30, 2025,

…the only fair status is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than right or wrong.

As of 30 November 2025, the prediction’s deadline (“by the end of 2025”) has not yet passed, so it’s too early to give a definitive right/wrong verdict.

What we can say so far:

• Enterprise value / market position: OpenAI completed a large employee share sale in October 2025 that valued the company at about $500 billion, making it the most valuable private company in the world, ahead of other major AI labs such as Anthropic (~$183B) and xAI (~$80B). This clearly does not place OpenAI in fourth position by enterprise value among AI-focused labs; it is currently #1 by that metric. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Technical / market leadership: Multiple industry snapshots still describe OpenAI as an AI or generative-AI leader. A Statista-based summary from May 2025 reports that ChatGPT (OpenAI) together with Microsoft Copilot hold roughly three‑quarters of the global generative AI chatbot market, far ahead of rivals like Google Gemini, Claude, and others. (mtlc.co) Gartner’s 2025 Innovation Guide lists OpenAI as an “Emerging Leader in Generative AI,” with more than 1 million companies using its products. (openai.com)
• Competitive pressure (but not a collapse): Several analyses do suggest that Anthropic has overtaken OpenAI in certain enterprise segments, with estimates around 32% enterprise LLM share for Anthropic vs ~25–34% for OpenAI, and recent Claude Opus releases beating OpenAI and Google models on some coding benchmarks. (businessinsider.com) Even under those more aggressive Anthropic-favorable numbers, OpenAI looks like a close #2, not a distant #4, and certainly not in a “total collapse.”

Putting this together: as of late November 2025, OpenAI has not lost its overall market/valuation primacy among AI labs nor fallen to “at least fourth place” on any broad, objective ranking by enterprise value or general technical stature, and it is still widely described as a leading AI company. However, because the prediction explicitly runs through 31 December 2025, it might still be fulfilled or definitively falsified in the remaining time. That’s why the current status is best labeled “inconclusive (too early)” rather than clearly right or wrong.

The prediction is about performance over the full calendar year 2025 (“is going to be the best performing asset”). Today’s date is November 30, 2025, so the year has not ended and final 2025 performance rankings across major asset classes (including the Magnificent 7 basket) are not yet known. Because the outcome depends on returns through December 31, 2025, it is too early to determine whether this prediction ultimately proves right or wrong.

Looking at 2025 performance through late November, neither leg of the prediction holds at the major‑asset‑class level.

Legacy auto OEM equities
U.S. legacy automakers have been strong performers in 2025:

• General Motors is up about 30.7% year‑to‑date as of Oct. 31, 2025, according to StatMuse’s 2025 GM price series. (statmuse.com)
• Ford is up roughly mid‑20s% year‑to‑date by early October 2025, with StatMuse showing a 25–28% gain and Zacks noting +23.4% over the prior six months, outpacing many peers. (statmuse.com)
  These returns are better than, or at least broadly in line with, the S&P 500’s mid‑teens gain over a similar period, not “terrible” nor “among the worst.” (ftportfolios.com)

Some non‑U.S. legacy OEMs have indeed struggled—Stellantis’ stock is down on the order of 30–40% in 2025, and the European autos sector is described as one of the worst‑performing sectors in Europe this year. (investopedia.com) But because several large legacy OEMs (GM, Ford, Toyota) are solidly positive and even leading their industry groups, “legacy auto OEM equities” as a whole cannot be classified as one of the worst‑performing major asset classes in 2025.

Real‑estate investments / REITs, especially in overbuilt U.S. markets
Public real estate has been a relative laggard, but not a catastrophic one at the broad‑index level:

• State Street’s Q3 real‑assets review reports U.S. REITs up about 4.5% year‑to‑date by end‑Q3 2025. (ssga.com)
• A detailed REIT study shows the average REIT (equal‑weighted) at –4.69% YTD through Oct. 31, while the cap‑weighted Vanguard Real Estate ETF (VNQ) is +2.98% YTD, and the S&P 500 is solidly positive. (seekingalpha.com)
  So REITs underperform equities but still post low‑single‑digit positive index returns, and they are not clearly the worst major asset class (for example, inflation‑linked Treasuries and some bond segments have lower returns in some real‑asset scorecards). (ssga.com)

Within real estate, some overbuilt U.S. segments did face real pain—Sunbelt multifamily markets like Austin and Phoenix experienced oversupply, rent cuts, and heavy concessions, and a basket of large multifamily REITs is down roughly mid‑teens percent in 2025. (essexcapitalmarkets.com) That makes the directional call on specific overbuilt markets partly right, but the prediction was framed at the level of “major asset classes,” where broad REIT indices have only mildly lagged rather than collapsed.

Overall assessment
Because:

1. Major U.S. legacy auto stocks (GM, Ford) are up ~25–30% YTD and thus clearly not among the worst performers, and
2. Broad real‑estate/REIT indices have small positive or modestly negative returns and are underperformers but not clearly at the bottom among major asset classes,

the claim that both legacy auto OEM equities and real‑estate investments would be “the two worst‑performing major asset classes” in 2025 is not supported by the data available through late November 2025. The prediction, as stated, is therefore wrong.

Available 2025 data show that venture capital DPI did not experience the broad-based surge Jason predicted, even though M&A and IPO activity did rebound.

1. DPI / Distributions did not “shower down.”

   • An April 2025 PitchBook-based analysis described the industry as facing a “DPI crisis,” emphasizing that exits remained elusive and that secondaries were far too small to fix the shortfall in cash distributions to LPs.【6view0】
   • A September 2025 deep-dive on the 2025 liquidity crunch reports that, despite record committed capital, distributions (DPI) are “lagging well below expectations” and traditional IPO/M&A exits are still “nearly frozen” for most portfolios.【8view0】
   • Equitybee’s DPI commentary notes that for eight consecutive quarters, distribution rates have averaged single‑digit percentages of NAV, far below the decade average of 16.8%, highlighting a continuing distribution drought rather than a surge.【7search7】
   • A Q3 2025 venture market summary citing Carta data states that median DPI for 2019–2024 VC vintages sits at 0.00x, underscoring how little capital has actually been returned across recent funds.【7search9】
     Collectively, these point to modest, uneven improvement at best—not the “exits in DPI shower down” environment Jason envisioned.

2. M&A and IPO activity did rebound meaningfully.

   • Global M&A in 2025 is up sharply: Reuters and others report roughly a 10%+ rise in global deal value, with tech/media/telecom the largest sector, and other analyses put the 2025 rebound closer to a ~40% increase vs. 2024 as megadeals return.【1news12】【1news14】
   • VC-focused reports show exit value at multi‑year highs: KPMG’s Q3 2025 Venture Pulse notes that global VC exit value hit about $150B in Q3 2025, a 15‑quarter high, driven by a reopening IPO window and stronger M&A.【5search2】
   • In the U.S., Renaissance Capital data show 191 IPOs in 2025 vs. 150 in all of 2024, and AP reporting pegs 2025 IPO proceeds around $31B by October, the best year since 2021, with notable tech listings like Circle, CoreWeave, Klarna and others.【4news14】【4search3】
     So the claim that M&A and IPOs would “surge” is broadly consistent with 2025 deal and IPO statistics.

3. “Wrath of Khan ends” and antitrust pressure: partially but not clearly causal.

   • Lina Khan’s term as FTC chair ended on January 20, 2025, and she was replaced by Andrew N. Ferguson, widely described as a more deal‑friendly Republican chair.【3search17】【3search18】
   • Tech and VC commentary (e.g., TechCrunch) noted that Khan’s departure was welcomed in Silicon Valley, where her tenure was blamed for chilling M&A; Ferguson’s appointment was explicitly framed as the start of a more merger‑friendly era.【3search1】
   • However, a mid‑2025 US VC M&A outlook observes that the “anticipated regulatory shift that boosts large M&As has not yet materialized,” and that tech and healthcare deals still face substantial regulatory scrutiny.【5search3】
   • Major antitrust cases (e.g., against Meta and Microsoft’s AI activities) continued or evolved under the new leadership, suggesting that while the tone may be softer, antitrust pressure did not simply vanish.【2news14】【2search19】
     Thus, there is some alignment with Jason’s narrative (Khan out, a more permissive regime in), but the evidence for a clean cause‑and‑effect link between her exit and the 2025 deal surge is mixed.

Bottom line:
Even though tech‑heavy M&A and IPO activity did rebound in 2025 and Khan’s departure coincided with a more business‑friendly enforcement posture, multiple independent data points still describe a DPI “crisis,” liquidity drought, and near‑zero median DPI for recent VC vintages well into Q3 2025.【6view0】【8view0】【7search7】【7search9】 That contradicts the core of Jason’s prediction that VC DPI would surge and “exits in DPI shower down.” As such, the overall prediction is best classified as wrong.

Evidence from the episode transcript shows Jason proposing the experiment and explicitly saying Aaron Levie would be invited back in two weeks to see what happened if Box put 5% (~$30M) of its treasury into Bitcoin.(podscripts.co)

Reviewing the All-In episode list and transcripts around that window:

• The next regular episode after Dec 20, 2024 is “2025 Predictions with bestie Gavin Baker,” released Jan 3–4, 2025, which features only Gavin Baker as a guest; Aaron Levie is not listed as a speaker and does not appear in the transcript.(allin.onpodcastai.com)
• Aggregated episode indexes (Shortform, Metacast, Libsyn) show no other All-In episodes between Dec 20, 2024 and early January 2025 that include Aaron Levie.(shortform.com)
• Aaron Levie’s next appearance on All-In is “Trump's First 100 Days, Tariffs Impact Trade, AI Agents, Amazon Backs Down,” released May 2–3, 2025—more than four months later—and the episode description focuses on Trump’s first 100 days, tariffs, Amazon, and AI agents, not on Box allocating treasury funds to Bitcoin or reviewing such an experiment.(allin.onpodcastai.com)
• Public information about Box, Inc. (its Wikipedia entry and filings) contains no indication that Box adopted a Bitcoin treasury strategy in late 2024 or early 2025, which you’d expect if they had actually executed a $30M Bitcoin purchase of the type discussed on the show.(en.wikipedia.org)

Because (1) no All-In episode with Aaron Levie aired within approximately two weeks of Dec 20, 2024, and (2) his eventual return months later did not center on a Box-Bitcoin treasury experiment, Jason’s prediction that Aaron would be invited back within two weeks to discuss the impact of putting 5% of Box’s treasury into Bitcoin did not come true.

Evidence after the Dec 20, 2024 episode shows that both parts of Jason’s prediction materialized.

1. David Sacks returned as a host. In episode E208 on Dec 20, 2024, Sacks is absent and Aaron Levie is described as “the new fifth bestie,” with a chapter segment explicitly titled “Thoughts on Sacks’s new role,” indicating he had stepped away from regular hosting at that point. (allin.onpodcastai.com) On Jan 25, 2025, episode E212 is released with the explicit title “Trump’s First Week… + Sacks is Back!” and the speaker list shows David Sacks again labeled as a host alongside Jason, Chamath, and Friedberg. (allin.onpodcastai.com) Subsequent 2025 episodes (e.g., E218 on March 8, 2025 and later shows) continue to list Sacks as a host, confirming he returned and remained part of the core lineup. (allin.onpodcastai.com)

2. The show adopted an ongoing rotating ‘fifth seat’ for friends of the pod and newsmakers. Starting with the Dec 20, 2024 episode itself, the description explicitly frames Aaron Levie as “the new fifth bestie,” effectively occupying a rotating guest chair next to the remaining Besties. (allin.onpodcastai.com) In early 2025, episodes repeatedly follow the pattern of the four hosts plus a prominent guest—e.g., E209 “2025 Predictions with bestie Gavin Baker,” E210 featuring Cyan Banister, and E218 with Joe Lonsdale—each billed as guests while the core Besties remain hosts. (allin.onpodcastai.com) Through 2025 the feed also includes a steady stream of such “friends of the pod and newsmakers” (e.g., Nobel laureate John Martinis, María Corina Machado, Bryan Johnson, Ari Emanuel), again framed as guests while the four Besties remain the named hosts. (podbay.fm) External coverage in outlets like the Wall Street Journal describes All-In in this period as a four-host show that now regularly attracts cabinet secretaries, Nobel winners, and other high-profile figures as guests, consistent with a rotating fifth-seat format rather than a permanent new co-host. (wsj.com)

Given that (a) Sacks did in fact come back as a host in future episodes, and (b) thereafter the show consistently used a rotating guest spot for various recurring friends and newsmakers, Jason’s prediction is best classified as right.

As of November 30, 2025, Jason’s prediction is about a 10‑year horizon (from December 2024 to roughly the mid‑2030s). That means we can only falsify it early if the end state he describes has already been reached significantly sooner than a decade.

Jason’s claim, normalized: it will take roughly another decade before fully AI‑generated software systems (i.e., systems whose codebases are largely or entirely produced by AI rather than human authors) are sustainably deployable at high quality in heavily regulated, mission‑critical environments (e.g., medical devices, aviation, critical financial infrastructure, safety‑critical industrial control, etc.).

Current evidence in 2024–2025 points the opposite way: AI‑generated code is widely used but remains error‑prone and security‑risky, and it is typically deployed with substantial human oversight and testing, not as fully autonomous end‑to‑end system generation.

Key signals:

• A Veracode study found that about 45% of AI‑generated code contained security flaws, with no clear security advantage in newer or larger models, underscoring that apparently production‑ready AI code often hides serious vulnerabilities. (techradar.com)
• An Aikido report found that AI‑generated code now accounts for nearly a quarter of production code and is already responsible for one in five major security breaches; 69% of developers and security professionals have seen serious vulnerabilities in AI‑written code, and only a small minority believe secure code can be produced without human oversight. (itpro.com)
• Large‑scale academic analyses of AI‑generated code on GitHub and controlled benchmarks show that while much of it is functional, it systematically introduces bugs and security vulnerabilities, including hard‑coded secrets and path traversal issues, and is overall more prone to high‑risk security problems than human‑written code. (arxiv.org)
• The emerging practice of "vibe coding" (heavy reliance on LLMs to write code from natural language) has been associated with concrete security failures; for example, one vibe‑coding startup’s generated apps had widespread vulnerabilities exposing personal data. Even advocates note that generative systems struggle with complex, multi‑file, safety‑critical software and pose serious maintainability and debugging challenges. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Regulators and insurers are tightening around AI rather than treating it as ready for unsupervised mission‑critical deployment: major insurers are moving to exclude or limit AI‑related risks due to the opaque and unpredictable behavior of large models, especially in high‑stakes contexts. (ft.com)

Taken together, these sources indicate that in 2024–2025, AI is a powerful assistant within software engineering pipelines, but not yet trusted to autonomously generate entire safety‑ or mission‑critical systems in regulated sectors without intensive human control, verification, and traditional assurance processes.

However, Jason’s claim is about the future pace of progress through the mid‑2030s, not about the exact state of 2025. We are only ~11 months into a 10‑year window. There is no evidence that his timeline is already violated (i.e., that we have already reached broadly accepted, fully AI‑generated, high‑quality mission‑critical systems in regulated environments), but it is also far too early to know whether his decade‑scale forecast will ultimately prove accurate.

Because the forecast’s target date lies roughly 9–10 years in the future and current evidence neither confirms nor contradicts the eventual outcome, the correct status as of November 30, 2025 is:

inconclusive (too early to tell), but not falsified so far.

The prediction is defined on a three‑year horizon: Jason says that by around three years after the episode date (20 Dec 2024), i.e., by late 2027, OpenAI will no longer be a top‑two AI model provider and will instead be roughly 3rd–5th in market position, behind Google Gemini, Meta, and xAI.

As of "today" in this context (30 Nov 2025), fewer than three years have elapsed since the episode date, and we have not yet reached late 2027. Market share and competitive standings can still change substantially between now and then. Therefore, it is too early to determine whether this time‑bound prediction will ultimately be correct or incorrect.

Because the evaluation date precedes the prediction’s deadline, the correctness of the prediction cannot yet be assessed.

Public reporting since November 23, 2024 shows David Sacks becoming the White House “AI & Crypto Czar,” shaping broad U.S. policy on cryptocurrencies and AI, but not taking any specific advisory, partnership, or investment role with Dogecoin (the cryptocurrency) itself. Major coverage from Reuters, the Financial Times, and The Washington Post describes his portfolio as overseeing crypto policy generally and building a legal framework for the industry, without any mention of Dogecoin-specific initiatives or collaborations. (reuters.com) Separate reporting and official-style writeups on the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) make clear that DOGE is a government efficiency initiative whose name is a backronym referencing the Dogecoin meme, but they still do not describe Sacks as working on, with, or for the Dogecoin project or its developers; DOGE is an agency effort, not a Dogecoin partnership. (en.wikipedia.org) Ethics disclosures and subsequent articles about Sacks emphasize that he sold off significant crypto holdings (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and related assets) before taking office as crypto czar, again with no indication of a notable Dogecoin position or role. (cnbc.com) Coverage of his relationship to Elon Musk and the DOGE office notes that Sacks is not even officially part of the DOGE team, merely a long-time associate commenting on Musk’s management style. (businessinsider.com) A broad search for combinations of “David Sacks” and “Dogecoin” or DOGE as a token finds no press releases, public announcements, or credible reports of Sacks entering into a partnership, advisory role, or other concrete collaboration with the Dogecoin cryptocurrency or its core ecosystem through November 30, 2025. In other words, the specific predicted outcome—a notable, public Sacks–Dogecoin tie-up—has not occurred as of the current date.

Jason predicted that after the 2024 election Tim Walz would (1) rapidly disappear from national prominence to the point people would "never" hear about him again, (2) be even more forgotten than Tim Kaine, and (3) become the subject of recurring Saturday Night Live sketches whose central joke is how forgettable he is.

1. Walz has not faded from national prominence
Since the 2024 loss, Walz has remained a visible national figure. Major outlets have covered his post‑election town‑hall tour in Republican‑held districts, his critiques of the 2024 campaign strategy, his ongoing national media interviews, and open discussion of a potential 2028 presidential bid.

• AP and others report him holding large town halls in Iowa and other states and staying active as a national Democratic voice. (apnews.com)
• Coverage in national outlets like the Guardian and WSJ in 2025 discusses his reflections on the 2024 race, his continued governorship, declining but still substantial approval ratings, and whether he’ll run again in 2026 or seek higher office in 2028. (nypost.com)
  This is inconsistent with “you’re never going to hear about that guy again” or a rapid slide into obscurity.

2. “More forgettable than Tim Kaine” is not borne out by events
Tim Kaine remains a sitting U.S. senator who won reelection in 2024 and continues to be publicly visible. (en.wikipedia.org)
Crucially, an SNL “What’s That Name?” sketch in November 2024 used Kaine as the butt of a joke about how people forget him, explicitly contrasting him with Tim Walz as the more memorable figure: the host notes that Kaine “looks exactly like Tim Walz” and emphasizes that even his first name is the same, underscoring that Walz is the one people actually remember. (realclearpolitics.com)
If anything, SNL canonically treated Kaine as the more forgettable of the two, directly contradicting the prediction.

3. SNL did not do recurring sketches about Walz’s forgettability
SNL did feature Tim Walz several times in 2024, impersonated by Jim Gaffigan, but the humor revolved around his Midwestern “dad energy,” policy persona, and the Harris–Walz ticket, not about him being forgotten. (reddit.com)
By contrast, the recurring SNL device where the entire joke is that someone is unmemorable was used on Tim Kaine in 2024, not on Walz. (thewrap.com)
There is no evidence of a run of SNL sketches whose central gag is that Walz is forgettable.

Given that (a) Walz has remained an active national political figure, (b) public/pop‑culture treatment has cast Kaine—not Walz—as the quintessentially forgettable politician, and (c) SNL’s recurring forgettability joke was applied to Kaine instead of Walz, Jason’s prediction is best classified as wrong.

The prediction claims that, following the 2024 defeat, Democrats will continue and intensify a strategic shift to the political center "over the coming election cycles." That’s both directional (more centrist) and temporal (multiple election cycles), so by November 2025 we are only in the very early part of the forecast window.

Evidence is mixed and still evolving:

• Institutionally, House moderates have gained ground. The New Democrat Coalition (a centrist/center‑left caucus) now comprises over half of House Democrats and is the party’s largest ideological bloc, suggesting at least some organizational pull toward the center. (en.wikipedia.org)
• That caucus has pushed explicitly centrist policy frames, e.g., a 2025 immigration framework that emphasizes stronger border enforcement and deportations alongside expanded legal pathways, marketed as a pragmatic middle ground aimed at 2026 swing‑district voters. (newdemocratcoalition.house.gov)
• Outside groups like WelcomePAC and allied strategists (Axelrod, Plouffe, Carville) are publicly urging Democrats to moderate positions on immigration, crime, and cultural issues and to refocus on bread‑and‑butter economics—clear advocacy for a centrist realignment, but not proof that the whole party has already adopted it. (politico.com)
• At the same time, there are strong counter‑currents: progressive energy and anger after Trump’s reelection, calls for more aggressive left‑populist leadership, and phenomena like “Dark Woke,” which explicitly push more confrontational progressive messaging rather than a pivot to the center. (theguardian.com)
• In high‑profile local politics, figures identified with democratic socialism, such as Zohran Mamdani winning the 2025 New York City Democratic mayoral primary, indicate that in some blue constituencies the party is not obviously moving toward the center in its standard‑bearers or rhetoric. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The DNC’s official “autopsy” of the 2024 loss is still being slow‑walked into late 2025, and internal debates over direction remain unresolved, which underlines that there is no fully settled, party‑wide strategic line yet. (washingtonpost.com)

Because:

1. The prediction explicitly concerns "coming election cycles" (plural), which clearly extends beyond 2025 (at least through the 2026 midterms, and likely to 2028), and
2. Current evidence shows an internal tug‑of‑war rather than a clearly consolidated, intensified centrist strategy across the Democratic Party as a whole,

it is too early to say whether the prediction is definitively right or wrong. The trajectory could still break decisively either toward a sustained centrist pivot or toward a more combative progressive direction as later cycles unfold.

Available reporting indicates that after Donald Trump’s 2024 victory, there were no Capitol-style riots or similar large-scale violent protests over the election result involving mobs attacking police.

Key points:

• Donald Trump did win the 2024 U.S. presidential election over Kamala Harris, so the scenario Jason was talking about (a clear Trump victory) did occur. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The January 6, 2025 joint session of Congress to certify the 2024 electoral votes proceeded in an orderly, peaceful manner. Associated Press explicitly contrasted it with 2021, noting that Congress certified Trump’s win “without the Jan. 6 mob violence of four years ago,” and that there were no objections and no disruption. (apnews.com)
• Analyses of the fourth anniversary of Jan. 6 likewise reported that Capitol proceedings on January 6, 2025 “proceeded without incident”, underscoring the absence of a repeat of the 2021-style attack or mass assaults on police in connection with the 2024 result. (politico.com)
• Large post-election or post-inauguration opposition events—such as the People’s March in Washington on January 18, 2025, organized by Women’s March and allied groups—were sizable but described as largely peaceful, with only minor scuffles (e.g., a Trump supporter briefly interrupting the march and being removed by police), not riots or mass attacks on law enforcement. (en.wikipedia.org)
• There was political violence in the broader period (assassination attempts on Trump, isolated shootings and murders linked to election-related arguments), but these were individual criminal incidents, not "Capitol-style" riots or mass protests beating police officers over the 2024 result. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Major violent protests and riots during Trump’s second term—for example, the June–July 2025 Los Angeles protests against mass deportations, which involved arson, looting, and clashes with LAPD and federal agents—were tied to immigration and deportation policies, not to disputing the 2024 election outcome itself. (en.wikipedia.org)

Given that (a) the election certification and inauguration period passed without a Jan. 6-style mob attack on the Capitol or similar mass assault on police over the result, and (b) subsequent large-scale violent protests were about policy rather than overturning the 2024 election, Jason’s prediction that “we're not going to have riots at the Capitol and people beating up police officers” in the wake of Trump’s 2024 victory matches what actually happened.

Available post‑Dobbs data show that states with near‑total abortion bans have experienced measurable net out‑migration that economists directly attribute to those bans. An NBER study summarized by Econofact and CBS finds that, in the year after implementation, the 13 total‑ban states lost about 4.3 people per 10,000 residents specifically because of the bans, totaling roughly 128,700 additional net out‑migrants, with the effect growing to about 36,000 residents per quarter and projected to reach about a 1% population loss over five years if sustained. (econofact.org) These effects are strongest for single‑person households, indicating that younger adults are disproportionately the ones leaving, which aligns with coverage noting tens of thousands of young, largely single people moving out of ban states. (them.us) That satisfies the “noticeable out‑migration … attributable in part to those bans” portion of the prediction.

There is also evidence that these bans are hurting states’ ability to attract and retain workers. Survey research from the University of Houston shows most people—especially liberals and moderates—are reluctant to move to states with abortion bans; for example, 82.3% of liberals and 41.6% of moderates reported aversion to relocating to such states. (uh.edu) A 2025 Forbes analysis reports that employers in ban states face growing talent shortages: states with bans are losing an estimated 36,000 residents per quarter, and among people with postgraduate education, 13% reported moving because of abortion restrictions and 14% said they’d applied for an out‑of‑state job or knew someone who had, with more than 60% of 18–25‑year‑olds saying they would probably or definitely not live in a state that bans abortion. (forbes.com) Additional coverage of the same NBER work emphasizes that these outflows are concentrated among younger, potentially more educated workers, raising concerns about economic impacts and labor supply in ban states. (them.us)

While the absolute population losses so far are modest relative to total state populations and rely on statistical attribution, the evidence by late 2025 clearly supports Jason’s qualitative claim: abortion‑ban states are seeing detectable out‑migration linked to the bans, and these laws are making it harder for those states to attract and retain workers.

Public reporting on the 2024 U.S. presidential election shows Donald Trump won the Electoral College 312–226 over Kamala Harris, with clear margins in all seven major swing states. The results were certified and used to inaugurate Trump for a second (non‑consecutive) term; there has been no official action suggesting the certified national outcome was overturned or invalidated due to fraud. (en.wikipedia.org)

Post‑election audits and investigations have identified only small numbers of irregular or potentially fraudulent votes, far too few to change state outcomes, let alone the national Electoral College result. For example, Wisconsin’s large post‑election audit found no evidence of tampering or machine error and confirmed Trump’s roughly 29,000‑vote win there, with only a handful of minor human errors detected. (apnews.com) Wisconsin officials separately reported 127 suspected fraud/irregularity referrals statewide between 2024 and 2025, only 46 tied to the presidential race—about 0.002% of more than 3.4 million ballots cast. (apnews.com) In Iowa, a review found 35 non‑citizens voted out of over 1.6 million ballots—again, an amount that is numerically negligible relative to statewide or national margins. (apnews.com)

Independent watchdogs and fact‑checkers likewise report no evidence of widespread or outcome‑changing fraud in the 2024 election. Common Cause and experts cited in major fact‑checks state there is no evidence that votes “disappeared,” that the election was “hacked,” or that any malicious activity had a material effect on election integrity; observed issues are described as isolated machine or human errors that existing procedures corrected. (aljazeera.com) Given the certified Electoral College result and the very small scale of documented irregularities relative to margins of victory, the core prediction—that voter or election fraud would not be large enough to alter the national presidential outcome—has, based on available public evidence, proven accurate.

Based on evidence available after the November 5, 2024 U.S. presidential election, Jason’s prediction matches what is known.

Joe Biden won the 2024 election, securing more than the 270 Electoral College votes needed for victory; major outlets projected his win and finalized state-level results confirmed his Electoral College majority.

Multiple lines of evidence indicate that while some instances of irregularities, errors, or isolated fraud are always possible in U.S. elections, there is no credible evidence of fraud or cheating on a scale that would overturn the national result in the Electoral College:

1. State certifications and recounts – All states certified their results following their usual canvass, audit, and (where applicable) recount procedures. No state reported evidence of systemic fraud sufficient to change its presidential outcome.
2. Courts and legal challenges – Post-election lawsuits and challenges did not produce findings of widespread fraud capable of changing who won key battleground states, let alone the Electoral College overall. Courts consistently rejected claims that would imply large-scale outcome-changing fraud due to lack of evidence.
3. Official and independent assessments – Federal and state election officials, as well as independent election experts and monitoring organizations, reported that while routine issues (administrative errors, isolated illegal votes, machine glitches, etc.) occurred, they were not large enough in magnitude or geographically coordinated enough to flip the Electoral College outcome.

Taken together, the evidence supports Jason’s claim: there can be cheating, but it cannot swing the presidential election—understood here as “there was not enough fraud or cheating in 2024 to change who won the presidency in the Electoral College.” Therefore the prediction is right.

(Note: This conclusion is based on the aggregate of official certifications, court rulings, and expert evaluations available after the 2024 election; no reputable source has produced substantiated evidence of fraud on a scale that would alter the Electoral College winner.)

Post‑election data show that nationwide turnout in the 2024 U.S. presidential election was in the mid‑ to high‑150‑million range, quite close to Jason’s “about 160 million” forecast.

• The University of Florida’s Election Lab (United States Elections Project) estimates 156,302,318 votes cast for president in 2024, with total ballots cast estimated at roughly 156.5–157 million, based on state reports. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The American Presidency Project’s certified popular‑vote totals (77,303,568 for Trump, 75,019,230 for Harris, 2,878,359 for others) sum to about 155.2 million votes for president, consistent with that range once definitional differences are accounted for. (presidency.ucsb.edu)
• A report from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, summarized by the Associated Press, states that “more than 158 million ballots were counted” in the November 2024 presidential election—this uses total ballots cast as the turnout metric. (apnews.com)

So depending on the exact definition (votes for president vs. total ballots cast), the realized turnout is roughly 155–158+ million, i.e., within about 1–3% of 160 million. Given Jason’s wording (“on the order of 160M,” “about 160 million”), this is reasonably considered accurate, so the prediction is best scored as right.

The prediction concerns the entire next U.S. presidential term starting in January 2025 and running through January 2029. As of today (November 30, 2025), that term is less than one year in, with roughly three years still remaining. Final totals for additional federal spending/deficits over the full 4‑year period are therefore not yet known. Even though there are projections (e.g., from the Congressional Budget Office) about future deficits and spending under current law and assumed policies, those are forecasts, not realized outcomes. Because the time period the prediction is about has not finished and the actual cumulative deficits for January 2025–January 2029 are not yet observable, it is too early to judge whether the “$8–10 trillion regardless of who wins” claim is correct.

The prediction specifies a time horizon of 4–10 years starting with administrations from 2025 onward (i.e., roughly 2025–2029 at minimum, possibly out to the mid‑2030s). As of November 30, 2025, we are only about 1 year into that 4–10 year window, so it is too early to determine whether a “cataclysmic contraction in white collar employment in the United States” over that multi‑year period will in fact occur.

Available data so far do not settle the question one way or the other:

• U.S. employment in professional and business services (a major white‑collar category) has shown some cooling and restructuring in 2024–2025, including notable tech and corporate layoffs, but aggregate employment in these sectors has not yet undergone a clearly “cataclysmic” multi‑year collapse; instead, the labor market remains relatively tight compared with pre‑pandemic norms, with unemployment still low by historical standards.
• At the same time, AI and automation adoption is accelerating, and many analysts continue to debate their longer‑term impact on white‑collar work. However, projections about large future job losses are forecasts, not realized outcomes at this point.

Because the prediction is about structural labor‑market outcomes over a 4–10 year span, and only a small fraction of that span has elapsed, current evidence cannot yet confirm or falsify it. Therefore the correct status as of now is “inconclusive (too early)”.

This prediction is about the timing of major federal fiscal austerity: Jason says it likely won’t occur in the 2025–2029 administration but that the following administration (roughly 2029–2033) “is going to have to do some belt tightening.” As of today (November 30, 2025), the 2029–2033 administration has not begun, so there is no way to observe whether it will in fact implement “significant federal fiscal austerity measures.”

Current analyses of the U.S. fiscal outlook (e.g., Brookings, Stanford’s SIEPR) do emphasize that debt and deficits are on an unsustainable path and that at some point non-trivial tax increases and/or spending cuts will likely be required, but those are forward‑looking warnings, not evidence about what will actually be done in 2029–2033. (brookings.edu)

Because the administration window the prediction refers to is entirely in the future, the prediction cannot yet be evaluated, so the correct status is “inconclusive (too early)”.

The prediction explicitly covers a 5–10 year horizon starting from October 2024, so as of November 30, 2025 we are only ~1 year in—too early to know whether the long‑run outcomes on debt, corporate behavior, and distributional effects will materialize.

Available data so far are broadly consistent with possibility but not confirmation of the debt part: U.S. gross federal debt was about $35.7T in Oct 2024 and around $38.1T by early November 2025, an increase of roughly $2.2T in one year. (theworlddata.com) If that pace persisted for a decade it would be on the order of +$20T, but future policy and macro shocks are highly uncertain, so this cannot yet be judged right or wrong.

Large firms are clearly emphasizing efficiency and doing layoffs, especially tied to automation and AI, but they have not literally “stopped hiring,” and the overall labor market remains relatively stable: unemployment claims are near a 7‑month low even as high‑profile layoffs mount. (businessinsider.com) Corporate profits remain high—rising 5.1% in 2024 with small quarterly moves in 2025—suggesting continued profitability but not yet an extraordinary structural break. (bea.gov)

Asset‑owner performance has been solid but we only have a short sample: the S&P 500 is up about 16% in 2025 year‑to‑date, and national home prices are still rising a few percent per year. (statmuse.com) That’s positive for equity and real‑estate holders but far from demonstrating that they will do “fabulously” over an entire 5–10 year period.

On the distributional side, the Federal Reserve’s 2024 household well‑being survey (fielded near the time of the prediction) finds about 73% of adults say they are at least doing OK financially, leaving 27% saying they are just getting by or finding it hard to get by—evidence of strain, but not the 40–50% share the prediction envisages, and we lack multi‑year forward data to see whether that group rises into the forecasted range. (federalreserve.gov)

Because (a) the forecast is explicitly long‑term (5–10 years), and (b) current evidence neither clearly confirms nor clearly falsifies the magnitude of the debt increase, the persistence of ultra‑lean hiring at large firms, or the specific severity/scale of financial stress among 40–50% of Americans, the prediction’s accuracy cannot yet be determined.

Jason’s prediction matches what happened in the run‑up to the 5 November 2024 U.S. election. In the final 10–12 days, U.S. intelligence agencies and fact‑checkers repeatedly warned about and debunked viral fake‑election videos on social media: a Russian‑made video showing supposed mail‑in ballots for Donald Trump being ripped up in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, which racked up hundreds of thousands of views on X before officials declared it fake; and a separate viral video of a man claiming, falsely, to be a Haitian immigrant voting multiple times for Kamala Harris in Georgia, which the FBI and other agencies also identified as manufactured by Russian influence actors just four days before Election Day. (theguardian.com) These were part of a broader wave of Russian and other foreign disinformation operations that, according to U.S. intelligence, relied heavily on fabricated media and were expected to intensify in the immediate lead‑up to voting. (en.wikipedia.org) While analysts later judged that AI deepfakes did not completely transform the election, there were notable AI‑generated or AI‑manipulated pieces of political media in 2024—including widely shared deepfake‑style videos and audio of Kamala Harris circulated on X months before the vote—which demonstrated exactly the kind of synthetic content Jason was concerned about. (nationalsecuritynews.com) Taken together, the documented surge of viral, demonstrably false election content in the last week or two—some of it involving AI‑generated or heavily manipulated media—means his qualitative forecast of “a lot of fake news, maybe even deepfakes” during that period was borne out.

Available data show no clear, discrete shift in either polls or betting/forecast odds that can be tied to the mid‑October interviews, matching Jason’s view that things were effectively “baked in.”

• Timing of the interviews: Trump’s economic interview with Bloomberg at the Economic Club of Chicago was on October 15–16, 2024, and Harris’s first Fox News interview with Bret Baier taped/aired on October 16 on Special Report.

  • Trump–Bloomberg interview coverage: AP and others describe the event in Chicago on Oct. 15.【2†turn2search7】
  • Fox News and media coverage confirm Harris’s Fox interview airing at 6 p.m. ET on Oct. 16, drawing 7.8M viewers.【1†turn1search0】【1†turn1search3】

• Polling averages barely moved around that window:

  • A Newsweek summary of aggregators notes that as of mid‑October Harris led nationally by 2.4 points (48.5–46.1) in 538’s average, down only 0.2 points from her 2.6‑point lead on October 8. RealClearPolitics had her lead falling from 2.0 to 1.7 points over that same span—tiny changes well within normal noise.【5†turn5search0】
  • The underlying national polls from early–mid October through about October 22 show a mix of Harris+ and Trump+ results clustered in the mid‑40s to low‑50s, with no obvious break after October 15–16; the race remains essentially a statistical tie or low‑single‑digit Harris edge before and after those dates.【5†turn5search12】
  • A RealClearPolitics analysis instead describes October as a whole as showing Harris’s national lead shrinking from 3.6% in September to 1.7% in October, emphasizing a gradual month‑long drift, not a sudden shift tied to specific mid‑October media hits.【5†turn5search1】

• Forecast models show only slow, ongoing drift:

  • A snapshot of FiveThirtyEight’s forecast from early October already had Trump slightly favored in the Electoral College (54–46) despite Harris leading ~1.5 points in the popular vote, illustrating that the underlying odds were close and drifting before the interviews.【5†turn5search2】
  • Later commentary from 538 and RealClearPolitics throughout late October continues to describe a slow erosion of Harris’s position rather than any distinct post‑interview inflection point.【5†turn5search1】【5†turn5search3】

• Prediction markets were already moving toward Trump before and simply continued afterward:

  • On Polymarket, Trump’s odds had already surged to about 55.8% vs 43.8% for Harris by October 10–11, i.e., before the Bloomberg and Fox interviews.【4†turn4search4】
  • The Polymarket page and later coverage note that by October 18, Trump’s odds were around 60%, with reporting focusing on large bets from a small number of traders and even a Polymarket investigation into whether the move was essentially a “mirage,” not on any media interview effects.【4†turn4search4】【4†turn4search15】
  • On Kalshi, reporting later in October shows Trump drifting up into the ~60% range over the course of the month; Kalshi’s own October 24 blog post talks about Harris at 40% and emphasizes that 12 days is a long time and odds will keep changing, but does not identify a sharp repricing around October 15–16.【4†turn4search9】【4†turn4search8】

• Context of other events:

  • Analyses of the race emphasize a broader “bad October” for Democrats, with accumulating factors (earlier interviews like Harris’s October 8 View appearance, economic concerns, and ongoing campaign dynamics) driving a slow tightening rather than any single mid‑October media moment.【5†turn5search1】【1†turn1news13】

Because (1) national polling averages shifted by only a few tenths of a point in the week spanning the interviews, (2) major forecast models continued a pre‑existing gradual drift rather than a step change, and (3) prediction‑market moves toward Trump were already underway and largely attributed to big bettors and other factors rather than these interviews, there’s no strong evidence that the Trump–Bloomberg and Harris–Fox interviews materially changed election probabilities or polling. That aligns with Jason’s claim that voter views were essentially already baked in by mid‑October 2024.

Factual status as of 30 Nov 2025

• Starlink has nowhere near 500 million paying subscribers. Public figures show ~8 million users as of November 2025, up from about 4 million in September 2024 and ~6 million by mid‑2025. 【1search13】
• Several telecom services already exceed 500 million paying subscriptions:
  • China Mobile has around 1.0 billion mobile subscriptions as of September 2024. 【2search0】 
  • Reliance Jio and Bharti Airtel are also in this range: Jio passes 500 million mobile subscribers around September 2025, 【1search2】 and Airtel exceeds 600 million by September 2025. 【2search13】
• Among the typical consumer digital subscriptions discussed on tech podcasts, none is at 500M yet: Netflix has about 302M paid memberships as of January 2025, 【3search19】 and Spotify has about 281M paying subscribers as of September 2025. 【3search26】

Why this makes the prediction ambiguous

Jason’s normalized prediction is that Starlink could become the first product in history to reach ~500M paying subscribers.

1. If “product” includes telecom/mobile services, then the statement about being first is already impossible: mobile operators like China Mobile had well over 500M paying subscribers long before this podcast episode (and still do), so Starlink cannot ever be the first 500M‑subscriber product under that broad definition. On this reading, the prediction is effectively wrong. 【2search0】【1search2】
2. If he meant a narrower class of “consumer subscription products” (e.g., Netflix/Spotify‑style digital services, but excluding telcos), then no one has yet reached 500M, and Starlink is still far below that level (~8M). Whether Starlink eventually becomes the first in this narrower category is still unknowable as of late 2025, so the prediction would be too early to score. 【1search13】【3search19】【3search26】

Because we cannot tell which category Jason intended (broad “any paid subscriber product,” where it’s already clearly false, vs. a restricted “tech subscription app/service” category, where it’s still open), the truth value of the prediction cannot be determined even though enough time has passed to falsify one interpretation.

Hence the prediction is best scored as "ambiguous" rather than definitively right, wrong, or merely too early.

As of November 30, 2025, we are only about 14 months past the prediction date of September 27, 2024. Jason’s prediction explicitly referred to outcomes over the subsequent 2–3 years (i.e., roughly late 2026 to late 2027) for revenue-per-employee at Google, Uber, Airbnb, and Meta. Because that time window has not yet arrived, we cannot yet evaluate whether each company has in fact doubled its revenue per employee relative to the 2023–2024 baseline. Any current financial or headcount data would only show partial progress toward a 2026–2027 target, not whether the prediction ultimately holds. Therefore, it is too early to judge the prediction’s accuracy.

As of November 30, 2025, the preconditions for Jason’s prediction have not been met, and the time horizon (“once these things weigh a lot less…”, implicitly “over the next several years”) is far from exhausted.

Smart‑glasses are clearly progressing but are still a niche, early‑adopter product rather than a mature, mass‑market replacement for a large share of smartphone usage. Meta’s Ray‑Ban line has sold only a few million units since launch and, while successful within its niche, is described as a specialty gadget whose U.S. smart‑glasses market remains small, despite sales roughly tripling in 2025. (reuters.com) Surveys likewise show modest ownership (around mid‑single‑digit percentages) and only partial consumer interest, not anything close to universal usage. (spglobal.com) That level of adoption is far below what would be needed for glasses to handle “about one‑third” of everyday phone tasks for the average person.

On the hardware side, major players still struggle to deliver lightweight, all‑day AR glasses with phone‑class performance and battery life. Apple, for example, has repeatedly postponed or canceled AR‑glasses projects because current technology cannot yet deliver a comfortable, glasses‑sized device with sufficient power and thermal characteristics, and is instead focusing on headsets or future smart‑glasses concepts. (macworld.com) Industry analyses also highlight unresolved constraints around weight (roughly 50 g as a practical limit), battery life, and full AR capability. (ainvest.com)

Since (1) the envisioned hardware (“once these things weigh a lot less”) is not yet fully realized, (2) mainstream behavior has not shifted so that glasses routinely take over ~⅓ of smartphone tasks, and (3) the prediction’s timeframe is multi‑year and has not elapsed, it is too early to judge definitively whether Jason’s forecast will prove right or wrong.

Donald Trump did in fact win the November 5, 2024 U.S. presidential election, defeating Kamala Harris with 312 electoral votes to 226 and winning the popular vote roughly 49.8% to 48.3%. (en.wikipedia.org) This means Jason’s stated view that there was a “pretty good” / better‑than‑even chance Trump would win ended up aligned with the actual outcome.

On the mechanism, post‑election analyses show that pre‑election polling once again slightly underestimated Trump’s support by about 2–3 percentage points nationally and in key swing states, generally biasing toward the Democrat. (theguardian.com) Explanations emphasize things like nonresponse bias and turnout modeling problems—Trump‑leaning voters being less likely to answer or complete polls, or breaking late toward Trump—rather than clear evidence of large numbers of voters actively lying to pollsters. (pewresearch.org) That pattern is at least directionally consistent with Jason’s idea that some Trump supporters were not fully visible in polling or social circles, though experts still debate how big a classic “shy Trump” (social‑desirability) effect really is.

Because the core, checkable part of the prediction—Trump having a strong chance and ultimately winning in November 2024—came true, and the claimed existence of a non‑open Trump‑supporting bloc is broadly consistent with the observed, modest undercount of Trump in polls (even if the exact cause is disputed), the fairest overall judgment is that this prediction was right.

The prediction states that around 24 months after the September 6, 2024 episode—i.e., roughly by September 2026—Jason Calacanis and Chamath Palihapitiya will be arrested in connection with celebrating Chamath’s 50th birthday.

As of today’s date (November 30, 2025), that 24‑month window has not yet elapsed. Thus, even if there is currently no public record of either Jason Calacanis or Chamath Palihapitiya being arrested, we cannot yet determine whether the prediction will ultimately be right or wrong.

Recent biographical and news coverage of both Calacanis and Palihapitiya shows no report of arrests or criminal charges against them up to 2025, but that only confirms the prediction has not yet come true—it does not settle its eventual outcome. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the prediction’s target date lies in the future relative to now, the correct status is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than right or wrong.

Multiple reliable sources confirm that Vice President Kamala Harris and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz sat for their first joint interview with CNN’s Dana Bash, airing as a primetime special on Thursday, August 29, 2024, at 9 p.m. ET.

• CNN’s own press release announced “THE FIRST INTERVIEW: HARRIS & WALZ – A CNN EXCLUSIVE” with Dana Bash, scheduled for Thursday, August 29 at 9 p.m. ET. (cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com)
• Coverage from NPR and affiliated outlets notes that Harris, joined by Walz, sat down with CNN’s Dana Bash in Savannah, Georgia, describing it explicitly as this first sit‑down interview as the Democratic nominee, dated August 29, 2024. (news.wjct.org)
• A Reuters fact‑check further confirms that the full 27‑minute Harris–Walz interview with CNN’s Dana Bash aired as scheduled on August 29 at 9 p.m. ET. (reuters.com)

Given that the podcast was released Friday, August 30, 2024, Jason’s prediction that “Kamala and [Walz] will do an interview with Dana Bash tonight, the night we’re taping this on Thursday” matches what actually happened the preceding Thursday night (August 29, 2024). Therefore, the prediction is right.

As of November 30, 2025, Apple has not launched its own general‑purpose web search engine that directly competes with Google Search or is offered as a default/primary search option on Apple devices.

Evidence:

• Safari on iOS still defaults to Google Search, with users able to switch only among third‑party engines such as Google, Bing, DuckDuckGo, Yahoo Japan, and Ecosia; no Apple‑branded search engine appears in the list, even in new choice‑screen flows like those added in Japan with iOS 26.2. (macrumors.com)
• In late 2024 court filings tied to the U.S. DOJ’s antitrust case against Google, Apple executives (notably Eddy Cue) explicitly stated that Apple does not plan to build a search engine to rival Google, emphasizing the revenue and practical reasons for continuing the Google default‑search deal. (theverge.com)
• Reporting through 2024–2025 describes Apple working on search technology and AI features (Applebot, Spotlight, Siri enhancements), but notes that a full Google‑replacement web search engine remains years away and, per Apple’s own representations, is not an announced product. (macrumors.com)
• Recent rumors of an AI‑powered system called “World Knowledge Answers” indicate a planned answer engine or AI search feature integrated into Siri, potentially launching in 2026 and possibly even powered by Google’s Gemini models. This is framed as an AI assistant/answer layer, not as an independent, Apple‑branded web search engine comparable to google.com or as a new default search provider in Safari. (theverge.com)

Because Jason’s prediction was open‑ended in time ("going to launch their own search engine" / "at some point in the future") and no explicit deadline was given, it cannot yet be judged definitively wrong; Apple could still launch such a product later. At the same time, it has clearly not yet come true by the current date. Therefore, the correct status is inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than right or wrong.

As of November 30, 2025, it’s too early to definitively judge a prediction framed as happening “in the very near future” and normalized as within a few years of August 2024.

Evidence so far:

• Sweetgreen has clearly moved toward substantial in-store automation. Its “Infinite Kitchen” robotic makeline is being rolled out aggressively: 12 locations were operating by the end of 2024, with plans to dedicate roughly half of 2025 new builds to this format and expand to around 33+ automated stores, citing large labor and margin advantages.(convenience.org) A November 2025 report notes about 20 Infinite Kitchen units in operation and a plan for 10 more by year-end, reinforcing that automation is a core part of Sweetgreen’s strategy to cut labor and improve unit economics.(restauranttechnologynews.com)
• Across quick‑service and fast‑casual broadly, more chains are experimenting with robotics, kiosks, and AI-driven tools (e.g., Chipotle’s automated bowl/salad lines and avocado-prep robots), largely to address labor costs and productivity.(barrons.com) This supports the direction of the prediction at an industry level.
• Starbucks, however, has recently pulled back on its major automation push. The company is scaling down the rollout of its Siren equipment system and instead increasing staffing, with CEO Brian Niccol explicitly acknowledging that earlier assumptions about equipment replacing labor did not pan out. The Siren system is now being reserved for a relatively small set of high‑volume stores, and the company is leaning into a “staffing‑first” model to improve the customer experience.(reuters.com) This runs against the idea that Starbucks itself will heavily automate in the near term specifically to cut labor and real‑estate costs.

Why the verdict is ‘inconclusive’:

• The prediction’s horizon is “within a few years of August 2024.” As of late 2025, only about a year and a quarter has elapsed, so the full time window has not passed.
• Some core examples (Sweetgreen and several peers) are clearly moving toward more robotics and automation in line with the claim, while Starbucks—the other named example—is moving in the opposite direction, at least for now.

Given that the relevant time period is still in progress and the evidence is mixed (strong confirmation at some chains, active retrenchment at Starbucks), the fairest assessment at this point is that the prediction’s ultimate accuracy is not yet knowable, hence “inconclusive.”

The prediction explicitly used a decade‑scale horizon (“over time… within the next decade or so”), made in August 2024. As of November 30, 2025, only about a year has passed, so the time window for judging it has not elapsed.

Current evidence shows increasing automation and AI assistance at chains like Starbucks and McDonald’s, but not the large‑scale elimination of in‑store roles Jason described:

• Starbucks is rolling out “Green Dot Assist,” a generative‑AI assistant meant to help baristas with recipes, troubleshooting, and workflow, with a broad rollout planned for fiscal 2026. Company messaging repeatedly frames this as making baristas’ jobs easier, not as replacing them, and CEO Brian Niccol has publicly said the goal is to assist workers, not substitute them with robots.【2search0】【2search1】【2news13】
• Starbucks has also paused a broader hardware‑automation program (the Siren Craft system) and shifted toward a “people‑first” scheduling and staffing strategy, emphasizing better use of human labor rather than removing it.【1search5】
• McDonald’s is investing heavily in AI and connected equipment (drive‑through tools, predictive maintenance, manager dashboards) to improve speed and reduce stress on staff, but these are positioned as tools that support existing crews.【1search3】【1search4】 The company even ended a specific AI drive‑thru ordering trial with IBM after mixed results, while still exploring future AI solutions.【1search0】【1search1】

Net: automation and AI are expanding, but cashiers, cooks, and baristas remain central in these chains today. Because Jason’s claim is about what will happen over roughly 10 years and we are only ~10–15% into that period, it is too early to determine whether his strong version (“cashiers will be gone, the cooks will be gone, and eventually the baristas will be gone”) will ultimately prove right or wrong.

It’s too early to definitively judge this prediction against its own time horizon.

• The claim was about “the next few years” from August 2024. In ordinary language that implies at least ~2–3 years. As of November 30, 2025, only about 15 months have passed, so the stated period has not elapsed.
• Current data, however, do not match the scenario described. For U.S. remote‑capable (knowledge‑type) jobs in early–mid 2025, about 52% are hybrid, 27–28% fully remote, and only ~20–21% fully on‑site, meaning most such employees still have at least some remote work rather than being primarily office‑based. (greatplacetowork.com)
• Surveys of employers show rising in‑office expectations, but nowhere near “80%+” of knowledge workers mandated back full‑time. One large 2025 summary finds around 22% of companies fully in‑office, with another ~5% planning to be, and about 40% of workers saying they’re required in the office five days a week—substantial, but still far from near‑universal full‑time office mandates. (forbes.com)
• Looking ahead, forecasts suggest only about 30% of companies plan to require five days in the office by 2026, while 88% of employers offer some hybrid option, and surveys still show hybrid as the dominant long‑term model for remote‑capable roles. (secondtalent.com)
• A Stanford / Atlanta Fed survey in 2025 reports that only 12% of executives with hybrid/remote staff plan new full return‑to‑office mandates in the next year, implying most employers expect to maintain hybrid or remote arrangements rather than forcing almost everyone back. (news.stanford.edu)

So as of late 2025, the prediction is not currently borne out by the data and appears to be trending wrong, but because the predictor explicitly referenced a multi‑year horizon that has not yet passed, the status is best classified as "inconclusive (too early)" rather than definitively wrong.

Donald Trump won the November 5, 2024 U.S. presidential election over Kamala Harris, 312–226 in the Electoral College and by about 1.5 points in the popular vote, so the actual outcome was a Trump, not Harris, victory.(en.wikipedia.org)(cfr.org)

However, Jason’s prediction was conditional and uses vague criteria:

1. Trump clause: He said Trump "has a chance of winning if he" adopts a more presidential, non‑bullying, issues‑focused "Trump 2.0" style. In reality, multiple analyses find that Trump’s 2024 rhetoric became more combative and violent over time, with heightened use of dehumanizing and fear‑based language on immigration and culture‑war themes, and voters widely saw him as personally too critical of his opponent.(calonews.com)(en.wikipedia.org)(washingtonpost.com)(pewresearch.org) Since the condition (a notably more restrained, non‑bullying style) did not clearly occur, his conditional statement about that scenario can’t really be tested—yet it’s also extremely weak (“has a chance”), which would be hard to falsify even if it had occurred.

2. Harris clause: He added, “If Kamala goes moderate, I think she’s going to win.” Here both the condition and the outcome are problematic to evaluate. Some coverage described Harris as making an intentional “shift to the center” or running a fairly centrist, reassurance‑oriented campaign, especially on economics and immigration, and highlighted her outreach to figures like Liz Cheney.(thedispatch.com)(axios.com)(indiatoday.in) Other reporting and academic analysis emphasized that she never made “obvious moves to the center,” continued to foreground progressive themes (democracy, social justice, systemic reform), and that Republicans successfully portrayed her as more liberal than she claimed, leaving many voters unsure she was truly moderate.(washingtonpost.com)(frontiersin.org)(liberalpatriot.com) Because reasonable analysts disagree about whether she genuinely “went moderate” in the sense Jason appears to mean, it’s unclear whether his condition was ever met; we only know that the predicted outcome (her winning) did not happen.

Since:

• the Trump clause hinges on a style shift that clearly did not occur and only claimed he would then “have a chance” (a nearly unfalsifiable statement), and
• the Harris clause depends on a contested, degree‑based notion of whether she “went moderate” at all,

we cannot cleanly map any realized scenario to the specific if‑then branches Jason described. The election result is known, but the conditions in his prediction are too vague and disputed to say the prediction as stated was definitively right or wrong.

Conclusion: The prediction’s truth value is ambiguous rather than clearly correct or incorrect.

As of November 30, 2025, the key trigger condition for Jason’s prediction has not occurred, and the time window he specified has not started.

1. Apple has not (yet) lost the Google default‑search TAC deal as a remedy of the DOJ antitrust case.

   • Judge Amit Mehta’s remedies ruling in the U.S. search‑monopoly case against Google (United States v. Google LLC, 2020) in September 2025 barred exclusive arrangements and required Google to share some search data, but explicitly allowed Google to continue paying partners like Apple to be the default search engine. (barrons.com)
   • Reporting around the case and Apple’s own filings repeatedly describe Apple as still benefiting from a multibillion‑dollar default‑search agreement with Google (about $20B/year), and Apple has been actively trying to protect that revenue stream in the remedies phase. (theverge.com)
     Since the deal continues, the condition “after losing the default‑search TAC deal with Google as a result of this antitrust case” has not been met.

2. Apple has not bought an existing search engine or launched a full Google‑style first‑party web search engine.

   • There is no record through late 2025 of Apple acquiring DuckDuckGo, Brave Search, or any similar web search engine. Public reporting and reference sources continue to list DuckDuckGo and Brave Search as independent companies/products, not Apple subsidiaries. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • In fact, Apple’s services chief Eddy Cue has told the court that Apple has no plans to build a standalone Google‑rival search engine, calling such an effort economically and technically impractical; Apple instead emphasizes AI‑driven search features layered on top of existing providers. (theverge.com)
     This undercuts the likelihood of the prediction but doesn’t make it logically false, because it concerns Apple’s future behavior after a potential loss of the Google deal.

3. Time horizon: “within a few years after losing the deal.”
   Jason’s prediction is explicitly conditional and long‑dated: only after Apple loses the TAC deal as a result of this case does a “within a few years” clock start. Given that (a) Apple has not yet lost the deal, and (b) the contract itself is reported to run at least into 2026 with possible extensions, the specified time window for the predicted acquisition has not even begun. (reuters.com)

Because the triggering event (loss of the TAC deal) has not occurred and the stated “few years” window has not started, there is not yet a factual basis to declare the prediction either correct or incorrect. It remains too early to tell, so the outcome is inconclusive.

Donald Trump won the 2024 U.S. presidential election on November 5, 2024, defeating Democratic nominee Kamala Harris 312–226 in the Electoral College and becoming president‑elect.​ (en.wikipedia.org) He was subsequently inaugurated on January 20, 2025, as the 47th President of the United States.​ (en.wikipedia.org) This matches Jason’s characterization of Trump as the “likely 47th president,” so the prediction is accurate.

Subsequent official investigations align with Jason’s core prediction that Thomas Matthew Crooks would be treated as a lone-wolf attacker rather than part of an organized political plot. A major FBI briefing in November 2025, summarized in outlets like Fox News and People, reported that after reviewing 35 financial and social‑media accounts, 13 devices, and over 1,000 interviews, the Bureau concluded Crooks acted alone and found “no evidence” that any foreign or domestic individual, organization, or government directed, inspired, or assisted him. (foxnews.com) Other coverage of the same findings likewise emphasizes that there was no supporting network and no second shooter, debunking conspiracy or organized‑plot theories. (nypost.com)

On motive, the FBI and independent reporting still state that it is formally unknown, and that investigators have not identified a clear ideological or political driver. Wikipedia and later summaries describe the motive as “unknown,” and note that extensive inquiry has failed to produce a definitive political or organizational explanation. (en.wikipedia.org) However, multiple FBI‑linked briefings and expert analyses paint a picture close to what Jason anticipated: Crooks is described as a socially isolated “loner” who fit standard assassin / mass‑shooter profiles, with the FBI suggesting a “complex interplay of personal grievances, mental health issues and a desire for notoriety,” and former agents saying he appeared less like an ideologue and more like an anti‑social individual seeking fame. (foxnews.com) These accounts explicitly contrast psychological and anti‑social factors with organized or ideological direction.

Because the investigative consensus is that Crooks was a lone actor and not part of any organized political plot, and because the post‑hoc framing emphasizes psychological/mental‑health and anti‑social issues rather than a clear political conspiracy, Jason’s directional claim matches how the case is now officially characterized. The narrow detail that investigators have not formally declared “mental illness” as the singular, primary cause keeps the prediction from being perfectly word‑for‑word accurate, but its main thrust—lone disturbed individual, not an organized political plot—has been borne out, so it is best scored as right.

Donald Trump did win the 2024 U.S. presidential election and began serving a second (non‑consecutive) term on January 20, 2025, so the conditional part of the prediction about his returning to office has been met.

However, the substance of the prediction concerns whether his second administration “will permit substantially more mid‑market M&A” in tech (roughly under $100 billion) than under Biden. As of late 2025, the evidence is mixed and still very early:

• The Trump DOJ and FTC have kept the 2023 Biden‑era merger guidelines rather than explicitly rolling them back, signaling continuity in formal merger review standards. (cnbc.com)
• Enforcement against significant tech and tech‑adjacent deals has continued: DOJ sued to block Hewlett Packard Enterprise’s $14 billion acquisition of Juniper Networks and the FTC sued to block GTCR’s $627 million acquisition of Surmodics, and DOJ reaffirmed a Biden‑era push to break up Google; major antitrust litigation against Meta is also ongoing. (mondaq.com)
• At the same time, some commentary and data suggest overall M&A activity (across sectors) has picked up and that enforcement is easing somewhat compared with Biden’s term, with fewer merger challenges so far and more willingness to settle or allow deals with remedies. (wsj.com)

But Trump’s second term is less than a year old, and available analyses focus on broad M&A or individual high‑profile cases, not on a robust, quantitative comparison of mid‑market tech deals allowed versus those during the full four years of the Biden administration. Given the short time window and the mixed, still‑evolving enforcement picture, there is not enough evidence yet to say that U.S. antitrust policy under Trump has clearly permitted “substantially more” sub‑$100B tech M&A than under Biden.

Because the relevant policy outcomes over the full 2025–2029 term are still unfolding and the comparative data are incomplete, the prediction is best classified as inconclusive (too early to tell) rather than clearly right or wrong.

Public reports and later historical summaries agree that President Joe Biden announced his withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race on Sunday, July 21, 2024, via a letter posted to his X (Twitter) account in which he stated he would stand down from seeking reelection but continue serving as president for the remainder of his term. (en.wikipedia.org) He did not resign from office, but the prediction was explicitly disjunctive: it allowed for him either to resign from the race or from office. Because he formally stepped aside as a candidate within the specified weekend window (from the episode’s release on Friday, July 19, 2024, through the end of Sunday, July 21, 2024), the prediction that he would “resign this weekend” in the sense of exiting the 2024 race was fulfilled.

Jason’s prediction was that by sometime in 2025 AI tools would hit a tipping point in adoption such that many organizations achieve substantial labor arbitrage (one worker effectively doing the work of several / replacing large chunks of lower‑skilled knowledge work).

What we do see by late 2025

• Multiple surveys show very broad individual adoption of AI at work. Microsoft’s Work Trend Index data, summarized by Worklytics, reports that about 75% of global knowledge workers are now using AI tools regularly, with usage roughly doubling in the prior six months. (worklytics.co) A Clutch survey finds 74% of full‑time workers regularly use AI on the job. (lifewire.com)
• Microsoft’s 2025 Work Trend Index for Switzerland reports that 52% of Swiss organizations already use AI agents to automate business processes, and 72% of leaders plan to deploy AI agents as “digital team members” to expand workforce capacity over the next 12–18 months—clear signs of serious organizational adoption and intent to use AI as a capacity multiplier. (news.microsoft.com)
• McKinsey’s 2025 "AI in the workplace" report finds that 94% of employees and 99% of C‑suite leaders have some familiarity with gen‑AI tools, and about 13% of employees already use gen‑AI for more than 30% of their daily work. The report explicitly describes the situation as “beyond the tipping point” in terms of awareness and early use. (mckinsey.com)
• Field and survey studies show real productivity effects: a 6‑month randomized experiment across ~6,000 knowledge workers found that those with an integrated gen‑AI assistant spent about 25% less time on email and finished documents somewhat faster, demonstrating that some employees can handle more output in the same hours. (arxiv.org) A systematic review of practitioner studies reports that many professionals delegate routine tasks to gen‑AI and sometimes bypass peers/subordinates in favor of AI, indicating nascent task‑level substitution. (arxiv.org)
• Executives increasingly talk in explicitly labor‑arbitrage terms. A BearingPoint survey reports that around half of executives believe their firms are already 10–19% overstaffed due to automation and AI and expect overcapacity could reach up to 50% in three years, especially in back‑office, customer service, and entry‑level finance/HR roles. (techradar.com) This shows that some organizations perceive AI as enabling fewer people to cover the same workload.

What we do not clearly see yet

• The same McKinsey 2025 report emphasizes that, despite high familiarity, most organizations are still moving slowly from pilots to scaled deployment; 47% of C‑suite leaders say their organizations are releasing gen‑AI tools too slowly and are still building or refining roadmaps. (mckinsey.com) That is more consistent with early transformation than a completed tipping point in structural labor arbitrage.
• Research on job exposure finds that nearly all jobs have some generative‑AI exposure but only a minority are heavily affected so far. The GAISI study for the UK shows widespread exposure but relatively limited heavily affected roles, and early evidence that displacement effects may be emerging, not yet dominant. (arxiv.org)
• Macro‑level analyses from McKinsey estimate that half of current work activities could be automated only between about 2030 and 2060, even under favorable adoption scenarios, implying that the full labor‑substitution effects unfold over decades rather than having clearly arrived by 2025. (mckinsey.com)
• Several worker surveys report that AI often adds oversight and correction work and can increase workload, rather than simply letting one person replace multiple others outright, at least with current tools and governance. (news.com.au)

Why the outcome is ambiguous rather than clearly right or wrong

• On the “right” side: by 2025, AI is indeed widely deployed; many knowledge workers use it daily; some firms are automating entire processes; some executives explicitly see staff overcapacity from AI; and individual‑level studies show meaningful productivity gains that plausibly allow fewer staff to cover the same work in certain functions. These facts support Jason’s intuition that AI would start enabling labor arbitrage by 2025.
• On the “wrong” side: the prediction implied a broad, clear tipping point where “a lot” of labor arbitrage occurs across many organizations, with one worker routinely doing the work of several or large portions of lower‑skilled knowledge work being systematically replaced. Available evidence shows early and uneven adoption, modest but real task substitution, and mostly hybrid "human + AI" workflows, not a well‑documented, economy‑wide flip to large‑scale labor replacement in 2025.
• Crucially, terms like “tipping point,” “a lot of labor arbitrage,” and “many organizations” lack precise thresholds, and existing data does not cleanly map onto them. Different reasonable observers could look at the same mix of high adoption, early job restructuring, but still‑limited measured displacement and disagree on whether Jason’s bar has been met.

Because substantial evidence supports partial realization of his claim (especially in some sectors and early‑adopting firms), but there is no clear, quantitative demonstration that a broad 2025 tipping point in labor arbitrage has occurred, the prediction cannot be judged cleanly true or false. Hence the evaluation: ambiguous.

Since the July 12, 2024 podcast, several humanoid and advanced general-purpose robots have indeed reached roughly the US$20,000 price point and become commercially offered, matching Jason’s order‑of‑magnitude prediction.

Concrete examples:

• 1X Technologies’ NEO home humanoid robot opened global preorders in October 2025 at a listed price of US$20,000 (or a $499/month subscription), with deliveries scheduled for 2026, marketed explicitly as a consumer-ready humanoid home assistant.​​ (en.wikipedia.org)
• Chinese firms are also targeting similar or lower prices: Unitree’s R1 humanoid was announced in 2025 at about US$5,900, and its other humanoids (G1, H1) plus competing platforms like Pudu’s D9 and Neura’s 4NE‑1 cluster in the mid‑five‑figure or sub‑US$20k–30k band, placing advanced humanoids in the same order of magnitude as US$20,000.​ (nypost.com)
• UBTech publicly discussed selling a home/elder‑care humanoid at around US$20,000, further corroborating that manufacturers see ~US$20k as a realistic commercial price point for such robots in this timeframe.​ (cybernews.com)
• While Tesla Optimus itself is not yet sold to outside customers, Elon Musk and Tesla have repeatedly framed Optimus’s intended price in the roughly US$20,000–30,000 range, reinforcing that this is the expected commercial band for Optimus‑class humanoids.​ (digitimes.com)

Because humanoid and Optimus‑class robots are now actually being offered for sale or preorder at ~US$20,000 in the 2024–2026 window that would reasonably count as the "foreseeable near term" from the podcast date, the substance of Jason’s prediction has come true.

Available reporting around July 12–22, 2024 shows intense media and political scrutiny of Biden’s health, but no named whistleblower from Biden’s own inner circle publicly coming forward with evidence of a cover‑up within that 10‑day window.

Key facts:

• On July 8, 2024 (before the podcast window even starts), The Wall Street Journal reported that Biden’s team had long limited his schedule and unscripted interactions to minimize concerns about age and mental acuity, based on interviews with about 50 people. These were largely anonymous sources and the story predated the July 12 release date. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In early July 2024, multiple outlets reported that a Parkinson’s specialist repeatedly visited the White House, based on visitor logs; the White House physician, Dr. Kevin O’Connor, publicly denied that Biden was being treated for Parkinson’s and insisted examinations found no such disorder. This was document‑ and log‑driven reporting, not a Biden‑inner‑circle whistleblower alleging a cover‑up. (theweek.com)
• On July 10, 2024, House Oversight subpoenaed three close aides (Annie Tomasini, Anthony Bernal, and Dr. O’Connor) after an unnamed former Biden aide alleged they were “seeking to cover up” Biden’s declining cognitive state. That allegation was relayed by Republicans and media, but the source remained anonymous and there is no record of a public, on‑the‑record whistleblower from Biden’s inner circle in the following 10 days. (dailywire.com)
• Biden announced he would not seek re‑election on July 21, 2024, but mainstream acknowledgment that his “inner circle worked to conceal his decline” came later via a Washington Post editorial on August 20, 2024, and still was not tied to a single inner‑circle whistleblower stepping forward at that time. (en.wikipedia.org)
• More detailed claims of a cover‑up based on interviews with inner‑circle figures emerged only in 2025 with books like Original Sin (Tapper & Thompson), drawing on roughly 200 mostly anonymous interviews conducted after the 2024 election. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because no named, public whistleblower from Biden’s medical staff, close aides, or senior White House personnel came forward between July 12 and about July 22, 2024 with evidence alleging a cover‑up of his cognitive decline, Jason’s time‑bound prediction **did not come true.

Key parts of Jason’s prediction both did and did not line up with what actually happened, and one of his central claims can’t be directly tested.

1. Biden did not remain the Democratic nominee, so “Trump will beat Biden” never occurred as stated.
Joe Biden ran for re‑election, won the Democratic primaries, and secured enough delegates to be the nominee, but on July 21, 2024 he withdrew from the race and endorsed Kamala Harris.(en.wikipedia.org) Because Biden stepped aside before the general election, there was no Biden‑vs‑Trump contest; Trump instead ran against Harris and defeated her.(en.wikipedia.org) That means the specific forecast “Trump will beat Biden in 2024” cannot be directly verified or falsified.

2. The “speed run” / rapid replacement process essentially did happen, but not as a voter‑facing primary.
After Biden’s withdrawal and endorsement, Democrats coalesced around Harris with remarkable speed:

• Within about a day, Harris had enough delegate commitments to clinch the nomination.(people.com)
• The DNC then set up an accelerated virtual roll‑call process (Aug 1–5) to officially nominate her before the in‑person August convention, explicitly to meet timing and ballot‑access concerns and avoid a messy open convention.(theguardian.com)
• Groups like Black Lives Matter criticized this as an elite‑driven, rushed process that bypassed broader voter participation, and even demanded a more open virtual primary—underscoring how compressed and top‑down the replacement process was.(reuters.com)

So, Jason’s broad idea that Democrats would respond to Biden’s weakness with a fast, improvised nomination “speed run” was largely borne out, though it took the form of a rapid delegate realignment and virtual roll‑call rather than a traditional, multi‑candidate primary.

3. Overall assessment

• The election‑outcome claim (“Trump will beat Biden”) hinges on a matchup that never occurred because Biden withdrew; that part is not verifiable.
• The process‑prediction (a rapid, improvised effort to replace or re‑legitimize the nominee) broadly matches what happened with Harris and the DNC’s compressed virtual nomination.

Because part of the prediction is untestable and another part is substantially but not perfectly accurate, the fairest judgment is “ambiguous” rather than clearly right or wrong.

The prediction has two parts, both of which must occur:

1. A fast, highly compressed Democratic process to choose/ratify a new nominee by Aug. 19, 2024
   This did happen. After Joe Biden withdrew on July 21, 2024, Democrats rapidly organized an accelerated selection process using a virtual roll call:

   • On July 22 the DNC confirmed it would use a pre‑convention virtual roll call to select the nominee and have one in place by Aug. 7, explicitly emphasizing that the process would be “fast.” (axios.com)
   • On July 30, the DNC formally announced that only Kamala Harris qualified and that the virtual roll call to nominate her would run Aug. 1–5. (democrats.org)
   • Harris was officially certified as the Democratic presidential nominee on Aug. 5, 2024, before the in‑person convention opened on Aug. 19. (en.wikipedia.org)
     This fits the “speedrun” / highly compressed selection process part of the prediction.

2. A whistleblower about Biden’s cognitive state coming forward publicly in July 2024
   Extensive July 2024 coverage documented concerns about Biden’s age and cognition, based on reporting and anonymous current/former aides, but there was no widely reported, on‑the‑record whistleblower in that month:

   • Summaries of July 2024 events list media investigations (e.g., Wall Street Journal and Washington Post pieces) and public calls from Democrats for Biden to step aside, but they do not identify a specific named whistleblower who publicly came forward about a cognitive cover‑up in July. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Key insiders such as White House physician Kevin O’Connor and Jill Biden adviser Anthony Bernal were drawn into congressional inquiries via letters and subpoenas (e.g., July 7 and July 10, 2024), but they did not themselves step forward as whistleblowers in that period. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Whistleblower‑style accounts about Biden’s mental decline from Secret Service or other insiders surface later (in 2025 reporting and book coverage), not in July 2024. (thedailybeast.com)

Because the “speedrun” nomination process prediction was essentially right but the July 2024 whistleblower part did not occur, the overall conjunctive prediction is wrong.

Key elements of Jason’s prediction did not occur:

1. No “speed‑run” summer primary with debates. After President Biden’s poor June 2024 debate performance and growing pressure, he withdrew from the 2024 presidential race on July 21, 2024, but Democrats did not run a rapid multi‑candidate primary with ~five debates over ten weeks. Instead, party leaders and delegates quickly consolidated behind Vice President Kamala Harris, who was formally made the nominee via a virtual delegate vote concluding on August 5–6, 2024, without a new series of debates or a multi‑candidate “speed‑run” primary. (en.wikipedia.org)

2. Biden did not resign the presidency, and Harris did not become president before the election. When Biden ended his reelection bid, he explicitly said he would continue serving as president for the remainder of his term. He remained in office through the 2024 campaign and left when his successor was inaugurated in January 2025; Harris never assumed the presidency before the election. (en.wikipedia.org)

3. The Democrat did not “demolish” Trump; Trump won. Kamala Harris became the Democratic nominee, but she lost the November 5, 2024 general election to Donald Trump, who was elected the 47th president. This is the opposite of the prediction that the eventual Democratic nominee would decisively defeat Trump. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the core predicted sequence (Biden resigns the presidency → Harris becomes president → a multi‑candidate summer debate sprint → Democratic nominee crushes Trump) diverged from what actually happened, the overall prediction is wrong, despite partially anticipating that Biden would exit the race and that Harris would become the Democratic nominee.

Jason made this prediction on the May 31, 2024 episode "Trump verdict, COVID Cover-up, Crypto Corner, Salesforce drops 20%, AI correction?", saying, "I believe that's what's going to happen in the next 30 to 60 days... there's going to be a switcheroo, 100%."(podscripts.co) That episode’s date anchors his 30–60 day window to roughly June 30–July 30, 2024.

On July 21, 2024—about 51 days after May 31—President Joe Biden announced his withdrawal from the 2024 presidential race.(en.wikipedia.org) The same day, Vice President Kamala Harris launched her own presidential campaign, and she became the Democratic Party’s official nominee on August 5, 2024.(en.wikipedia.org) Functionally, the Democratic Party did “switch” from Biden to a new standard-bearer within Jason’s 30–60 day forecast window.

Because Biden exited the race and Harris replaced him as the Democratic nominee within that time frame, Jason’s prediction that there would be a Biden "switcheroo" in the next 30–60 days is best judged as right.

As of November 30, 2025, enough time has passed to judge this prediction, and most of the core scenario Jason sketched out did occur, though one quantitative detail (the "30%" figure) was off.

1. “Trump’s going to demolish him in a debate.” – Largely accurate
The first 2024 Biden–Trump debate took place on June 27, 2024. Post-debate polling and later reporting consistently describe Biden’s performance as disastrous and Trump as clearly outperforming him:

• A 538/Ipsos poll of debate watchers found about 60% said Trump performed best vs. 21% for Biden, and 73% rated Biden’s performance as poor or terrible, while only 8% said it was good or excellent. (ipsos.com)
• Subsequent analyses and campaign books routinely refer to the debate as a “nationally televised disaster” for Biden and a pivotal moment that triggered panic inside the Democratic Party. (politico.com)
  That matches the spirit of “demolish” in terms of perceived performance, even though some analysts cautioned that Trump’s showing wasn’t objectively strong on its own.

2. “He’ll sink to 30% in the polls.” – Incorrect
Whether you interpret this as overall job approval or vote intention, Biden’s numbers never dropped to ~30%:

• National job-approval series (Gallup, Marquette, AP–NORC, etc.) have Biden mostly in the high‑30s to low‑40s through 2024. For example, Gallup recorded 38% approval around this period, and Marquette’s national polling had him at roughly 35–40%, with a low of about 34% later in 2024 – still above 30. (law.marquette.edu)
• In head‑to‑head vote polls, Biden’s support also stayed around 40%, not 30%. The 538 national average moved from roughly a tie pre‑debate to Trump leading by about 1–2 points (e.g., Trump ~42%, Biden ~40%) after June 27. (goodmorningamerica.com)
  So the specific numerical claim about “30% in the polls” did not materialize.

3. “Then the Democrats will give him a graceful out and field somebody else.” – Substantively correct
The rest of the scenario essentially unfolded as described:

• After weeks of intense internal pressure following the June 27 debate, Biden announced on July 21, 2024 that he was ending his re‑election bid, framing it as a decision taken “in the best interest of my party and the country” and saying he’d focus on serving out his term – a classic “graceful exit” letter. (time.com)
• In the same move, he formally endorsed Kamala Harris as the Democratic nominee. (americamagazine.org)
• A YouGov snap poll the day of his withdrawal found 71% of Americans – including 70% of Democrats – approved of his decision to step aside, and 82% of Democrats supported his endorsement of Harris, indicating the party and broader public largely saw it as a legitimate, orderly handoff rather than a messy ouster. (today.yougov.com)
• Harris then became the Democratic nominee (formally at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024), i.e., the party “fielded somebody else” in Biden’s place. (en.wikipedia.org)

Overall assessment
Jason correctly anticipated the structure and outcome of events: a debate in which Trump was widely perceived to outperform Biden, followed by Democratic elites engineering a dignified way for Biden to withdraw and replacing him with another nominee. The one clear miss was the specific claim that Biden’s support would crash to around 30%, which did not happen. Because the main causal story and end state he forecast did occur (disastrous debate → intra‑party pressure → Biden’s graceful exit → new Democratic candidate), the overall prediction is best classified as right, with a notable but secondary numerical inaccuracy.

Jason said on June 29, 2024 that “he is not going to be in this race in the next 30 days,” i.e., by around July 29, 2024, Joe Biden would no longer be an active 2024 presidential candidate.

Authoritative reports show that President Joe Biden publicly ended his 2024 reelection bid on July 21, 2024, announcing his withdrawal from the race and endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris as his replacement at the top of the Democratic ticket. (en.wikipedia.org)

July 21, 2024 is 22 days after June 29, 2024—well within the 30‑day window Jason specified. Since Biden indeed dropped out of the race within that period, the prediction was correct.

The prediction did not come true.

Key parts of Jason’s forecast vs. what actually happened:

1. “He’s out… We’re going to have President Kamala.”

   • As of the end of Joe Biden’s first term (which concluded at noon on January 20, 2025), Biden did not leave office early and was not replaced by Kamala Harris as president. Public records and news coverage of the 2024 election and subsequent inauguration show Biden serving through the full term and then leaving office in the normal course at inauguration, not via early resignation or removal.

2. “She’s going to get her flowers for four months as she gets to be the first female president… Then she steps out of the way… decides she’s not going to run.”

   • Kamala Harris never became President in 2024 or early 2025, so there was no four‑month Harris presidency and no announcement by a President Harris that she would decline to run. Coverage of the 2024 campaign confirms that this scenario never occurred.

3. “There will be two new people who will be moderates” heading the Democratic ticket in 2024

   • In the actual 2024 election cycle, the Democratic presidential ticket was not composed of two entirely new, post‑Biden, non‑Harris “moderate” figures created by a last‑minute Biden exit. Mainstream reporting on the 2024 Democratic ticket and convention shows the ticket emerging through the standard primary/nomination process, not through a sudden presidential resignation followed by a short Harris presidency and her withdrawal.

4. Timing element: “the real election starts in about 15 days” after Biden exits

   • Because Biden never exited early, there was no 15‑day reset point that launched a brand‑new general‑election matchup.

Since none of the critical elements occurred (no early Biden departure, no Harris presidency, no four‑month window, no Harris withdrawal, no completely new moderate duo emerging on that basis), the prediction is substantively wrong.

Jason predicted that within 72 hours of June 29, 2024, Barack Obama would call Joe Biden and that this would cause Biden to agree to step down as the 2024 Democratic nominee (a “hot swap”). The podcast transcript shows him saying Obama would talk to Biden in the next 72 hours and that he “guarantee[d] the hot swap happens.” (podcasts.happyscribe.com) In reality, Biden did not step down in that window. In the immediate aftermath of the June 27 debate and on June 29, reporting described Biden as acknowledging a poor performance but vowing to stay in the race and defeat Donald Trump. (en.wikipedia.org) He continued to insist he would not drop out for weeks, including a July 5 ABC News interview where he said only the Lord Almighty could convince him to quit, and a July 8 letter to congressional Democrats reiterating that he would remain a candidate. (en.wikipedia.org) The first sitting Democratic member of Congress did not publicly call for his withdrawal until July 2, 2024, still with Biden refusing to leave the race. (en.wikipedia.org) Biden ultimately announced his withdrawal on July 21, 2024, more than three weeks after Jason’s 72‑hour window, and there is no public evidence that a phone call from Obama in late June directly triggered an immediate decision to step aside. (en.wikipedia.org) Because the predicted timeline and mechanism (Obama’s call causing a hot swap within 72 hours) did not occur, the prediction is wrong.

Available public information does not establish how Jason Calacanis actually filled out his 2024 presidential ballot.

What we do know:

• In the June 29, 2024 All‑In episode “Presidential Debate Reaction, Biden Hot Swap?, Tech unemployment, OpenAI considers for‑profit & more,” Jason explicitly says: “This is breaking news. I am not voting for Biden. I’ve eliminated Biden as a possibility. I was waiting to see what happened last night.” (podcasts.happyscribe.com)
• Joe Biden subsequently withdrew from the 2024 race and endorsed Kamala Harris; Harris became the Democratic nominee against Donald Trump in November 2024, so Biden was not the Democratic candidate on the general‑election ballot. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In the post‑election All‑In episode “Trump wins! How it happened and what’s next,” the hosts joke about having all voted for Trump “twice” and in multiple swing states, but this is clearly tongue‑in‑cheek banter rather than a factual disclosure of each host’s ballot. (happyscribe.com)
• Coverage of the All‑In podcast and Jason’s political activity documents his endorsement of Dean Phillips in the Democratic primaries and his broader alignment with the show’s pro‑Trump, anti‑Biden shift, but none of these sources state whom he personally voted for in November 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)

Crucially, U.S. ballots are secret. Unless Jason himself publicly states “I voted for X” (or “I wrote in Joe Biden”), no external source can definitively confirm or deny whether he cast a vote for Biden—especially given that Biden was no longer the nominee and could only have been supported via an unusual write‑in or similar mechanism.

Because the election is long past but Jason has not disclosed his actual vote, we cannot determine with certainty whether he did or did not vote for Biden. The circumstantial evidence makes a Biden vote highly unlikely, but not provably impossible, so the prediction’s truth value remains ambiguous rather than definitively right or wrong.

Trump did win the 2024 election and returned to office on January 20, 2025, satisfying the prediction’s “if reelected” condition. (en.wikipedia.org) During the 2024 campaign he repeatedly floated a 10–20% universal tariff on all imports and 60% or higher tariffs on Chinese goods, a clearly broad and aggressive tariff agenda. (cnbc.com) Once in office, he implemented that agenda in substance: beginning April 5, 2025, the U.S. started collecting a sweeping 10% tariff on virtually all imports, with significantly higher, country‑specific rates (up to about 50% on some goods and roughly 54% total on Chinese imports), explicitly framed as a new global trade system. (reuters.com) The administration has since insisted that the 10% baseline tariff will remain in place as a core feature of U.S. trade policy, reinforcing that these are not symbolic or short‑lived measures. (nypost.com) Because Trump did in fact implement a far‑reaching, aggressive tariff regime similar in scale and spirit to what he campaigned on, Jason’s prediction that he was merely pandering and would “not implement the tariff thing anyway” is wrong.

What happened: In the 2024 U.S. presidential election on November 5, 2024, Donald Trump (Republican) ran against Kamala Harris (Democrat), not Joe Biden. Trump won with 312 electoral votes to Harris’s 226, and about 49.8% of the popular vote to Harris’s 48.3%.(en.wikipedia.org)

On “Democrats will lose”: This part is correct in a narrow sense: the Democratic ticket (Harris/Walz) lost the presidency to Trump/Vance.(en.wikipedia.org)

On “Joe Biden will be defeated”: This is wrong. Biden did not end up as the Democratic nominee; Harris was. Since Biden never faced Trump on the 2024 ballot, he could not be “demolished” or defeated in that election.(en.wikipedia.org)

On “by a large margin / demolished”: Trump’s national popular-vote margin over Harris was about 1.5 percentage points, the narrowest popular-vote gap since 2000, and the decisive states collectively turned on roughly 230,000 votes across Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—evidence of a close race, not a blowout.(cookpolitical.com) While Trump’s 312–226 Electoral College margin is larger than in some recent elections, major analyses characterize his popular-vote win as modest and historically tight.(cookpolitical.com)

Because the prediction specifically asserted that Joe Biden himself would be the candidate and would get “demolished” (a large-margin defeat), and neither of those key elements occurred—even though Democrats did lose overall—the prediction is best scored as wrong.

Evidence from multiple sources shows that before the November 5, 2024 U.S. presidential election, the Democratic Party did in fact replace Joe Biden with another nominee:

• Joe Biden became the Democratic Party’s presumptive 2024 nominee on March 12, 2024 after clinching enough primary delegates. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Following intense concerns after the June 27, 2024 debate, Biden announced on July 21, 2024 that he was withdrawing from the 2024 presidential race and would not accept the nomination, and he endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris as his preferred successor. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Harris immediately launched her own campaign and, by July 22, 2024, had secured enough delegate support to become the presumptive Democratic nominee in Biden’s place. (en.wikipedia.org)
• On August 5, 2024, in a virtual roll call of Democratic National Convention delegates, Kamala Harris was formally confirmed as the Democratic Party’s 2024 presidential nominee—months before the November 5, 2024 election. (en.wikipedia.org)

So, in the run-up to the 2024 election, Democrats effectively conducted the “hot swap” Jason described: they replaced Biden with another candidate (Harris) as their presidential nominee prior to Election Day. The prediction therefore came true.

Available reporting shows that Apple has not auctioned off its system‑level LLM integration to the highest bidder, nor set up a search‑style paid competition for default placement.

1. OpenAI / ChatGPT integration: When Apple announced Apple Intelligence and system‑wide ChatGPT integration at WWDC 2024, multiple reports (summarizing Bloomberg’s Mark Gurman) stated that neither Apple nor OpenAI is paying the other for the deal, and that the arrangement is not expected to generate meaningful revenue initially. Instead, Apple grants OpenAI exposure to hundreds of millions of devices, while Apple gets ChatGPT features for free. This is explicitly contrasted with the lucrative Google‑as‑default‑search deal and described as not involving direct payments. (gadgets360.com) Apple Intelligence documentation likewise describes ChatGPT as an opt‑in, system‑wide integration, free to users, with optional sign‑in for paid ChatGPT features, and notes Apple plans to support other models in the future. (en.wikipedia.org) None of this resembles an auction for default status.

2. Future revenue‑sharing, not auctions: Follow‑on coverage notes Apple may in the future receive a cut from third‑party LLM vendors who monetize on Apple platforms (e.g., ChatGPT Plus subscriptions via in‑app purchase), and that it is in talks with other LLM providers such as Google and Anthropic. But these are described as potential revenue‑sharing or partnership models, not as a bidding war for default placement. (thedailyjagran.com) No source indicates Apple has run or announced a formal auction for the system‑level LLM slot.

3. Google Gemini / Siri deal structure: In late 2025, Bloomberg/Reuters reporting indicates Apple is paying Google roughly $1 billion per year for a custom Gemini model to power a redesigned Siri as part of Apple Intelligence, after evaluating OpenAI and Anthropic. (reuters.com) That is the opposite direction of the classic Google‑Search‑on‑iPhone arrangement (where Google pays Apple); it reflects Apple choosing a vendor and paying for access, not running a highest‑bidder auction in which model providers pay Apple for default placement.

Across the 2024–2025 coverage, there is no evidence that Apple has auctioned off LLM integration rights or default status to the highest bidder, or that OpenAI, Google, or others have paid Apple for that privilege. Instead we see (a) a non‑monetary, opt‑in OpenAI integration and (b) Apple itself paying Google for Gemini. That contradicts the specific prediction that Apple would monetize its default LLM slot via a paid auction similar to its Google search deal.

Jason’s prediction is about the next AI adoption cycle, i.e., a multi‑year future trajectory, not a specific state by late 2025. That cycle is clearly still unfolding, so it’s too early to say definitively whether Apple will ultimately become the dominant consumer AI assistant platform.

As of November 30, 2025, Apple has launched Apple Intelligence across iOS, iPadOS, macOS and VisionOS, but rollout is still constrained by hardware (A17‑class and newer) and staged language/region support, indicating an early and incomplete deployment rather than a mature, settled market position. (de.wikipedia.org) Apple has also moved to license Google’s Gemini model for a redesigned Siri, with major Siri upgrades not expected until 2026, which shows Apple is still catching up technically rather than already having secured a clear, enduring lead. (reuters.com)

Across personal devices, Apple’s installed base remains much smaller than competitors on key platforms where AI assistants run: Android holds about 72% of the global mobile OS market versus ~28% for iOS, and Windows dominates desktop/laptop OS share, which underpins broad deployment of Microsoft’s Copilot and other assistants. (en.wikipedia.org) In adjacent consumer‑assistant arenas like smart speakers and smart‑home voice AI, Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant still lead, with Apple Siri/HomePod participating but not in a clearly dominant position. (market.us)

Taken together, current evidence shows Apple is a strong but not dominant player in consumer AI assistants as of late 2025, while the broader “AI adoption cycle” for assistants on phones, tablets, and PCs is still in its early to middle stages. Because the prediction is explicitly about who will win over that entire cycle, and the outcome has not yet been determined, the correct status today is inconclusive (too early) rather than right or wrong.

The prediction explicitly covers “the next couple of years” after June 2024, i.e., roughly through mid‑2026. As of now (late November 2025) that window has not finished, so the forecast period is still in progress.

Available data are also mixed relative to the normalized claim:

• Headcount levels: Global employment is still growing rather than flat. The ILO’s World Employment and Social Outlook updates project tens of millions of net new jobs in 2024–2025 and forecast employment growth of around 1.5–1.7% per year, not a plateau in aggregate headcount. (ilo.org) At the same time, some large firms (e.g., HP and other tech companies) are cutting thousands of jobs partly in connection with AI‑driven restructuring, showing that at least some organizations are not keeping headcount flat. (sfchronicle.com) But these aggregate and anecdotal data don’t tell us whether “most” individual organizations have been roughly flat versus modestly expanding.
• Per‑employee productivity from AI: There is credible evidence of productivity gains from AI tools in specific domains—e.g., a 2024 study on GitHub Copilot finds around a 5–6% increase in individual and project‑level productivity for open‑source software development. (arxiv.org) However, it’s not yet clear to what extent such gains have scaled across most organizations or translated into broad, “notably higher” organizational efficiency at the economy‑wide level.

Because (1) the stated time horizon has not yet elapsed, and (2) current evidence does not cleanly confirm or falsify the precise combination of flat headcount for most organizations plus significantly higher per‑employee productivity from AI, the prediction cannot yet be definitively judged. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early).

The prediction claimed that after the first 2024 Trump–Biden debate in late June 2024, Joe Biden would perform so poorly that Democrats would that same month replace him with Gavin Newsom, leading to a Trump vs. Gavin Newsom general election.

What actually happened:

• The first 2024 Trump–Biden presidential debate took place on June 27, 2024, hosted by CNN in Atlanta.
• Joe Biden remained the presumptive Democratic nominee through the end of June 2024; there was no June "hot swap" to Gavin Newsom.
• Biden later announced he would not seek re‑election on July 21, 2024, and endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris. Major media and party reports through late July 2024 document Harris, not Newsom, consolidating support and becoming the Democratic nominee; Gavin Newsom never became the party’s presidential nominee.
• The 2024 general election was not a Trump vs. Gavin Newsom matchup; the Democratic ticket was led by Kamala Harris.

Because Biden was not replaced in June 2024, and Gavin Newsom did not become the Democratic nominee or Trump’s opponent, the specific prediction is wrong.

Jason predicted that in November 2024 the Democrats would be “demolished” in a landslide loss to Donald Trump, conditional on not significantly changing course or replacing Biden.

What actually happened:

• Joe Biden withdrew from the race on July 21, 2024 and endorsed Kamala Harris, who became the Democratic nominee in early August, so the party did replace Biden and alter course. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In the November 5, 2024 election, Trump defeated Harris 312–226 in the Electoral College and by roughly 1.5 percentage points in the national popular vote (about 77.3M vs. 75.0M votes). (en.wikipedia.org)

On the key “landslide” aspect, multiple post‑election analyses explicitly characterize Trump’s win as not a landslide: the Council on Foreign Relations notes that, by either Electoral College or popular-vote standards, the 2024 result was far from historic blowouts like 1936, 1964, 1972, or 1984. (cfr.org) Trump’s popular‑vote margin is described as modest and one of the narrower wins in modern history. (aljazeera.com)

So while Jason was directionally right that the Democrats would lose the presidency, his specific prediction of a landslide “demolition” did not come true, and the conditional (“if they don’t replace Biden”) was also violated. Overall, the prediction is best judged wrong.

Evidence shows that within 30 days of June 7, 2024, Trump publicly softened his anti‑EV stance and expressed support for electric vehicles:

• At a rally captured in a June 7, 2024 clip, Trump said he was "a big fan of electric cars" and of Elon Musk, while still emphasizing that people should also have the option of gas cars.(zerohedge.com)
• On June 20, 2024, coverage of an Arizona rally quoted Trump again saying he was "a big fan of electric cars" and praising Tesla and Musk, explicitly framing this as a shift in his position on EVs and sustainability.(electrifynews.com)
• Subsequent reporting in July 2024 by Reuters and others described these June remarks as Trump saying he was "a big fan of electric cars" and a fan of Elon, treating them as a notable change from his prior anti‑EV rhetoric.(reuters.com)
• By contrast, earlier coverage of his 2024 campaign repeatedly stressed that he had "made no secret his disdain for electric vehicles" and was vowing to end what he called an EV "mandate," underscoring that the June comments were a softening rather than a continuation of his prior line.(business-standard.com)

Because these supportive/softened statements about EVs occurred in mid‑June 2024—well within 30 days of June 7, 2024—the prediction that Trump would "come out magically in support of EVs" in that timeframe is best scored as right.

Biden’s status condition was effectively met during the relevant period. Jason said this on June 7, 2024, and conditioned the prediction on Biden not being “swapped out.” Biden did not announce his withdrawal until July 21, 2024, and Kamala Harris was not formally made the Democratic nominee until August 6, 2024, so throughout most of the 30–60 day window (July 7–August 6) Biden was still the presumptive nominee.

Within roughly 40 days of June 7, at least ten very high‑profile figures—clearly better known to the general public than Chamath Palihapitiya, David Sacks, or Doug Leone—publicly backed Trump:

• Elon Musk explicitly endorsed Trump on X on July 13, 2024, shortly after the assassination attempt, saying “I fully endorse President Trump and hope for his rapid recovery.” (slaynews.com)
• Bill Ackman formally endorsed Trump on X on July 14, 2024, after the same shooting. (washingtonpost.com)
• Marc Andreessen and Ben Horowitz, co‑founders of Andreessen Horowitz, publicly said in a July 16, 2024 podcast that they were supporting and voting for Trump, explaining why they preferred his policies to Biden’s. (techcrunch.com)
• At the Republican National Convention (July 15–18, 2024), multiple mainstream celebrities endorsed Trump from the stage, including Hulk Hogan, Kid Rock, Dana White, Amber Rose, and Savannah Chrisley. (en.wikipedia.org)
• The same coverage notes Azealia Banks appearing at a Trump rally in support of him during the summer as well. (fox5atlanta.com)

Counting Musk, Ackman, Andreessen, Horowitz, Hogan, Kid Rock, Dana White, Amber Rose, Savannah Chrisley, and Azealia Banks gives at least ten individuals whose mainstream name recognition is, by ordinary standards, substantially higher than the three VCs Jason named. These endorsements occurred between July 13 and the RNC (July 15–18), squarely inside the 30–60 day post–June 7 window, while Biden was still the presumptive nominee. Given that both the timing and the volume/visibility of endorsements match what Jason forecast, the prediction is best scored as right, acknowledging that "extremely high‑profile" is somewhat subjective but clearly satisfied by figures like Musk and Hogan.

Jason described the Texas Stock Exchange (TXSE) plan as: file SEC registration documents later in 2024, start facilitating trades in 2025, and host its first new listing in 2026, based on contemporaneous reporting that BlackRock- and Citadel-backed TXSE intended exactly that timeline. (business-standard.com) In reality, TXSE did not file with the SEC in 2024; instead, TXSE Group announced that the exchange had filed for registration around February 1, 2025, alongside news that it had raised about $161 million in capital. (news.bloomberglaw.com) Later, on September 30, 2025, the SEC approved TXSE to operate as a national securities exchange, with public statements now projecting that trading will begin in early 2026 rather than 2025, and that first listings are targeted for 2026. (reuters.com) Because the predicted 2024 filing and 2025 trading milestones were both missed, the overall timeline Jason gave has already failed, even though the goal of first listings in 2026 remains in place and cannot yet be fully evaluated.

Jason’s prediction window was roughly from May 31, 2024 (podcast release) to about July 30, 2024 ("the next 30 to 60 days").

On July 21, 2024, President Joe Biden ended his 2024 reelection campaign and announced he would not seek another term. In the same announcement, he endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris as his replacement to lead the Democratic ticket, and Democrats quickly moved to unite behind her as the new standard-bearer.(pbs.org) This effectively removed Biden as the Democratic presidential candidate and installed Harris as the de facto nominee within the 30–60 day window Jason specified.

Formally, Harris was only officially nominated by the Democratic National Committee on August 5, 2024, after a virtual roll call that concluded that day, which is just outside the 60‑day window.(en.wikipedia.org) However, Jason’s wording about Democrats “fielding a different candidate” is satisfied in the common political sense as of July 21–22, when Biden withdrew and Harris became the presumptive nominee and active Democratic presidential candidate. On that practical interpretation, the prediction came true within the timeframe, so it is best scored as right, with the caveat that the formal nomination occurred slightly later.

Jason’s multi-part prediction substantially came true.

1. Trump “demolishing” Biden in the June 27 debate
   A 538/Ipsos post‑debate poll found that about 60% of debate watchers said Trump performed best vs. 21% for Biden, and 73% rated Biden’s performance as poor or terrible, with only 8% calling it good or excellent. (ipsos.com) This matches the spirit of “demolish” and a clear Trump outperformance.

2. Biden’s support dropping to ~30%
   After the debate, Biden’s job approval and general standing slid into the low–mid 30s in major polls. Gallup recorded his all‑time low presidential approval at 36% in July 2024, in the days after the debate and just before his withdrawal. (news.gallup.com) Pew’s July 1–7, 2024 survey (covering the immediate aftermath) put his approval at 32%. (en.wikipedia.org) That’s “roughly 30%” by normal forecasting standards, even if not exactly 30 in the averages.

3. Democrats engineering a ‘graceful out’ and replacing Biden as nominee
   On July 21, 2024, Biden announced he would not accept the Democratic nomination and was ending his re‑election bid, explicitly framing it as being in the best interest of his party and the country. (time.com) In the same window he endorsed Kamala Harris to be the nominee, and Democratic leaders rapidly coalesced around her; reporting at the time tied his withdrawal directly to the “disastrous” June 27 debate and the subsequent party revolt. (latimes.com) Harris then became the Democratic presidential nominee at the August 2024 convention.

Putting it together: Trump clearly outperformed Biden in the June 27 debate; Biden’s national support (as measured by job approval) dropped into the low 30s; and Democratic leaders did in fact orchestrate a relatively face‑saving withdrawal and substitute a different nominee. Minor numerical imprecision aside, the core scenario Jason described played out closely enough that this forecast is best judged right.

The prediction had two clear conditions:

1. Democrats replace Joe Biden with another presidential candidate during June 2024.
2. That replacement candidate then defeats Donald Trump in a landslide in November 2024.

What actually happened:

• Joe Biden remained the Democratic nominee through and after June 2024; there was no June “switcheroo” to a different Democratic candidate. Major reporting throughout summer 2024 continued to identify Biden as the Democratic nominee against Donald Trump, with no formal replacement occurring.
• Since the conditional trigger (a June 2024 replacement of Biden) never happened, the prediction’s scenario did not materialize, and thus its stated outcome (a landslide win by the replacement candidate) did not occur.

Because the prediction is explicitly conditional on an event that did not occur (Democrats switching candidates in June 2024), the prediction as stated is wrong.

Evidence about the June 3, 2024 House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic hearing supports parts of Jason’s prediction but not the full, stronger claim in the normalized version.

What clearly happened

• Contentious / “explosive” tone: Major outlets described the hearing as contentious and fiery, highlighting bitter partisan clashes. Coverage emphasized heated exchanges, including Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene accusing Fauci of “crimes against humanity,” which briefly derailed the hearing over decorum issues. (cbsnews.com) This matches the “explosive” / highly contentious aspect of the prediction.
• Widely covered: The hearing was carried and analyzed by national news organizations (CBS, CNN, AP‑syndicated local outlets, Reuters, etc.), as well as partisan and niche outlets, indicating substantial media attention. (cbsnews.com)
• Some “revealing” material: Public questioning revisited and amplified material already emerging from Fauci’s January 2024 closed‑door testimony, including: his statement that the 6‑foot distancing guideline “sort of just appeared,” questions about NIH‑funded work with EcoHealth and the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and emails from Fauci aide David Morens about avoiding FOIA. Fauci publicly distanced himself from Morens and reiterated that he keeps an open mind on lab‑leak vs. natural origin while denying any cover‑up. (cbsnews.com) These points gave commentators “takeaways,” though most were continuations of earlier revelations rather than brand‑new bombshells.

Where the prediction goes beyond what we can verify

• The normalized prediction adds that the exchanges would “significantly escalate public controversy over Fauci’s role” in COVID‑19 origins and an alleged cover‑up. While controversy around Fauci and the lab‑leak hypothesis did intensify over 2024–2025 in general—e.g., the Republican‑led subcommittee’s December 2024 report concluding a lab‑associated origin is “most likely” and sharply criticizing Fauci, and later political moves like the Trump administration’s 2025 COVID‑origin website and removal of a Fauci mural at NIH (en.wikipedia.org)—those developments stem from a multi‑year investigation, accumulated documents, and broader politics.
• Available reporting on the June 3 hearing itself (from mainstream and partisan sources) treats it as a high‑profile, partisan hearing but does not identify it as a clear watershed that newly “cracked open” the origins issue or produced decisive new evidence against Fauci. Instead, it mainly publicized already‑emerging disputes and Fauci’s denials. (amp.cnn.com) There is no robust, quantifiable way to isolate how much that single hearing, versus the ongoing investigation and subsequent report, “significantly escalated” public controversy.

Because:

• The tone and media‑attention parts of the prediction clearly came true (contentious, widely covered, and to some extent revealing), but
• The claimed causal impact—that this specific hearing would significantly escalate controversy over Fauci’s role and a cover‑up—cannot be cleanly measured or attributed from available evidence,

the overall accuracy of the normalized prediction cannot be determined with confidence. Hence the classification "ambiguous" rather than clearly right or wrong.

Dr. Fauci did testify publicly before the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic on Monday, June 3, 2024, and the hearing was widely covered and described as contentious or fiery, with sharp partisan exchanges and high political drama. (cbsnews.com) However, major mainstream accounts emphasize that the hearing did not produce new evidence or decisive revelations about a COVID “cover‑up.” Associated Press reporting on the hearing noted that after more than a year of investigation, the GOP-led subcommittee had found no evidence linking Fauci to wrongdoing and that there was no new scientific information resolving the lab‑leak versus natural‑origin debate. (waka.com) Scientific American similarly characterized the session as Fauci fending off allegations and calling cover‑up claims “simply preposterous,” without highlighting any breakthrough disclosures. (scientificamerican.com) CNN’s detailed takeaway piece focused on Fauci’s reiteration of long‑standing positions about COVID’s origins, his denial of influencing scientists via grants, and his description of ongoing death threats—again, not on any dramatic new facts emerging. (keyt.com) Some partisan or activist outlets on the right framed the hearing as producing “fireworks” or a “heated showdown,” largely because of confrontational questioning and calls for prosecution rather than because of substantiated new findings. (childrenshealthdefense.org) Taken together, the public record shows a high‑temperature but largely rehashing hearing, not one that “cracked open” a COVID cover‑up with major, widely recognized revelations, so Jason’s prediction is best judged as wrong.

Jason’s prediction has two main parts:

1. A clear, pro‑crypto regulatory framework would emerge as a political issue by the 2024 U.S. general election.

   • On the law side, Congress had not passed a comprehensive, clear framework for crypto by Election Day (Nov 5, 2024). The House passed the FIT21 bill in May 2024, which would clarify SEC/CFTC jurisdiction over digital assets, but it stalled in the Senate and never became law in that Congress.(mayerbrown.com) The first major federal framework, the GENIUS Act on stablecoins, was only enacted in July 2025 under Trump, i.e., after the election.(en.wikipedia.org) So a formal, enacted “crypto framework” did not exist yet for voters to respond to in 2024.
   • On the politics side, crypto policy clearly did become a visible campaign issue for a minority of voters and elites. Industry‑ and crypto‑adjacent surveys (DCG/Harris, Gemini, Grayscale, Paradigm, etc.) consistently found that roughly 20% of some voter samples considered crypto a “major” or “significant” issue, and that many wanted candidates to talk more about regulation.(cryptopotato.com) A Paradigm poll in October 2024 found that 5% of voters were “single‑issue” crypto voters.(paradigm.xyz) Trump explicitly campaigned on ending the “war on crypto,” promised to fire SEC Chair Gary Gensler, and attracted significant crypto‑industry money via the Fairshake super PAC and other efforts; contemporaneous summaries describe crypto regulation as a wedge issue in the 2024 race.(en.wikipedia.org)
   • At the same time, mainstream issue polling and the televised debates show crypto was not a top‑tier concern for most voters. Large non‑industry polls list the economy, inflation, democracy, abortion, immigration, etc. as the dominant issues; crypto usually doesn’t appear on those lists.(today.yougov.com) The Harris–Trump debate in September 2024 did not mention crypto at all, and analysis in both crypto and general‑finance media argued this reflected how low it ranked for the broader electorate.(coindesk.com) One post‑hoc critique also points out that industry‑funded polls may overstate both usage and salience of crypto.(bettermarkets.org)
   • Net: crypto regulation clearly emerged as a recognizable campaign and wedge issue for a niche but non‑trivial slice of voters and donors, but not as a clear, enacted pro‑crypto regulatory framework understood by the general electorate. Whether that matches what Jason meant by a “crypto framework” is interpretive rather than factual.

2. Supporting crypto would be worth roughly 5 percentage points of the vote in that election.

   • The main quantitative support for a “5‑point” effect comes from the Paradigm polling that 5% of voters self‑describe as single‑issue crypto voters.(paradigm.xyz) Paradigm itself emphasized that 5% is larger than the 1–2 point margins typical in key swing states, implying that, in theory, a strongly pro‑crypto stance could swing close races. This is almost exactly Jason’s “worth probably five points” framing.
   • However, there is no solid evidence that pro‑crypto positions actually produced a ~5‑point shift in realized vote share:
     • Even crypto‑friendly coverage notes that a Paradigm‑commissioned poll found just 5% of likely voters considered crypto a key issue, underscoring how small this bloc is nationally.(coindesk.com)
     • Broader polls show crypto ranks near the bottom of issues, especially among men 18–29, where it came dead last among 28 tested issues.(blueprint-research.com)
     • Post‑election commentary argues that crypto money and PAC spending mattered more than any measurable “crypto voter” bloc; one analysis explicitly doubts that single‑issue crypto voters had a large electoral impact, suggesting industry cash did the heavy lifting.(dlnews.com)
     • No exit polls or rigorous academic studies attribute a ~5‑percentage‑point net swing in national or swing‑state margins specifically to candidates’ crypto stances, as opposed to the dominant issues (economy, democracy, abortion, immigration, etc.).(grokipedia.com)
   • Because the available data are either industry‑funded and hypothetical (“could swing,” “could decide”) or high‑level and non‑specific, we cannot confidently say that being pro‑crypto actually yielded ~5 extra points for any candidate in 2024.

Why this is scored “ambiguous”:

• There is credible evidence that crypto policy and regulatory debates did emerge as a visible, partisan wedge issue, especially in elite politics and among a notable minority of voters; in that narrow sense, part of Jason’s intuition was directionally right.(en.wikipedia.org)
• But a clear, enacted pro‑crypto regulatory framework did not exist by Election Day 2024, and the claim that supporting crypto was “worth probably five points” cannot be empirically validated: we only have suggestive polls, no robust measurement of an actual 5‑point vote effect.(mayerbrown.com)

Because one part of the prediction is partly borne out in a limited way (salience as an issue) while the stronger claims (a clear framework in place and a realized ~5‑point electoral payoff) are not clearly supported nor clearly disproven by the available evidence, the overall forecast cannot be cleanly classified as simply right or wrong. Hence, “ambiguous.”

Donald Trump’s New York business‑records/hush‑money case resulted in a May 2024 felony conviction on 34 counts, but when he was finally sentenced on January 10, 2025, Judge Juan Merchan imposed an unconditional discharge—no jail time, no probation, no fine, and no community service—leaving only collateral consequences such as a felony record, loss of gun rights, and a DNA submission requirement. (apnews.com) The conviction remains on the books and is being appealed in New York’s courts, and Trump has also pursued related federal litigation seeking to move or undo the case; so far, no appellate court has overturned the verdict. (theguardian.com) Because this is a state conviction, it is not subject to a presidential pardon, and no form of clemency has mooted it. (theguardian.com) However, by late 2025 the criminal‑justice outcome is effectively limited to a largely symbolic sentence with minimal practical punishment, while Trump continues to serve again as president, which aligns with Jason’s core claim that the case would function more like a political “speeding ticket” than a source of severe long‑term punishment—even though his more specific expectations about an outright overturning or pardon have not (at least yet) materialized. (theguardian.com)

Available public information confirms that Poker Power does run a Summer Bootcamp tied to All-In Summit tickets, but does not provide data on how fast the 2024 cohort filled or whether all spots were taken.

What we can see:

• Poker Power currently advertises a 2025 Summer Bootcamp, a free 2‑week virtual program that is explicitly capped (“reserved for the first 100 people who register”) and culminates in a tournament awarding two tickets to the 2025 All‑In Summit. Registration is described as first‑come, first‑served, with a prominent “Register” call‑to‑action, but there is no public indicator of whether or when capacity is reached. (pokerpower.com)
• Site‑wide banners and blog pages reference a “Win All‑In Summit tickets! FREE 2‑week poker bootcamp + tournament” promotion, which is clearly the same campaign, but again they provide no enrollment statistics or waitlist/sell‑out notices. (pokerpower.com)

However:

• There is no accessible archived 2024 Summer Bootcamp landing page (e.g., a 2024-summer-bootcamp URL or similar) and no press release or news item describing the 2024 women’s bootcamp filling its 80‑spot capacity or selling out quickly.
• Searches across Poker Power’s site and broader web (including news and blog coverage) do not turn up any statements about 2024 registration numbers, sell‑out timing, or a public waitlist for that year’s women‑only summer bootcamp.

Because Jason’s claim is very specific—that the 2024 women’s summer bootcamp with 80 spots would "fill up quick" after the episode—verifying it would require internal registration data or explicit public confirmation that the 80 places sold out rapidly. No such evidence is available from public web sources, and there is also no counter‑evidence that it failed to fill or was still advertising open spots near the start date.

Given the lack of concrete public data either confirming or refuting the bootcamp’s fill rate in 2024, the prediction cannot be reliably judged as correct or incorrect. Therefore the outcome has to be classified as ambiguous rather than right, wrong, or merely “too early to tell.”

Jason makes this statement at the end of the May 31, 2024 episode, saying they are "going to do a party in Vegas" when they hit a million subscribers, in the context of directing listeners to the YouTube channel. (podscripts.co)

However, multiple independent analytics trackers show that the All-In Podcast YouTube channel has not yet reached 1,000,000 subscribers as of late November 2025. Social Blade lists the channel at around 963K subscribers in late October 2025, while its realtime page and history show mid–900Ks through fall 2025. (socialblade.com) SPEAKRJ reports 972K subscribers as of November 23, 2025, and SocialCounts.org shows roughly 975K subscribers on November 27, 2025—still below 1M. (speakrj.com)

Given that the trigger condition (1,000,000 YouTube subscribers) has not yet been met, we cannot know whether they will in fact hold a Vegas party at or near that milestone. The prediction therefore cannot yet be judged as either fulfilled or failed, so the correct status is "inconclusive (too early)".

Available reporting through late 2025 shows no evidence that the Scarlett Johansson–OpenAI "Sky" voice dispute ever became a filed lawsuit or ended in an out‑of‑court settlement.

Instead, Johansson hired legal counsel, sent two letters to Sam Altman and OpenAI demanding details on how the Sky voice was created, and OpenAI then "reluctantly agreed" to take down the Sky voice and apologized publicly. News coverage at the time and since describes this sequence—letters followed by OpenAI pausing/removing the voice—but does not report any settlement agreement.(fortune.com) Legal and policy analyses from TechTimes and the American Bar Association in late 2024 explicitly note that Johansson had not filed a lawsuit and speak only in hypothetical terms about what would happen "if the actress decides to sue OpenAI."(techtimes.com) A Georgetown Law explainer likewise frames the dispute as a potential right‑of‑publicity case, not as an existing one.(georgetown.edu)

Later 2025 profiles and interviews describe Johansson as having taken "legal action" in the sense of threatening action and pushing for legislation, and they emphasize that OpenAI dropped the Sky voice following this pressure, but they still do not mention any lawsuit or settlement being reached.(instyle.com) Nor is there any reported court decision involving Johansson and OpenAI, let alone one that changes U.S. fair‑use precedent; experts consistently describe the main theory here as right of publicity rather than copyright fair use.(americanbar.org)

So while it is true that no new fair‑use case law emerged from this incident, the central part of the prediction—that this specific Johansson vs. OpenAI dispute would be resolved via an out‑of‑court settlement after a case was brought—did not occur. The controversy effectively cooled after OpenAI withdrew the Sky voice under legal threat, with no lawsuit filed and no settlement reported, making the prediction wrong overall.

Multiple independent sources confirm that the All-In Summit 2024 was held as an in-person, three-day event at Royce Hall, UCLA in Los Angeles from September 8–10, 2024, with a large paid audience. The All-In podcast’s own Wikipedia entry notes that the 2024 summit "returned to Royce Hall from September 8 to 10" and drew about 1,950 attendees. (en.wikipedia.org) Hotel and event listings (e.g., BAE Ventures and several Marriott-affiliated event pages) also describe All-In Summit 2024 as a physical event at Royce Hall on September 8–10, 2024. (baeventures.com)

Since the summit did in fact occur in Los Angeles on those dates with in-person attendees and was not canceled or made fully virtual, Jason’s prediction was accurate.

Available data indicate that the All‑In Podcast YouTube channel has not yet reached 1,000,000 subscribers, so the condition that would trigger the Vegas celebration has not been met.

Key points:

• Third‑party analytics for the official All‑In YouTube channel (@allin) show about 972,000 subscribers as of November 23, 2025, below the 1M threshold. These stats also include a recent subscriber‑growth table and do not show any point at which the channel exceeded 1M. (speakrj.com)
• Another independent YouTube analytics site similarly reports the channel in the hundreds of thousands of subscribers (e.g., 886k at an earlier snapshot), again well under 1M. (hk.youtubers.me)
• In multiple episode outros and a June 28, 2024 500K subscriber livestream, Jason and the other hosts describe the million‑subscriber party in Las Vegas as a future event, contingent on hitting 1M subscribers ("we're going to do a party in Vegas… when we hit a million subscribers"; "we're going to throw a million subscriber party," to be held in Las Vegas/Wynn). (podcasts.happyscribe.com)
• While recent episodes note that some shows are recorded live from Las Vegas (e.g., from The Venetian), they are not described in public materials as a "million subscriber" celebration, and they occurred while the channel was still under 1M subscribers. (muckrack.com)

Because the triggering condition (reaching 1,000,000 YouTube subscribers) has not yet occurred, we cannot evaluate whether the promised celebratory in‑person Vegas party will happen within a reasonable period after that milestone. The prediction therefore remains unresolved rather than right or wrong, making the outcome inconclusive (too early).

Rationale: The prediction was that before the All-In Summit scheduled for September 8–10, 2024 in Los Angeles, the organizers would announce and offer some number of scholarship tickets for attendees.

• The 2024 All-In Summit was indeed held in Los Angeles from September 8–10, 2024, at Royce Hall, UCLA. (en.wikipedia.org)
• In the July 19–20, 2024 episode titled Trump assassination attempt, Secret Service failure, Inside the RNC, VC liquidity problem, the hosts explicitly say that All-In Summit scholarship applications are now open at summit.allinpodcast.co, describing a very limited number of scholarship tickets held for the summit ("like we did the last two years"), with some scholarships sponsored by Athletic Brewing Company. (podcasts.happyscribe.com)
• A Reddit user posted on July 24, 2024 that they "got in on scholarship" for the All-In Summit, which corroborates that scholarship tickets were in fact offered and granted ahead of the September dates. (reddit.com)

Because scholarship tickets were announced and offered in July 2024, well before the September 8–10, 2024 summit, Jason’s prediction that scholarships would be coming soon and available before the event is fulfilled.

Only about 1.5 years have passed since the May 17, 2024 prediction, which explicitly talks about an ongoing trend of models becoming ~90% cheaper per year and being ~99% cheaper over any two‑year span. The first full two‑year window (to compare “models two years prior”) would end around May 2026, which hasn’t occurred yet.

We do see substantial price drops and efficiency gains around the time of, and shortly after, the prediction:

• Between the original GPT‑4 (March 2023) at $30 per million input tokens for the 8k context model and GPT‑4‑Turbo (April 2024) at $10 per million, OpenAI cut the per‑token price by about 3× in a bit over a year, a ~67% cost reduction but not a full 90%. (help.openai.com)
• GPT‑4o, launched May 2024, was announced as delivering GPT‑4‑level intelligence at half the cost and twice the speed of GPT‑4‑Turbo, a further ~2× drop in price at similar or better quality, but again not a clean 10× year‑over‑year step. (investopedia.com)
• GPT‑4o mini (July 2024) is priced at $0.15 per million input tokens and $0.60 per million output tokens—roughly two orders of magnitude cheaper than the original GPT‑4 pricing for frontier‑level models—and OpenAI describes it as “an order of magnitude more affordable than previous frontier models” while often outperforming GPT‑4 in chat preferences. (openai.com)
• In 2025, newer models like GPT‑4.1 and o3‑mini are described as cheaper than their immediate predecessors (e.g., GPT‑4.1 about 26% cheaper than GPT‑4o; o3‑mini about 63% cheaper than o1‑mini), continuing the downward trend but at increments far short of a consistent 10× drop each year. (theverge.com)

However, the prediction is about future sustained rates (“will continue to become about 90% cheaper every year … every two years these things are gonna be 99% cheaper and better”), not just the one‑off transition up to GPT‑4o. We have:

• Less than the two years he explicitly uses as the benchmark window.
• No standardized, industry‑wide metric for “cost to run” across all “AI foundation models,” since provider prices mix model quality, context length, and product strategy.

Because (a) the forecast period he specifies has not fully elapsed, and (b) existing data, while showing large cost reductions, is not sufficient to confirm or falsify a continuing ~90%‑per‑year drop, the status of this prediction as of November 30, 2025 is inconclusive (too early).

OpenAI has indeed pushed more powerful models and tools into the free tier (for example, making GPT‑4o and several advanced capabilities available to ChatGPT Free users), which aligns partially with the “make it free or close to free” part of the prediction. (openai.com) However, the company still clearly relies on large numbers of individual paid subscribers via Plus and Pro plans: as of July 2025 around 35 million users (about 5% of weekly actives) were paying $20 or $200 per month for these individual tiers, and OpenAI internally projects around 220 million paying ChatGPT subscribers by 2030. (cio.economictimes.indiatimes.com) OpenAI’s own pricing page in late 2025 still positions Free as limited, with substantial additional reasoning power, usage, memory, and tools reserved for individual Plus and Pro users at $20 and $200 per month, respectively. (openai.com) While OpenAI also sells multi‑user “Team,” “Enterprise,” and other business offerings that emphasize collaboration, these exist alongside and not instead of a major consumer subscription business, and the firm is also exploring new revenue such as shopping and advertising features. (openai.com) Given that individual subscriptions remain central to both current revenue and long‑term projections, the specific prediction that OpenAI would “maybe just charge for a multiplayer version” does not match the observable strategy as of late 2025.

As of late 2025, the prediction looks directionally consistent with the data so far, but the stated time horizon (“over the coming years of the AI-driven productivity boom”) clearly extends beyond the ~18 months since May 2024, so it’s too early to call it definitively right or wrong.

On unemployment: The U.S. unemployment rate did rise modestly from around 3.8% in late 2023 to an average of about 4.2% in Q4 2024, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but remained in what economists generally consider a historically low range. (bls.gov) By September–October 2025, estimates put unemployment around 4.3–4.4%, a four‑year high but still low compared with past recessions and still among the lowest rates in the G7. (ft.com) Weekly jobless claims in November 2025 are at a seven‑month low, indicating layoffs remain subdued even as hiring slows. (reuters.com) So there has been no surge into high unemployment or “widespread joblessness” so far.

On “more companies”: New business formation has remained unusually strong. The U.S. saw about 5.21 million business applications in 2024, after a record 5.48 million in 2023, both far above the ~3.5 million pre‑pandemic level. (finder.com) Through 2025 to date, applications are slightly up relative to the same period in 2024, suggesting continued elevated entrepreneurial activity. (finder.com) This supports the idea that adjustment so far has included a large number of (often small) new firms rather than a collapse in employment.

However, because the claim was about the entire AI‑driven boom over “the coming years,” and structural effects of AI on labor markets can take several years to fully manifest, the available data window is too short to conclusively validate or falsify the long‑run prediction. Hence the classification: inconclusive (too early).

Evidence since mid‑2024 shows the emergence, and growing scale, of specialized intermediaries that clear or license publisher/creator content for AI systems, including answer/search products:

• The long‑standing Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) created new AI‑specific collective licenses in 2024–2025 that let organizations ingest and use large corpora of copyrighted works in AI systems via a central license, and then expanded this to an AI Systems Training License for models whose outputs are used externally—i.e., commercial, customer‑facing generative AI products. CCC acts as an intermediary between thousands of publishers and AI developers, and reports strong publisher uptake. (grokipedia.com)
• In the U.K., the Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA), Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS), and Publishers’ Licensing Services (PLS) are rolling out a collective licensing framework for AI training and retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG), explicitly designed so AI developers can get permission to use a wide range of text‑based published works through a single license, with CLA administering fees and distributions to rightsholders. This is exactly an intermediary model for AI training/RAG at national scale. (ailawandpolicy.com)
• A Bloomberg Law report describes a wave of “AI licensing startups” that aggregate and license copyrighted works for AI, including Created by Humans (authors and book publishers licensing to AI systems), Narrativ (voice actors’ likenesses), and ProRata, whose tools decompose AI outputs and route compensation back to contributors. These are explicitly characterized as "middlemen startups" aggregating many rightsholders into a single licensing package. (news.bloomberglaw.com)
• Separate coverage of ProRata AI shows it has enrolled 400+ (later 500+) publications—among them major brands like the Financial Times, Axel Springer titles, The Atlantic, Fortune, Vox Media, The Boston Globe, and others—into a 50/50 revenue‑share model. ProRata analyzes generative‑AI outputs, attributes them back to source publishers, and distributes revenue accordingly, functioning as a rights‑clearing and payment intermediary between publishers and AI services. (axios.com)
• ProRata also operates Gist.ai, an AI‑powered search/answer engine that uses this licensed publisher content to generate responses, a concrete example of an AI‑answer product built on top of a specialized rights‑clearing intermediary rather than purely on unlicensed web scraping. (digiday.com)

While Google specifically has not publicly outsourced AI Overviews licensing to a single neutral clearinghouse, the broader substance of the prediction—that a new class of intermediaries, whose core business is clearing/licensing publisher and creator content for AI answer/search and other generative uses, would emerge and reach meaningful scale—has clearly materialized by late 2025. The combination of large, AI‑specific collective licenses (CCC, CLA/ALCS/PLS) and scaled startups like ProRata/Created by Humans matches the predicted pattern closely enough to count this as right.

Jason is referring to the long‑dormant parody X (Twitter) handle @Fakechamath and says, right after Sheryl Sandberg reveals Dave Goldberg ran it: “My guess is that Twitter handle is about to get popular again. It’s going to get pretty popular.”(podscripts.co)

The episode’s show notes confirm that the handle in question is indeed twitter.com/fakechamath.(podcasts.apple.com)

Third‑party X viewers such as TwStalker show @Fakechamath having roughly 3,000 followers and 60 following, with multiple independent profile snapshots in 2025 all reporting about the same follower count.(ww.twstalker.com) However, these tools only expose the current count at the time they crawl the profile; they do not provide a time series or a pre‑May‑2024 snapshot. X’s own interface is behind a login/JS wall and likewise doesn’t expose historical follower numbers.

Because there is no accessible data on how many followers or what level of engagement @Fakechamath had before the May 3, 2024 episode, we cannot rigorously determine whether it became “significantly more popular” afterward. The current modest size (~3K followers) also doesn’t clearly prove or disprove a large relative increase from its prior baseline.

With sufficient time elapsed but no reliable before‑and‑after metrics for popularity, the outcome of this prediction cannot be determined from available evidence, so it is best classified as ambiguous.

As of late November 2025, more than a year and a half after the October 2023 Hamas attack and over 18 months after the May 2024 podcast, core factual questions about the Gaza war remain highly contested, supporting Jason’s prediction that the “fog of war” would persist.

1. Casualty numbers remain disputed and only partially verifiable. Gaza’s Health Ministry now reports over 70,000 Palestinians killed, figures the UN continues to treat as broadly credible, yet Israel publicly questions their accuracy and still does not provide its own comprehensive alternative count. (reuters.com) Peer‑reviewed analyses in The Lancet and related work suggest the ministry’s tallies may significantly undercount deaths, producing higher statistical estimates and thereby introducing another set of divergent figures. (theguardian.com) An Associated Press analysis of Health Ministry data highlighted shifting reported proportions of women and children among the dead and raised questions about data reliability under conditions of system collapse. (apnews.com)

2. International bodies and states openly contest interpretations of the same data. A May 2024 controversy over a UN/OCHA table of identified victims was seized on by pro‑Israel commentators as proof earlier UN‑cited totals were exaggerated, forcing the UN and WHO to clarify that overall death estimates had not been revised down and that they still could not independently verify the full toll because of access and capacity limits. (theguardian.com) This illustrates that, even well into 2024 and beyond, basic casualty breakdowns and their meaning remain politically and factually disputed rather than “settled.”

3. Authenticity of videos and on‑the‑ground facts are still heavily contested. Media‑forensics work and monitoring groups document hundreds of recurring myths, doctored or AI‑generated visuals, and miscaptioned war footage spreading on major platforms on both sides of the conflict into 2025, underscoring a long‑running information war with no clear resolution. (newsguardtech.com) Key incidents—such as responsibility for the Al‑Ahli hospital blast—have remained subjects of competing narratives and enduring uncertainty in formal media reviews long after the events themselves. (abc.net.au)

Because nearly all the domains Jason mentioned—casualty counts, civilian/combatant ratios, responsibility for specific attacks, and authenticity of visual evidence—remain murky, disputed, or only partially reconstructable well over a year after his May 2024 comment, the prediction that “the fog of war is going to be thick for a while” has clearly borne out.

Evidence since the podcast’s May 2024 release strongly supports Jason’s prediction that AI will make misinformation more prevalent and convincing, and thus make it harder for the public to discern truth from media sources.

1. Rising use of generative AI in misinformation & disinformation

• A July 2024 report by the Center for Countering Digital Hate documented how generative AI tools are being used to produce election-related disinformation, including fake images and text, at scale, with minimal friction for would-be propagandists.
• The EU’s disinformation monitoring initiatives have repeatedly warned in 2024–2025 that generative AI is lowering the cost and increasing the volume of misleading political content, especially ahead of major elections.

2. Increased believability and realism (deepfakes, synthetic media)

• Multiple 2024–2025 news and research reports describe rapidly improving deepfakes and AI-generated audio/video being used to impersonate public figures and spread false narratives, including fabricated speeches and statements. These are often realistic enough to fool ordinary viewers without careful verification, aligning with the idea that it’s becoming “harder and harder to find the truth.”

3. Growing difficulty for the public to distinguish real from fake

• Surveys and research in 2024–2025 show declining trust in online information and increasing concern that AI-generated content makes it harder to know what to believe, especially on social platforms and messaging apps. This is consistent with Jason’s claim that AI would worsen the signal‑to‑noise problem in media.

4. Timeframe: already observable within “the coming years”

• Jason’s prediction was made in early May 2024 and framed as a trend over “the coming years.” By late 2025, we already see:
  • Clear, documented increases in AI‑generated misinformation volume;
  • Growing realism and accessibility of tools to fabricate convincing fake media;
  • Evidence that audiences find it increasingly difficult to distinguish authentic from synthetic content.

Given this combination of quantitative reports and qualitative indicators, the direction and substance of Jason’s prediction have materialized by late 2025. While the trend is ongoing and may worsen further, the claim that AI is making it harder to find the truth in media is already borne out by current evidence, so the prediction is best classified as right rather than inconclusive or ambiguous.

The prediction is framed as happening “within the next several years,” so the time window clearly extends beyond November 2025. Only about 1.5 years have elapsed since the April 26, 2024 podcast, so the stated horizon has not yet expired.

What we can check today:

• Global web search remains overwhelmingly dominated by Google. Statcounter data for October 2025 shows ~90% global market share for Google, with Bing around 4% and the rest split among Yandex, Yahoo, DuckDuckGo, Baidu, etc.; Meta does not appear as a distinct search engine host or engine in these breakdowns. (gs.statcounter.com) This strongly suggests Meta’s traditional web search share is still negligible as of late 2025 and certainly nowhere near “roughly 10 percentage points.”
• Meta has in fact done what the prediction assumed: it integrated its Meta AI assistant directly into the search bars of WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook, and Messenger starting in early–mid 2024, and has continued rolling it out globally. (androidpolice.com) Meta reports hundreds of millions of monthly users for Meta AI, and it’s now present across many countries and languages inside those apps. (about.fb.com)

However, major measurement services for "global web search market share" still track classic search engines (google.com, bing.com, etc.), not in‑app AI assistant queries inside social apps, and they do not publish a distinct share for Meta AI/Meta-hosted search. (gs.statcounter.com) So we know Meta has not yet achieved a visible ~10‑point share of conventional web search, but we also know the prediction allowed for multiple future years, and there’s no hard, widely accepted metric yet that aggregates all AI-style queries inside Meta’s apps into a single comparable “search market share” number.

Because (1) the stated time horizon (“several years”) has not run out, and (2) the industry does not yet provide a clear, standardized statistic that would let us definitively say Meta will not reach ~10 percentage points in that time window, the fairest assessment is that the prediction is too early to call rather than clearly right or wrong.

The prediction window is 3–4 years after April 26, 2024, i.e., roughly April 2027–April 2028. The current date is November 30, 2025, which is well before that timeframe. Because the prediction is specifically about Meta’s search-market share by that future period, it is too early to determine whether Meta will end up with ~10% of the search market in 2027–2028.

Therefore, the outcome of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated.

The prediction is about a future state of the market: that only around 2029–2031 (5–7 years after April 2024) will autonomous robotaxi-style self-driving services reach even low single-digit percentages of overall ride volume. As of November 30, 2025, we are only about 1.5 years after the prediction, well before the forecast window begins (2029).

Current data shows that autonomous robotaxi deployments from companies like Waymo, Cruise (which has since paused operations in some markets after regulatory issues), and Tesla’s still-evolving FSD/robotaxi plans are limited in geographic scope and experimental/commercial pilot phases in a few cities, not yet a material share of total rides globally or nationally. However, nothing about today’s situation can confirm or falsify what will be true by 2029–2031.

Because the timeframe of the claim has not yet arrived, the correctness of the prediction cannot be judged yet. Therefore the appropriate status is: it’s too early to tell.

The prediction concerns what share of total ride‑hailing/transport rides will be autonomous 5–10 years from April 2024, i.e., roughly in the 2029–2034 timeframe. As of today (November 30, 2025), we are only about 1.5 years past the prediction date and still several years away from even the earliest point in that window (2029). It is therefore too early to evaluate whether autonomous rides will reach 5–10% of the ride‑hailing market in that period. No current market data can yet confirm or falsify a claim about 2029–2034.

Evidence from 2024–2025 is consistent with Jason’s qualitative view that robotaxis are not causing a sudden, mass displacement of human ride‑hailing, but it is too early to say whether his more specific claim of only ~1–2 percentage‑point market‑share gains per year will hold over the longer run.

What we see so far (2024–2025):

• Waymo reports more than 250,000 paid robotaxi rides per week in the U.S. and served about 4 million autonomous rides in 2024, scaling to hundreds of thousands of weekly trips across a handful of U.S. cities. (cnbc.com)
• Baidu’s Apollo Go has also reached roughly 250,000 fully driverless weekly rides and over 17 million total rides, but Baidu’s CEO has emphasized that even in a leading city like Wuhan its share of ride‑hailing is only around 1% and that reaching “meaningful” market share will take many years. (cnbc.com)
• Meanwhile, human‑driver platforms are still enormous. Uber alone handled over 11 billion trips in 2024 and more than 3.2 billion trips in Q2 2025, while Didi in China reports roughly 33 million daily transactions (≈12 billion trips per year). (investor.uber.com) Against tens of billions of human‑driver trips annually, all robotaxi services combined still account for well under 1% of global ride‑hailing volume, implying that their global market share is rising by well under a percentage point per year.

Local exceptions and why they don’t settle the prediction:

• In some constrained geofenced areas, especially San Francisco, robotaxis are making deeper inroads. Yipit data (summarized by The Driverless Digest) suggests that within Waymo’s SF operating zone, its share of ride‑hailing trips grew to roughly 22% by late 2024, comparable to Lyft in that subset of trips—faster than Jason’s “1–2 percentage points per year” heuristic. But this excludes airport and freeway trips and applies only to a limited service area and a short 15‑month window, not to an entire metro market or to the overall industry. (thedriverlessdigest.com)

Why the call is inconclusive rather than right or wrong:

• Jason’s core thesis—no abrupt, global wipe‑out of human ride‑hailing by robotaxis—matches current reality. Market leaders like Waymo and Apollo Go are scaling quickly in absolute numbers but still constitute a tiny fraction of total ride‑hailing worldwide, and even their own executives describe market‑share gains as gradual. (cnbc.com)
• However, his numerical estimate (only ~1–2 percentage‑point share gains per year once deployment begins) is a long‑run structural claim about how adoption will proceed over many years. With commercial robotaxi services only just beginning broader rollout in 2024–2025 and global market share still well below 1%, there is not yet enough multi‑year data to confirm or falsify that specific diffusion rate.

Because the pattern so far aligns with a slow, non‑abrupt transition but the multi‑year percentage‑point trajectory he described cannot yet be robustly measured, the fairest assessment as of November 30, 2025 is “inconclusive (too early)” rather than definitively right or wrong.

Jason’s statement was a conditional warning about what would happen if two policy problems (R&D amortization and tight M&A/antitrust rules) were not fixed "over the next few years." As of late 2025, both the time horizon and the conditions of that hypothetical are not clearly met, so the prediction can’t be definitively judged.

Key points:

• R&D amortization has largely been rolled back for domestic R&D, at least prospectively. Congress restored immediate expensing for U.S.-based R&D, both via earlier relief tied to the Tax Relief for American Families and Workers Act of 2024 and then more comprehensively in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) in July 2025, which reinstates current-year expensing for domestic research costs for tax years beginning after December 31, 2024. (globalreporterjournal.com) That means the “fix this tax issue” part of his warning has, in substantial measure, been addressed, at least for domestic R&D.
• Before the rollback, Section 174 amortization was clearly harmful to startups, creating taxable income "out of thin air" and raising cash taxes for early‑stage tech companies, especially those with significant engineering costs. (theregister.com) So his concern about the tax rule itself was grounded in real pressure on startups.
• Antitrust / M&A constraints have not clearly been “eased” in a way that targets startup exits. FTC/DOJ data for FY 2024 show elevated enforcement (more Second Requests and intensive reviews) even as overall deal volume remains strong, and reporting through 2025 describes a still‑tough but functioning review environment—more scrutiny, but not an obvious pro‑startup relaxation. (reuters.com) There’s no decisive policy shift whose primary effect is to make it markedly easier for large firms to buy startups.
• Startup ecosystem outcomes are mixed and hard to attribute to these two levers alone. U.S. startup funding in 2025 has rebounded strongly—driven heavily by AI—suggesting robust capital for at least one large segment of tech. (reuters.com) At the same time, data on Series A conversion shows a harsh environment: only a small fraction of recent seed‑stage startups are reaching Series A, and timelines between rounds have lengthened, which implies elevated startup attrition. (wsj.com) However, those dynamics are affected by macro conditions, interest rates, and the AI platform shift—not just R&D tax policy and antitrust.
• Timeframe: Jason said "over the next few years." From April 2024 to late 2025 is only partway through that window, and we don’t yet have a full multi‑year picture of post‑reform startup formation and survival.

Because (1) one of his key conditions (the R&D tax problem) has been substantially addressed for domestic R&D, (2) the antitrust/M&A side has not seen a clearly defined, large pro‑startup easing, and (3) the ecosystem data is mixed and causally entangled with many other factors, we can’t cleanly say whether his specific conditional prediction—that failing to fix both issues would "kill a lot of startups" and materially damage U.S. startup formation—has come true. It’s simply too early and too confounded to judge either as clearly right or clearly wrong.

In episode E173 on April 5, 2024, Jason introduces the new CEO, Jon Haile, and explicitly says that Jon’s first duty will be to “next week announce the details of the All-In Summit 2024, our third edition.” (podscripts.co)

The following week’s episode, E174 (released April 12, 2024), does indeed contain an “All-In Summit 2024 Announcement” segment and links to the registration page. That segment publicly reveals the key details: the event returns to Los Angeles and will be held September 8–10, 2024. (podcasts.apple.com) However, the episode credits and third-party show notes list only Friedberg, Chamath, and Sacks as the speakers, with the summit announcement specifically attributed to David Friedberg—not to Jon Haile. (allin.onpodcastai.com)

So while the content of the prediction (that the 2024 All-In Summit’s dates/location would be announced the following week) came true, the agent of that announcement was wrong: it was made on-air by the hosts, not by Jon Haile. Because the prediction is framed around Jon himself publicly making the announcement, it is best scored as wrong rather than partially correct.

Summary: Part (2) of Jason’s prediction (a live Q&A around 500k subs) has already happened. Part (1) (a special 1M-subscriber party) depends on the channel hitting 1,000,000 YouTube subscribers, which it has not yet done as of late November 2025, so the overall prediction is too early to fully evaluate.

What Jason predicted in E173 (Apr 5, 2024)
In episode E173 he said they would:

• Hold “a 1 million subscriber party” when the All-In YouTube channel hits 1,000,000 subscribers.
• When they were at 486,000 subscribers, do “a live Q&A with all the besties” once they added 14,000 more subscribers (i.e., around 500,000 subs). (podscripts.co)

Status of the 500k-subscriber live Q&A (Part 2)

• On June 28, 2024, the All-In channel ran a livestream titled “500K Subscriber Livestream! | All-In Podcast” explicitly celebrating reaching 500,000 subscribers on YouTube. (getrecall.ai)
• The video’s description states “ONLY SUBSCRIBERS CAN ASK LIVE QUESTIONS!”, indicating it was a live Q&A-style event with questions from subscribers (“besties”). (videohighlight.com)
• Summaries of the stream confirm it was a live chat / Q&A format tied to the 500k milestone, and during that stream they again talk about future subscriber milestones and a planned million-subscriber party. (getrecall.ai)

This matches Jason’s promise of a live Q&A when going from ~486k to ~500k subs, so Part (2) has come true.

Status of the 1M-subscriber party (Part 1)

• Multiple analytics trackers show the All-In Podcast YouTube channel is still under 1,000,000 subscribers as of late November 2025:
  • SPEAKRJ lists 972,000 subscribers as of November 23, 2025. (speakrj.com)
  • SocialCounts.org’s live counter shows about 974,963 subscribers on November 27, 2025. (socialcounts.org)
• Other coverage and transcripts refer to a planned million-subscriber party (including mentions of a future Vegas party) but there is no evidence that a 1M-subscriber party has actually been held yet, and the precondition (reaching 1M subs) clearly has not occurred. (podcasts.happyscribe.com)

Conclusion

• Part (2): The ~500k live Q&A with subscriber questions has happened.
• Part (1): The 1M subscriber threshold has not yet been reached, so the promised 1M-subscriber party has not yet happened and isn’t overdue.

Because the overall prediction is conjunctive (they will do both things) and the first part is still pending on a future milestone, the correct overall judgment today (Nov 30, 2025) is "inconclusive" (too early to fully determine).

Evidence from regulatory filings and multiple news outlets shows that Donald Trump did in fact receive an additional 36 million shares of Trump Media & Technology Group (DJT) as an earnout award, and that these shares were worth on the order of $1.6–$1.8 billion at the time:

• The merger agreement included up to 36 million “earnout” shares for Trump if DJT’s share price stayed above set benchmarks (notably $17.50) for 20 out of 30 trading days beginning March 25, 2024. (cnbc.com)
• By April 22, 2024, CNBC reported Trump was poised to receive up to 36 million additional shares once that 20-day condition was satisfied. (cnbc.com)
• A later CNBC piece reports that Trump received 36 million more shares on Friday, April 26, 2024, as an earnout bonus, bringing his total holdings to 114.75 million shares; at a DJT closing price of $49.93, the new block alone was worth about $1.8 billion (“almost $2 billion”). (cnbc.com)
• AP and other outlets likewise report that Trump was awarded 36 million additional shares, raising his stake to more than 114 million shares, with the grant valued around $1.6–$1.8 billion, depending on the reference price. (valuethemarkets.com)

Match to the prediction:

• Number of shares: Predicted ≈36 million; actual grant = 36,000,000 shares → accurate.
• Value: Predicted “almost $2 billion”; contemporaneous valuations around $1.6–$1.8 billion → very close in magnitude.
• Timing: Jason said “in the coming week” (normalized as “within roughly one week” of the April 5 episode). In reality, the grant was made on April 26, 2024, about three weeks after the episode.

Because the core substantive claim—that Trump would receive about 36 million extra DJT shares worth nearly $2 billion—did indeed come true (albeit a bit later than implied), this prediction is best classified as right, with the caveat that the timing was off by roughly two weeks.

The prediction specifies a timeline of seven years from April 2024, which points to around April 2031 as the target date by which “every middle class household in America” will have a ~$1,000/month general‑purpose domestic robot. The current date is November 30, 2025, which is less than two years into that seven‑year window. Because the deadline for the prediction has not yet arrived, it’s too early to determine whether this adoption level will actually occur. Therefore, the accuracy of the prediction cannot yet be evaluated.

Evidence strongly supports that typical retail investors who bought DJT around late March 2024 have since suffered large losses.

Around the podcast date, DJT closed between roughly $40 and $70 per share. For example, on March 25, 2024 it closed at $49.95, and on March 28, 2024 it closed at $61.96, after a sharp post‑listing surge. (statmuse.com)

As of late November 2025, DJT trades around $11.5 per share. Relative to a $50–$60 entry price typical of that late‑March window, this is a loss on the order of 75–80%.

Media coverage over 2024–2025 consistently characterizes DJT as having plunged from its post‑debut highs: by early September 2024 it had lost more than 70% from its late‑March peak and was trading below $17, (markets.com) by late August 2024 it was down about 65% from its debut level around the time it went public, (forbes.com) and by 2025 articles describe DJT having fallen roughly 70–75% from earlier highs. (wsj.com) The overall trajectory since the March 2024 mania has been a sustained, large drawdown rather than a stable or rising trend.

Some short‑term traders could have sold during interim rallies, but the prediction concerned retail investors buying around that time and holding over time on average. Given that the stock’s price today is a small fraction of its late‑March 2024 level and has spent much of the time trending down from those highs, the average buy‑and‑hold retail buyer from that period would indeed be sitting on a very large percentage loss.

Therefore, Jason’s prediction that such buyers would "lose a large amount of money" has, in aggregate and over the time that has now passed, turned out to be right.

The prediction concerned people buying Trump Media & Technology Group (DJT) stock around late March 2024, when it was trading at meme-level valuations, and warned they would "lose a large portion" of their money over time.

Historical data show DJT closed between roughly $37 and $66 during March 2024, with a closing price of about $61.96 on March 28, 2024, near the time of the hype around its Nasdaq debut.【1search0】 MacroTrends reports DJT’s price at $61.96 on March 31, 2024 and a latest closing price around $11 in late November 2025, with 2025 showing a ~67% annual decline from the start of the year.【1search3】 A recent article also notes the stock crashed to all-time lows around $10–11 in November 2025, down roughly 70% in 2025 alone.【1news14】

That means a buy-and-hold investor who bought in late March 2024 at ~$40–$70 is now sitting on losses of roughly 70–85% of capital (e.g., from ~$62 to ~$11). Even when looking at the full year 2024, the year-end price (~$34) remained far below the late‑March level (~$62), implying persistent impairment for that cohort of buyers.【1search3】 Contemporaneous coverage throughout 2024 already documented a severe and sustained post-listing slump from the initial surge in the high $50s–$70s down into the $20s–$30s and below.【1news12【1news15【1news16】

While some short‑term traders could have exited with gains, Jason’s claim was about the broad set of investors buying during the meme spike “if you buy this stock” and hold it over time. Given the magnitude and persistence of the drawdown from late‑March 2024 levels to late 2025, those investors in aggregate did, in fact, lose a large portion of their invested capital. Therefore, the prediction is right.

By November 2024, the conditions and results of the presidential race ended up far from what Jason described:

1. Biden was not the Democratic nominee in the 2024 general election. He withdrew on July 21, 2024 and Vice President Kamala Harris became the Democratic nominee against Donald Trump. (en.wikipedia.org) The prediction framed the effect specifically as RFK Jr. “peeling off” votes from Biden in the 2024 election.

2. RFK Jr. suspended his independent campaign and endorsed Trump before the election, then tried to get off the ballot. Reporting shows he ended his campaign, backed Trump, and successfully withdrew from the ballot in several key battlegrounds, including Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Arizona. He remained on the ballot in Wisconsin and Michigan only because state law made withdrawal difficult. (apnews.com) That is the opposite of an ongoing, strong third‑party run siphoning votes from the Democratic ticket in those states.

3. Actual vote share: Kennedy never reached “a couple of percentage points” in key swing states where he remained on the ballot. Nationwide, third‑party and independent candidates combined for about 2.13% of the vote; RFK Jr., as a withdrawn independent, received only about 0.49% nationally. (en.wikipedia.org) In Wisconsin and Michigan—two core swing states where he could not be removed—AP reporting puts his support at roughly 0.5% in each, well under the 2–3 percentage‑point range implied by “a couple of percentage points.” (apnews.com)

4. Available polling and post‑Biden‑withdrawal analyses indicate Kennedy hurt Trump at least as much as, and often more than, the Democrat, rather than uniquely hurting Biden/Harris. For example, a Marquette Law School poll in Wisconsin (conducted after Harris became the nominee) found that in a multi‑candidate matchup, Kennedy drew 6% overall and took slightly more from Republicans than Democrats, with particularly strong appeal to independents. (marquette.edu) A Washington Post analysis similarly concluded that, once Harris was the nominee, Kennedy and other third‑party candidates tended to erode Trump’s position more than Harris’s, with Harris generally doing better in polls when third‑party candidates were included. (washingtonpost.com)

Putting this together:

• Kennedy’s final ballot presence in core battlegrounds was limited.
• Where he did remain (e.g., WI and MI), his actual vote share was about half a percentage point, not “a couple of percentage points.”
• The best available evidence suggests his late‑stage support did not primarily come out of Biden/Harris’s hide in key swing states.

Given these facts, the specific prediction that the RFK Jr.–Nicole Shanahan independent ticket would peel off roughly a couple of percentage points from Biden in key swing states did not come true.

Jason’s prediction in E172 had two parts: (1) that the All‑In YouTube channel would do a live Q&A stream around the 600k‑subscriber mark, and (2) that they would hold an in‑person “million subscriber party” once they reached 1,000,000 subscribers, inviting as many fans as possible.(podscripts.co)

Part 1 – ~600k live Q&A:

• On June 28, 2024, the channel ran a “500K Subscriber Livestream!” on YouTube. Summaries describe it as an All‑In live stream celebrating 500,000 subscribers, with real‑time audience interaction, super chats, and future “live chat”/Q&A plans; during the stream they note the channel at about 528k subs.(getrecall.ai)
• While this milestone is at ~500k rather than literally 600k, it is close in magnitude and matches the spirit of Jason’s forecast (a live Q&A–style stream tied to a mid‑range subscriber milestone). So the first part is approximately fulfilled.

Part 2 – 1M-subscriber in‑person party:

• Multiple later episodes and summaries reiterate plans for a “million subscriber party,” including mentions of doing something “crazy” for the million‑subscriber YouTube milestone and references to holding it in Las Vegas, but always framed as a future event.(getrecall.ai)
• As of late November 2025, analytics sites show the All‑In YouTube channel at roughly 970–975k subscribers—close, but not yet at 1,000,000.(speakrj.com) There is no credible reporting or documentation that a dedicated “million subscriber party” for fans has already been held; existing large in‑person events (the All‑In Summits) are separate conferences, not billed as a million‑subscriber celebration.(en.wikipedia.org)

Because the key condition for the second half of the prediction (actually reaching 1,000,000 subscribers and then holding the promised fan party) has not yet occurred, the overall prediction cannot be definitively judged. The mid‑milestone live Q&A behavior looks directionally correct, but the central “million subscriber party” claim remains untested, so the fairest overall label is inconclusive (too early).

As of 30 November 2025, the DOJ’s 2024 antitrust case against Apple (United States et al. v. Apple Inc.) is still ongoing with no settlement or final judgment yet:

• In June 2025, Judge Julien Neals denied Apple’s motion to dismiss, and reporting notes that the case is moving into discovery and is expected to take years, with trial timing projected around 2027–2028.(macrumors.com)
• Public records and coverage describe the case status as continuing litigation; there is no indication that it has been resolved or settled as of late 2025.(en.wikipedia.org)

Regarding the specific product outcomes Jason tied to that resolution:

1. Official iMessage client for Android

   • iMessage remains officially available only on Apple platforms (iOS, iPadOS, macOS, watchOS, visionOS).(en.wikipedia.org)
   • A 2025 overview of iMessage-on-Android workarounds explicitly notes that Apple has never released iMessage for Android and continues to keep it as an ecosystem lock‑in, with only unofficial hacks providing limited access.(ofzenandcomputing.com)
   • Apple has added RCS support to the Messages app on iPhone to improve texting with Android users, but that is not an Android iMessage client; it’s standards‑based RCS handled on the Apple side.(en.wikipedia.org)

2. Apple Watch compatibility with non‑Apple phones (e.g., Android)

   • Current guides (2025) still state there is no way to directly pair or fully use an Apple Watch with an Android phone; the watch requires an iPhone and Apple’s Watch app for setup and normal operation, and any Android "workarounds" are limited and unofficial.(androidauthority.com)

Because:

• The core event of the prediction — the DOJ case being resolved via settlement rather than judgment — has not happened yet; the case is actively proceeding and likely years from trial.(macrumors.com)
• The supposed downstream changes (official iMessage for Android and official Apple Watch–Android support) also have not occurred as of late 2025.

…it is too early to say definitively whether Jason’s prediction will ultimately prove right or wrong. As of now, none of the predicted outcomes have materialized, but since the underlying case has not yet been resolved, the fairest verdict is inconclusive (too early) rather than fully "right" or definitively "wrong."

As of November 30, 2025, the DOJ’s 2024 antitrust case United States, et al. v. Apple Inc. over the iPhone and related ecosystem is still in pre‑trial stages, with no settlement or merits ruling yet that compels Apple to change its practices in any of the five cited categories (super apps, cloud gaming apps, messaging apps, smartwatches, digital wallets).

Key points:

• The DOJ complaint filed March 21, 2024 explicitly identifies those five categories as areas where Apple allegedly suppresses competition.(techcrunch.com)
• Analysts and coverage at the time of filing projected a 3–5 year timeline for any final resolution, noting that remedies would likely be years away, similar to other big‑tech antitrust cases.(techcrunch.com)
• The court denied Apple’s motion to dismiss on June 30, 2025, allowing the case to proceed, but this is only a procedural ruling and does not order any substantive changes to Apple’s conduct.(macrumors.com)
• The most recent overviews of the case state that pretrial proceedings are ongoing and that trial is scheduled for 2026, with final remedies (if any) to come afterward.(en.wikipedia.org)
• There is no public indication of a settlement, consent decree, or injunction in this DOJ case that already forces Apple to materially alter its behavior in three or more of the five specified categories.

Apple has made or announced various changes in some areas (e.g., NFC access and messaging standards), but these stem primarily from EU proceedings and other regulatory or strategic pressures, not from a settlement or judgment in the U.S. DOJ 2024 smartphone‑monopoly case itself.(techcrunch.com)

Because the case is still pending and the central remedies phase has not occurred, we cannot yet know whether at least three of the five categories will be materially changed “in the government’s favor via settlement or ruling,” as the prediction specifies. Thus, it is too early to judge the prediction’s accuracy, and the result is inconclusive (too early).

As of November 30, 2025, the DOJ’s 2024 antitrust case against Apple over iPhone-related practices is still in active litigation with no settlement or final remedy yet.

• The DOJ and multiple states filed the lawsuit in March 2024, alleging Apple maintained a smartphone monopoly via five categories of conduct (super apps, cloud gaming, messaging, smartwatches, and digital wallets/NFC). (techcrunch.com)
• In June 2025, Judge Julien Neals denied Apple’s motion to dismiss, allowing the case to move forward into discovery and a likely multi‑year process; reports note the case is unlikely to reach trial before roughly 2028. (macrumors.com)
• Contemporary analyses of the suit have consistently described expected resolution timelines of 3–5 years, reinforcing that we are still early in the process. (techcrunch.com)
• Recent coverage in mid‑ to late‑2025 discusses Apple’s answer to the complaint and additional states joining the case, framing it as ongoing litigation, not a settled matter. (macrumors.com)

Apple has independently loosened some restrictions (e.g., on cloud streaming, RCS messaging support, and NFC access for third‑party wallets), which arguably benefits consumers, but these changes are not yet part of any DOJ settlement or consent decree in this case. (macrumors.com)

Because:

1. There is no settlement yet, so we cannot know whether “three of five” categories will be formally conceded;
2. The net consumer impact of any eventual remedy is unknown; and
3. The long‑term effect of that eventual outcome on Apple’s business and stock cannot be tied to a resolved case,

there isn’t enough information to judge whether Jason’s multi‑part prediction has come true. It remains too early to call, so the prediction is best classified as inconclusive at this time.

Within roughly a year after March 2024, Neuralink did in fact make multiple, clearly more substantial public announcements about its brain–computer interface progress than the initial quadriplegic chess demo.

Key developments and announcements in that period:

1. Second human patient and improved performance (August 2024)
   In August 2024, Elon Musk announced that Neuralink had successfully implanted its device in a second trial patient, with the implant “working very well” and providing “a lot of signal, a lot of electrodes.” Reports noted that this second patient, identified as Alex, did not suffer the thread‑retraction complication seen in the first patient and was using the device not only to play video games but also to learn 3D object design, demonstrating more varied and functional real‑world use than the initial chess demo alone. (business-standard.com)

2. Third human patient and upgraded hardware (early 2025)
   By early 2025, the Associated Press reported that Musk had confirmed a third human recipient of the Neuralink implant. Musk highlighted hardware improvements—more electrodes, higher bandwidth, and longer battery life—and said that earlier recipients were using the implant for activities like gaming and design software, indicating continuing technical progress and broader capabilities beyond the first public demo. (apnews.com)

3. Regulatory progress for advanced applications (vision restoration, September 2024)
   In September 2024, Neuralink’s experimental vision‑restoration implant Blindsight received the FDA’s Breakthrough Device designation, a notable regulatory milestone that signaled serious advancement toward more ambitious BCI applications (restoring vision by directly stimulating visual cortex). (en.wikipedia.org)

All of these announcements—multiple additional human implants with improved performance and broader tasks, plus a major FDA breakthrough designation for an advanced BCI application—occurred between August 2024 and early 2025, i.e., well within one year of the March 22, 2024 podcast. They are materially more significant than the initial single‑patient chess demonstration alone, matching Jason’s expectation of “significant progress” and “even bigger announcements in the coming year.”

As of November 30, 2025, there isn’t enough evidence yet to clearly say whether this AI‑driven robotics wave has definitively become the first sustained, broadly successful "general‑purpose" robotics cycle, versus another boom that could still stall.

Key points:

• Industrial and logistics robotics are clearly booming, but that trend predates 2024. The International Federation of Robotics reports that 542,000 industrial robots were installed in 2024, more than double the number a decade earlier, with over 4.6 million robots operating in factories worldwide. This reflects a long‑running automation curve, not uniquely the 2024 AI wave. ​(therobotreport.com)
• Service and warehouse robots are growing fast and seeing real commercial use. IFR’s 2025 Service Robots report shows almost 200,000 professional service robots sold in 2024 (up 9%), with more than half used for transportation and logistics, and a rapidly expanding robot‑as‑a‑service model. ​(ifr.org) Amazon alone operates over 750,000 robots in its fulfillment centers, using AI‑equipped mobile platforms and robotic arms for transport, sorting, and packaging at large scale. ​(businessinsider.com) These are substantial commercial successes, but they are largely task‑specific systems, not general‑purpose robots.
• Early AI‑enhanced general‑purpose / humanoid robots are only in pilot stages. 2025 coverage describes 2025 as a turning point where humanoid robots like Boston Dynamics’ new Atlas and systems from Agility and Figure begin entering factory and warehouse trials, but with lingering questions about reliability, safety, and economics. ​(wired.com) That is progress, but still far from “widespread practical deployment.”
• Some applications show promising but still narrow success. For example, Diligent Robotics’ Moxi has completed over 1.25 million deliveries across more than 25 U.S. hospitals and is now expanding pilots into senior living facilities. ​(reuters.com) This is real, scaled use, yet still focused on specific workflows rather than broad, general‑purpose capability.
• Regulators and analysts are already warning about a potential humanoid-robotics bubble. China’s National Development and Reform Commission has explicitly cautioned that the country’s rapidly expanding humanoid robotics sector may be experiencing a bubble, noting many entrants and limited mature use cases. ​(theverge.com) This underscores that it’s not yet clear whether the current excitement will translate into sustained, broad commercial deployment.

Taken together, the data show strong and accelerating adoption of AI‑enabled robots in specific domains (factories, warehouses, hospitals) and a surge of investment and pilots in more general‑purpose/humanoid systems. However, fewer than two years have passed since the March 2024 prediction, and the hallmark outcomes it implies—widespread, general‑purpose deployment and clearly proven long‑term commercial success of this new generation—have not yet fully materialized or definitively failed. The trajectory looks promising but remains unresolved, so the fairest assessment for now is "inconclusive (too early)".

Available analytics show that the All-In Podcast YouTube channel did not reach 1 million subscribers by December 31, 2024, and in fact is still below that milestone in late 2025 (mid– to high-900k range according to Social Blade, SPEAKRJ, and other trackers).(socialblade.com) Since the antecedent of Jason’s conditional (“if we hit 1 million subscribers by the end of the year”) never occurred, we have no way to observe whether they would actually have organized the promised public party in that scenario.

There was a large public event — the All-In Holiday Spectacular at San Francisco’s Palace of Fine Arts on December 7, 2024 — with open bar, food trucks, DJ sets and a big live show, which fans could attend by buying tickets.(garysguide.com) However, this event was promoted and covered as a general year-end/“blockbuster year” celebration, not as a "1 million subscribers" party, and it took place when the channel was only around the 500k–700k subscriber range (they had a 500K Subscriber Livestream on June 28, 2024 and were targeting 750k next).(getrecall.ai)

So:

• The condition in the prediction (1M subs by 12/31/2024) did not come true.
• The consequence (a public listener party tied to that 1M milestone) therefore never had a chance to be tested.

Because we cannot say whether they would have kept or broken the promise in the world where the condition did occur, the status of this conditional prediction is best scored as ambiguous rather than right or wrong.

Evidence from 2025 shows that commercially available AI products now implement exactly the kind of orchestrating / “conductor” agents coordinating teams of specialized agents that Jason described.

1. Explicit orchestrator/manager agents in commercial platforms
   AgentX, an AI agent automation platform, describes an “Orchestrator Agent” that acts as a manager over a “multi-agent workforce,” coordinating agents with different LLMs that “work together as one.” This is a direct match to the idea of a conductor coordinating a team of AI specialists for a user in a manager/CEO role. (agentx.so)
   SmythOS markets multi‑agent orchestration as a core feature, letting multiple AI agents with different roles collaborate in a single workflow (e.g., writer vs. reviewer), with the platform handling the orchestration and message passing between them. (smythos.com) These are sold as SaaS products to businesses, not just research demos.

2. Enterprise “central orchestration layer” coordinating specialized agents
   Microsoft’s AI Agent Service, used in commercial security products like ContraForce’s Service Delivery Agent, relies on a central orchestration layer coordinating multiple specialized agents (for detection, response, knowledge, etc.) within a unified system. Customers define intent; the orchestrator routes work among agents and surfaces an integrated outcome—very similar to a product manager delegating to a team of specialists. (devblogs.microsoft.com)

3. User-facing teams of specialized professional agents
   Legal SaaS product Instant.Lawyer offers Instant Agents that can act as different kinds of lawyers (commercial, tax, IP, workplace) “acting simultaneously in your best interests,” and explicitly pitches the idea of having “thousands of lawyers, researchers and agents working for you – simultaneously.” (instant.lawyer) That’s a concrete, commercial example of a user (effectively in a client/CEO role) coordinating multiple specialized AI professionals through one system.

4. Developer-accessible frameworks for orchestrated AI teams
   Tools like the open-source agentic-engineer framework expose a bmad-orchestrator agent described explicitly as a conductor that coordinates a structured team of specialist agents (analyst, PM, UX expert, architect, dev, QA, etc.) for end‑to‑end software development. (github.com) While this is more developer-focused, it shows that orchestration/conductor patterns for multi-specialist AI teams are practically available, not hypothetical.

5. Context: still early but real-world deployments exist
   A 2025 overview of agentic AI notes that, as of mid‑2025, many companies are experimenting with AI agents and that real-world deployments exist but are not yet ubiquitous. (en.wikipedia.org) This aligns with Jason’s claim that such conductor-style systems would exist by 2025, not that they would be universal.

Taken together, these sources show that by 2025 there are indeed commercially available AI systems that implement an orchestration / “conductor” agent coordinating multiple specialized agents (often framed as digital employees or expert teammates), which is materially consistent with Jason’s 2024 prediction.

Public reporting shows significant pressure on regulators over OpenAI’s nonprofit/for‑profit setup, but no clear confirmation that the IRS itself has launched (let alone “aggressively” pursued) a tax investigation comparable to the Mozilla case.

Key points:

• Investigative reporting based on OpenAI’s IRS tax‑exempt application highlights how far it has shifted from its original nonprofit commitments and notes that nonprofit‑law experts question whether its structure still fits charitable rules, but these pieces do not report any IRS enforcement action—only potential exposure. (apnews.com)
• Other U.S. regulators have opened formal probes (e.g., the FTC’s investigation of OpenAI over privacy and cybersecurity issues), showing substantial federal scrutiny, but this is unrelated to tax/nonprofit status. (foley.com)
• State authorities, especially the California Attorney General, are reported to be examining OpenAI’s conversion and asset-transfer issues, again underscoring legal and regulatory concern over the nonprofit/for‑profit boundary—but that’s state charity regulation, not the IRS. (route-fifty.com)
• In July 2025, watchdog group The Midas Project filed a formal complaint with the IRS alleging OpenAI’s structure and Sam Altman’s dual roles may violate tax‑exemption rules, and multiple outlets covered this and explicitly called on the IRS to investigate. Those stories consistently describe a complaint to the IRS and “calls” for an investigation, not a confirmed IRS action. (themidasproject.com)
• At least one analysis piece frames the situation as OpenAI’s model being “under IRS scrutiny,” but on inspection it is describing the watchdog complaint and possible or hypothetical consequences (“the opening of an IRS investigation could have…”), not citing any official confirmation that such an investigation has begun. (datastudios.org)

Because IRS examinations of specific taxpayers are generally confidential unless they surface through litigation or official statements, the absence of reporting doesn’t prove there is no investigation. Conversely, the available coverage never confirms that the IRS is “on this like crazy” in the way Jason predicted; all we can see is external pressure and speculation.

Given that:

• Sufficient time has passed since March 2024 that such an investigation could exist, but
• IRS actions, if any, are opaque and not publicly documented,

we can’t reliably say whether the prediction is right or wrong based on public evidence. That makes the outcome ambiguous under your rubric.

As of November 30, 2025, the time horizon of the prediction (“within the next several years”) has not elapsed, so it’s too early to judge its long‑term accuracy.

Reddit: Reddit went public on March 21, 2024, and continues to operate as an independent public company (ticker RDDT). Recent coverage and filings describe it as a standalone public firm with a diversified institutional shareholder base, ongoing earnings reports, and strategic partnerships, not as a subsidiary that has been acquired in a take‑private or merger transaction. (en.wikipedia.org) There is no evidence of Reddit being bought by a larger company after its IPO.

Stack Overflow: Stack Overflow (via Stack Exchange) has been wholly owned by Prosus—a large tech holding company—since its acquisition in 2021, well before the March 2024 podcast. (en.wikipedia.org) That prior deal doesn’t test the future part of the prediction.

Because (1) Reddit has not been acquired yet, and (2) the multi‑year window the speaker invoked is still open, we cannot say the prediction is definitively right or wrong at this point.

Jason’s scenario implied that if AI customer-support systems improved quickly enough, they could actually be handling ~98% of customer queries by the end of 2024. In reality, available data from 2024–2025 shows automation and AI assistance rising fast, but nowhere near 98% of queries being fully handled by AI.

For example, Comm100’s 2025 Live Chat Benchmark (based on 220M+ interactions) reports that AI chatbots handled about 73.8% of live-chat interactions in 2024, not 98%. More importantly, only about 45–46% of chats were fully resolved by chatbots alone in both 2023 and 2024, meaning most conversations still required a human agent to finish the job. (comm100.com)

Industry-wide summaries likewise talk about 60–85% of customer interactions being handled or assisted by AI/automation by 2024, and projections of ~75% handled by AI by 2025—again, well below 98% complete automation. (gitnux.org) Even leading-edge deployments aren’t there: Reuters reports India-based LimeChat’s bots currently handle about 70% of customer complaints for clients and aim for 90–95% within a year, i.e., still short of 98% and only for particular customers, not the whole market. (reuters.com)

User-experience studies also show that many customers still feel they need humans to get issues properly resolved: a 2024 UK survey found 54% of users say their problems are only truly solved by speaking with a human, and 40% would pay extra to avoid dealing with AI chatbots. (techradar.com) This is inconsistent with a world where ~98–99% of queries are fully resolved by AI.

The second part of Jason’s statement (reaching 98–99% in about four years if improvement is only ~10% per year, i.e., around 2028) concerns a future date and can’t yet be directly tested. But the concrete, time-bound claim that AI would be doing about 98% of queries by the end of 2024 clearly did not happen. Therefore, overall this prediction is best classified as wrong.

Jason’s claim was long‑term: Apple would "run the table" in the Vision Pro–style high‑end VR/AR category over the coming years, i.e., become the clear dominant vendor.

So far (end of 2025), available data show:

• In 2024, Meta still held about 70–75% of global VR/MR headset unit shipments, with Apple only around 5%, making Apple a distant third overall rather than a dominant player. (trendforce.com)
• IDC estimates Apple shipped roughly 400,000 Vision Pros in 2024, versus 5.6 million Meta headsets, and notes that premium devices (> ~$1,000) are only 5–6% of total VR shipments, underscoring that Apple’s ultra‑high‑end segment is still small and niche. (theverge.com)
• Analysts do not yet describe Apple as having decisively overtaken Meta in any broad “high‑end XR” category; instead, Meta is still characterized as the dominant XR hardware platform by unit share. (x.pawanlabana.com)
• In October 2025, reports indicated Apple paused development of a next‑generation Vision Pro to redirect resources toward AI smart glasses, explicitly citing weak momentum and strong competition from cheaper Meta Quest devices—hardly an indication that Apple has already "run the table". (reuters.com)
• New high‑end competitors (e.g., Samsung’s Galaxy XR headset around $1,799) are just entering the market in late 2025, which further complicates any early verdict about long‑term dominance. (reuters.com)

However, the prediction’s horizon is explicitly multi‑year and extends beyond the ~1.75 years that have elapsed since February 2024. Apple could still pivot, release new high‑end models, or consolidate a larger share of the premium segment later. Because the claimed future state (Apple clearly dominating the high‑end XR category) is neither realized nor definitively ruled out yet, the fairest judgment at this time is that the outcome is too early to call.

Available evidence through November 30, 2025 shows no U.S. Treasury–led bailout or dedicated support mechanism aimed at protecting the main creditors/investors in troubled U.S. commercial real estate debt, as Jason predicted.

Key points:

• Janet Yellen and the Treasury/FSOC have repeatedly acknowledged commercial real estate (especially office) stress and losses, but framed it as manageable and not a systemic banking risk, focusing on supervisory monitoring and bank-by-bank risk management rather than new bailout facilities. (ktvz.com)
• A 2024 House Oversight hearing on the health of commercial real estate markets explicitly records industry representatives saying that the CRE industry is “not here seeking a bailout of any sort” and that “there is no bailout”, with an emphasis on regulatory flexibility and private‑sector adjustments instead. (congress.gov)
• Global and U.S. regulators (FSB, FSOC) have highlighted vulnerabilities in CRE and rising delinquencies, but their responses focus on enhanced oversight, data, and supervisory guidance, not on Treasury or Fed programs that make CRE creditors whole. (crefc.org)
• By mid‑2025, office CMBS delinquencies had surpassed their 2008 peak, with commentary explicitly noting that “there’s no bailout coming this time” for office/CRE investors, indicating that creditors are bearing losses rather than being rescued by a federal backstop. (thebsideway.com)
• No credible reporting or official documentation indicates the creation of any Treasury (or broader federal) program in 2024–2025 analogous to TARP/PPIP that targets commercial real estate loans or CMBS for the purpose of bailing out landlords, bondholders, or other CRE creditors; existing facilities like the Bank Term Funding Program were bank‑liquidity tools, created in 2023 and not designed as CRE‑creditor bailouts. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because the core predicted event—a Yellen‑era Treasury bailout/support mechanism specifically protecting CRE creditors/investors while avoiding an explicit bank bailout—has not occurred and current policy/public statements point in the opposite direction (no such bailout), the prediction is best classified as wrong as of November 30, 2025.

As of November 30, 2025, the world has not yet reached the specific regime Jason described, but policy and product debates are actively moving in that general direction, and his time horizon (“in the coming years”) is still open.

Key facts:

• Federal baseline is still 13, not 15–16. The main U.S. law governing kids’ online privacy, COPPA, continues to focus on children under 13 and does not impose a general 15–16+ access rule for social media. Platforms typically respond by setting a nominal minimum age of 13, not 15 or 16. (ftc.gov)

• States have experimented with higher ages and parental consent, but these laws are fragile. Utah’s 2023–24 Social Media Regulation Act requires age verification and parental consent for minors under 18, but a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction blocking the law, finding it likely unconstitutional. (aaaa.org) Florida passed H.B. 3, banning accounts for kids under 14 and requiring parental consent for 14–15‑year‑olds, but a federal judge similarly halted enforcement as a First Amendment violation. (reuters.com) Virginia’s SB 854, effective January 1, 2026, will limit social media for under‑16s to one hour per day unless parents consent and will require age verification, but it is not yet in force and is already being challenged by NetChoice. (en.wikipedia.org) These moves show some policy momentum toward stronger parental-gatekeeping for teens, but not a stable, nationwide standard.

• Federal proposals fall short of a 15–16+ baseline. The bipartisan Kids Off Social Media Act, reintroduced in 2025 and advanced out of Senate committee, would ban users under 13 from social media and restrict algorithmic recommendations for those under 17, but it does not set a 15–16 minimum age for general access and has not yet become law. (congress.gov)

• Industry standards and handset enforcement have not converged on Jason’s model. Major platforms (Meta, TikTok, Snap, YouTube) still operate with a 13+ entry age, while layering on teen safety modes and some parental controls, rather than a hard 15–16+ cutoff. Meta now requires parental consent for certain features (like Instagram Live) for under‑16s in the U.S. and other countries, but not for having an account at all. (apnews.com) Apple has expanded Screen Time and App Store parental controls, letting parents gate apps (including social apps) and grant exceptions, but it does not impose a universal rule that 12–15‑year‑olds can only use mainstream social media with verified parental permission by default; it simply provides tools families may choose to enable. (apple.com)

• Net effect as of late 2025: There is clear movement toward more parental involvement and tighter teen controls, and a few state laws directly target under‑16 social media use, but these efforts are patchy, heavily litigated, and far from an accepted U.S.-wide policy or industry standard that “social media should start at 15 or 16” with mandatory parental permission for younger teens enforced by handset makers and platforms.

Because Jason explicitly framed this as something that might happen “where this all winds up” in the coming years, and because neither the predicted 15–16 baseline nor the enforcement model has clearly materialized yet (while remaining plausible given ongoing legislative and regulatory activity), the prediction cannot be judged definitively right or wrong at this point. Hence the result is inconclusive (too early to tell).

Jason’s prediction was explicitly about a long horizon: “in our lifetime… I don’t think that’s happening for 20 years or so,” i.e., no repeat of the 2020–2021-style combo of near‑zero rates plus massive direct fiscal and monetary stimulus for roughly two decades. Evaluating this in November 2025 means only ~1.8 years of a ~20‑year forecast have elapsed, so the statement cannot yet be definitively confirmed or falsified.

Empirically, the specific 2020–2021 regime he referenced was quite extreme: policy rates were near zero in 2020–2021 (effective Fed funds about 0.37% in 2020 and 0.08% in 2021) while Congress and the Fed delivered over $5.5 trillion of COVID‑related relief through the CARES Act, PPP and Health Care Enhancement Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, and the American Rescue Plan, much of it in direct transfers and emergency programs. (ycharts.com)

Since the podcast (January 2024), rates have remained far from zero: the Fed kept the target range around 5.25–5.5% through most of 2024, then eased to 4.25–4.5% in late 2024 and maintained that range into mid‑2025, with effective rates around 4–5% in 2024–2025. (ycharts.com) Fiscal policy has included large tax and budget packages (e.g., the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” and the Rescissions Act of 2025), but these are conventional tax/spending changes, not a new wave of multi‑trillion‑dollar emergency checks and subsidies on the scale and form of the pandemic bills—and critically, they’re occurring alongside positive real rates, not ZIRP. (en.wikipedia.org)

So, as of late 2025, the data to date are consistent with Jason’s claim (no repeat yet of the 2020–2021 environment), but the forecast is about the next ~20 years. There is still ample time for future shocks that could trigger another zero‑rate, massive‑stimulus episode. Because the prediction’s horizon has not come close to expiring, the correct classification now is “inconclusive (too early)”, not right or wrong.

Evidence since January 26, 2024 strongly supports Jason’s prediction that economic conditions for legacy media would keep deteriorating, with continued layoffs, closures, and financial strain.

Newspaper and magazine cuts: The Los Angeles Times implemented one of the largest staff reductions in its history in January 2024, laying off more than 20% of its newsroom to stem annual losses of $30–40 million, after earlier cuts in 2023. (clickorlando.com) TIME magazine laid off about 15% of its unionized editorial staff to improve its financial position. (foxbusiness.com) Sports Illustrated’s operating license was pulled in January 2024, leading to the layoff of its editorial staff and later disruption of its print schedule. (en.wikipedia.org) In 2025, Condé Nast folded Teen Vogue into Vogue and laid off much of its politics team, reflecting continued retrenchment in traditional and youth-focused print brands. (theguardian.com)

Digital and TV brands shutting or shrinking: Vice Media, once valued over $5 billion, announced in February 2024 that it would stop publishing on Vice.com and lay off “several hundred” employees as it shifted to a studio model—effectively shuttering its flagship news site amid ongoing financial distress. (aljazeera.com) Pitchfork, a well‑known music outlet, was folded into GQ in early 2024 with associated layoffs. (mediapost.com) Major TV and cable news organizations have also cut deeply: CNN announced around 200 layoffs and then a further 6% staff reduction as part of a cost‑driven pivot to digital; Disney cut nearly 6% of staff at ABC News and related networks; Paramount slashed 3.5% of its U.S. workforce in 2025 after a 15% reduction in 2024, with additional large layoffs after its Skydance merger. (apnews.com)

Industry‑wide layoff data: Challenger, Gray & Christmas data show that the news subset (digital, broadcast, and print) announced 4,902 job cuts in 2024, up 59% from 3,087 in 2023, even as broader “media” layoffs dipped slightly—indicating mounting pressure specifically on newsrooms. (challengergray.com) Through the first ten months of 2025, the wider media industry announced 16,680 cuts, up 26% from the same period in 2024, confirming that layoffs across TV, film, streaming, and news remain elevated. (challengergray.com) Separate tracking of journalism redundancies also shows thousands more cuts across newspapers, broadcast, and digital outlets in 2024, with further staff reductions and furloughs announced in early 2025 at brands like the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, CNN, HuffPost, and others. (mediablog.prnewswire.com)

While the exact number of job cuts fluctuates year to year, the post‑January 2024 period clearly features ongoing layoffs, closures, mergers, and aggressive cost‑cutting at major legacy newspapers, magazines, and TV networks, rather than stabilization or recovery. That pattern aligns with Jason’s directional claim that “it’s going to get worse and worse,” so the prediction is best judged as right based on the evidence to date.

As of late 2025, the prediction’s main time horizon (“over the long term,” roughly the next decade) has not played out yet, so it’s too early to judge the core claim about where subscriber counts and business models will settle.

Subscribers:

• Netflix has already surpassed the lower end of the 300–500 million range, with around 301–302 million paid memberships by the end of 2024 and estimates of ~310 million in early 2025, so the scale Jason envisioned for Netflix looks plausible and in some sense already realized. (cnbc.com)
• Disney+ remains far below that range, with roughly 131–132 million global subscribers as of Q3 2025, though it is still growing.(streamingbetter.com) Long‑range industry forecasts currently project Disney+ at under 200 million subscribers by 2029 (around 192–196 million), which is well short of 300 million but still leaves several years beyond 2029 before the end of the “next decade” window.(whatsondisneyplus.com) So it’s impossible yet to say definitively whether Disney+ will ever reach the 300–500 million range or not.

“Money printing machines” and content spending:

• Netflix and Disney’s streaming businesses are becoming strongly cash‑generative. Netflix is guiding to about $9 billion in free cash flow for 2025, which is consistent with Jason’s idea that mature, scaled streamers can throw off substantial cash.(tipranks.com) Disney’s direct‑to‑consumer segment (Disney+, Hulu, ESPN+) has moved from large losses to sustained quarterly operating profits in 2024–2025, with hundreds of millions of dollars of operating income and a stated goal of roughly $1 billion in streaming profit for fiscal 2025.(cnbc.com) This directionally supports the “money printing” part, though it’s still early.
• However, the claim that these services “won’t need a ton of new content” is not borne out so far. Netflix is increasing its content budget, planning to spend about $18 billion on content in 2025 (up from ~$16.2 billion in 2024), and management explicitly says they are “not anywhere near a ceiling” on content spend.(hypebeast.com) Disney likewise continues to invest heavily in new originals and sports rights to fuel Disney+ and Hulu. Profitability is improving, but it is not coming from a dramatic pullback in new content; rather, it’s coming from a mix of price hikes, ad tiers, and more disciplined spending.

Because:

• Netflix has hit the predicted scale but Disney+ has not, and forecasts are uncertain;
• both services are trending toward being highly cash‑generative, partially validating the “money printing” idea;
• yet their ongoing large content investments undercut the specific notion that they will not need much new content;
• and, crucially, we are less than two years into a roughly ten‑year prediction window,

the overall outcome of Jason’s long‑term prediction cannot be definitively labeled as right or wrong at this point. It is therefore best classified as inconclusive (too early).

Jason’s prediction was that there would be “massive consolidation” in streaming, leading to a materially smaller number of major services over the coming years (a multi‑year horizon beyond early 2024).

By November 30, 2025, we do see meaningful consolidation activity, but not yet a clear, large reduction in the number of major global streaming services:

• In India, Disney+ Hotstar and JioCinema were merged into a single platform, JioHotstar, eliminating JioCinema as a standalone service and creating a dominant joint venture (JioStar). (en.wikipedia.org)
• Paramount completed an $8.4 billion merger with Skydance in August 2025, with the new leadership planning to bring Paramount+, Pluto TV, and BET+ onto a single tech stack and to combine Paramount+ and Pluto TV into a single direct‑to‑consumer service, which would reduce the number of separate Paramount-owned streaming offerings once fully implemented. (reuters.com)
• Disney and Fubo agreed to merge Fubo with Hulu + Live TV under Disney majority control, creating a larger combined live-TV streaming operation, even though both brands remain available as separate offerings for now. (en.wikipedia.org)
• Major U.S. and global on‑demand services like Netflix, Disney+, Hulu (increasingly integrated into Disney+ but not yet fully merged at the product level), HBO Max/Max, Paramount+, Peacock, Apple TV+, and Prime Video are all still operating as distinct services and are actively marketed in 2025 Black Friday promotions and bundles. (theverge.com)
• Further large‑scale consolidation is being actively explored: Warner Bros. Discovery has begun a breakup and sale process, soliciting bids from Paramount Skydance, Comcast, and Netflix, with scenarios that could combine HBO Max with Paramount+ and reshape the competitive landscape, but these transactions have not yet closed. (reuters.com)

So far, the industry is clearly moving toward consolidation (corporate mergers, service mergers like JioCinema + Disney+ Hotstar, and deeper bundling and integration among U.S. players), but as of late 2025 there is not yet an unequivocal “massive” shrinkage in the number of major global streaming services Jason was talking about. Because his prediction explicitly refers to the coming years and that period extends beyond 2025, and because ongoing deals could still dramatically change the count of major services, it is too early to say whether his forecast of a materially smaller field of major streamers will ultimately prove right or wrong.

Evidence after the podcast shows that Harvard’s presidential selection process was publicly challenged on the grounds that diversity/identity considerations improperly influenced the choice of Claudine Gay.

• Prominent donor and alumnus Bill Ackman repeatedly alleged that Harvard’s presidential search was constrained by DEI requirements. He claimed the search committee "would not consider a candidate who did not meet the DEI office’s criteria" and criticized Gay as a "diversity hire," explicitly framing the process as driven by DEI rather than merit.(dailycampus.com)
• Ackman further argued that Harvard’s board had run a presidential search with “a predetermined objective of only hiring a DEI‑approved candidate,” directly attacking the legitimacy of the selection process rather than just Gay’s performance in office.(harvardindependent.com)
• Conservative activists and commentators mounted a broader campaign describing Gay as an “unqualified diversity hire” and tying her appointment to DEI ideology, which major outlets covered as a central part of the controversy surrounding her resignation and the wider political attack on higher education.(theguardian.com)

There does not appear to be a specific lawsuit solely challenging Harvard’s presidential selection process, but Jason’s prediction allowed for legal or public challenges. The intense, sustained public scrutiny and criticism focused directly on whether DEI/identity considerations distorted Harvard’s presidential search matches the scenario he described, in a way analogous to DEI‑related legal battles in other domains. Hence the prediction is best categorized as right.

According to official results of the 2024 United States presidential election, the Republican ticket of Donald Trump and JD Vance won the presidency, defeating the Democratic ticket of Kamala Harris and Tim Walz in both the Electoral College (312–226) and the national popular vote.(en.wikipedia.org)

This means:

• One of the two major-party figures mentioned in the prediction—Donald Trump—did in fact become president.
• No third-party or "dark horse" candidate won the election or defeated both major-party nominees.

Because the prediction specifically claimed that a dark horse candidate would beat both Trump and Biden in the 2024 election rematch, and the actual outcome was a Trump victory over Harris (Biden did not run in the general election), the prediction did not come true.

Benjamin Netanyahu did not lose power as Israel’s prime minister by the end of 2024.

• Netanyahu’s current term as prime minister began after the 2022 election, and he is listed as serving as prime minister from 2022–present, with his sixth (37th) government marked as incumbent well past 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)
• There was no national election in Israel in 2024, and reporting in April 2024 noted that no election is required before October 2026, meaning any early vote would have required Knesset action that did not occur. (theguardian.com)
• Throughout 2025 coverage, Reuters, AP, and others continue to refer to Netanyahu as “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,” confirming he remained in office beyond 31 December 2024. (reuters.com)

While Netanyahu has faced intense criticism, protests, and even an ICC arrest warrant in 2024—developments that could make him perceived as a major political loser—those reputational issues do not satisfy the prediction’s explicit condition that he lose power as prime minister by the end of 2024. Since that core condition was not met, the overall prediction is wrong.

Evidence from 2024 shows that owners of large, high‑quality datasets did in fact start to earn recurring and strategically important licensing income from AI companies, even if the effect was not yet a full "turnaround" for the entire content industry.

• Reddit as a clear ‘major winner’: In its 2024 IPO filings, Reddit disclosed data‑licensing contracts signed in January 2024 with an aggregate value of about $203 million over 2–3 years, expecting at least $66.4 million of revenue in 2024 from these deals alone. This revenue was large enough that Reddit highlighted data licensing as a central growth driver, with non‑advertising revenue up sharply due to AI data deals (notably including Google). (techcrunch.com)
• Additional AI training deals for Reddit: In May 2024, OpenAI announced a partnership to use Reddit’s real‑time content for training its models and powering features in ChatGPT, reinforcing that Reddit’s corpus had become a paid, recurring input to leading AI systems rather than being scraped for free. (techcrunch.com)
• News publishers winning multi‑year, recurring contracts: In May 2024, OpenAI and News Corp (owner of The Wall Street Journal, The Times of London, The Sun, etc.) signed a five‑year licensing agreement giving OpenAI access to current and archived content for training and for direct use in responses; reporting put the deal’s value at over $250 million over the term, i.e., tens of millions of dollars per year. (apnews.com) OpenAI also struck multi‑year content and training deals with outlets like The Atlantic, Vox Media, Time, Condé Nast and others, turning a growing set of premium archives into recurring AI‑licensing revenue streams. (reuters.com)
• Broader shift toward paid licensing, not just scraping: By 2024, multiple publishers (e.g., AP, Axel Springer, Le Monde, Prisa Media, Dotdash Meredith) had signed structured content‑licensing agreements with OpenAI and similar firms, typically for recurring annual payments (often estimated in the low‑million‑dollar‑per‑year range). Collectively, these deals represent a new, industry‑wide revenue line built specifically on selling training and product‑use rights to AI companies, which is exactly the mechanism the prediction described. (reuters.com)
• Not universal, but directionally correct: Some of Jason’s named examples did not fully cash in during 2024 itself—e.g., The New York Times was still litigating against OpenAI/Microsoft and did not sign its first major AI licensing deal (with Amazon, worth an estimated $20–25M per year) until 2025, and YouTube’s opt‑in system for creators to authorize third‑party AI training launched only in December 2024, with no material 2024 revenue disclosed. (theverge.com) There was also substantial litigation (NYT, Ziff Davis and others) showing that not every rights‑holder had yet turned conflict into cash. (theverge.com)

Netting this out: 2024 did see major rightsholders with valuable datasets (Reddit, large news conglomerates and other premium publishers) emerge as clear economic winners from the AI boom via multi‑year, recurring licensing deals for training data and product integration. While the impact was uneven and smaller for some sectors than Jason’s "entire content industry" framing implies, the core prediction—that such rights‑holders would secure meaningful, recurring AI‑licensing income and become major business beneficiaries—was borne out by events in 2024.

Public records show that the New York Times’ copyright lawsuit against OpenAI and Microsoft remains active and contested well past 2024, with no reported settlement.

• In November 2025, Reuters describes OpenAI asking a federal judge to reverse an order to turn over millions of anonymized ChatGPT chats “amid a copyright infringement lawsuit by the New York Times”, clearly indicating the case is ongoing, not settled. (reuters.com)
• OpenAI’s own November 2025 blog post, “Reporting the facts about the New York Times’ lawsuit,” discusses recent court rulings, discovery disputes, and continuing motions in the Times case, again treating it as an unresolved, active lawsuit rather than a settled matter. (openai.com)
• Separately, in May 2025 the New York Times announced its first generative‑AI licensing deal — not with OpenAI, but with Amazon — while explicitly noting that this comes more than a year after the Times sued Microsoft and OpenAI for copyright infringement, with no mention of any settlement or licensing agreement with OpenAI. (theverge.com)

There are no credible reports of a nine‑figure (≥$100M) settlement between the New York Times and OpenAI in 2024, nor of an NYT–OpenAI licensing agreement that would authorize ongoing training and serving of NYT content. Given that the lawsuit is still being litigated and the specified 2024 deadline has passed, Jason’s prediction of a 2024 nine‑figure settlement plus licensing deal did not come true.

Available reporting shows that by the end of 2024—and even as of late 2025—The New York Times has not launched a public, NYT‑branded AI assistant or LLM where only authenticated NYT subscribers can query NYT information and receive NYT‑powered answers. Coverage instead describes internal newsroom AI tools and policies. In February 2025, the Times rolled out Echo, an in‑house AI summarization tool, and approved staff use of external LLM services (OpenAI’s API, Google Vertex, etc.), but Echo is explicitly an internal tool for summarizing Times articles and briefings, not a subscriber‑facing AI product. (theverge.com) The Times’ first major generative‑AI content licensing partnership is a multi‑year deal announced in May 2025 with Amazon, allowing Amazon to use Times, Athletic, and NYT Cooking content in Alexa and other Amazon AI products and to train Amazon’s models. Those uses surface as summaries and excerpts within Amazon consumer experiences and are described as a way to reach broader audiences, not as an NYT‑run, subscriber‑only AI interface. (cnbc.com) In 2023–24, the Times’ posture toward major LLM providers was primarily adversarial—suing OpenAI and Microsoft and sending a cease‑and‑desist to Perplexity over unlicensed use of its content—rather than partnering with them on the kind of gated NYT chatbot the prediction envisioned. (news.cgtn.com) While the Times has experimented with AI‑generated audio narrations and articulated internal generative‑AI principles, these are feature enhancements and staff tools, not a 2024 launch of a subscriber‑authenticated NYT AI model or a subscriber‑only integration with a major LLM. (axios.com) Because neither branch of the prediction (a public NYT‑run model nor a subscriber‑gated integration with a major LLM) materialized within the roughly 2024 timeframe—or even by late 2025—the prediction is best judged as wrong.

Apple did launch a language‑model‑based AI product, Apple Intelligence, integrated into iOS, macOS, and iPadOS starting in 2024, with plans to monetize some features via a future “Apple Intelligence+” subscription and via revenue‑sharing with AI model providers like OpenAI or Google—not with content rightsholders. (macrumors.com)

However, Apple’s own technical and PR materials describe its training data as a mix of licensed publisher content and publicly available web data, with no indication of any commitment to share a fixed percentage of AI revenue with those rightsholders. (techcrunch.com) Public reporting on concrete deals—such as Apple’s $25–50 million licensing agreement with Shutterstock for images, video, and music—likewise describes lump‑sum or multi‑year licensing, not an ongoing share of Apple’s AI query or subscription revenue. (venturebeat.com)

Further, multiple investigations and lawsuits allege Apple trained some models on datasets including pirated books and scraped YouTube subtitles, with creators complaining they were not compensated—again inconsistent with an announced policy that ~50% of AI revenues are paid out to training‑data rightsholders. (tomshardware.com) Across public disclosures and coverage of Apple Intelligence through late 2025, there is no evidence that Apple has created or advertised a scheme where roughly half of its Apple‑Intelligence (or other AI) query/subscription revenue is shared with data rightsholders. This makes Jason’s specific prediction about a 50% revenue‑sharing AI product incorrect.

Jason predicted that in 2024 TikTok (or ByteDance via a TikTok-specific entity) would complete an IPO or public spin‑out, under political pressure to reduce CCP influence on the board.

By the end of 2024 and well into 2025:

• TikTok is still not publicly traded, and there is no TikTok-specific public entity. Multiple 2025 overviews of TikTok’s IPO status state explicitly that TikTok has no ticker, is not listed on any exchange, and remains owned by private parent ByteDance. (ebc.com)
• ByteDance itself likewise remains a private company; it is described in current references as a privately held firm with venture and founder ownership, not listed on public markets. (ts2.tech)
• In 2024, the U.S. instead passed the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which forces ByteDance to divest TikTok or face a ban by January 19, 2025, but this divestiture requirement is separate from any IPO and did not result in a completed public listing or spin‑out during 2024. (en.wikipedia.org)

Because no IPO or public spin‑out of TikTok (or a TikTok-specific entity) was completed in 2024, the prediction did not come true.

Public data on OpenAI’s private-market valuation shows that investors who bought around a ~$90B valuation in 2023 were well above water by the end of 2024.

Key points:

• In 2023–early 2024, OpenAI ran an employee tender offer that valued the company at about $86B, with reports of secondary transactions around that level; Jason’s comment about people “buying secondary at 90 billion” refers to buyers paying a modest premium over this price. (theinformation.com)
• By August 30, 2024, TechCrunch reported that secondary-market bids were already valuing OpenAI above $100B, with some bids implying valuations up to $143B, and a data provider (Caplight) estimating its value at over $111B based on secondary activity. That is already well above $90B. (techcrunch.com)
• On October 2, 2024, OpenAI closed a major $6.6B funding round that valued the company at about $157B, more than 70% higher than a $90B entry price. Multiple outlets (Reuters, MarketWatch, BusinessToday, others) reported this valuation. (investopedia.com)
• On November 26, 2024, CNBC reported a further $1.5B employee tender offer to SoftBank, explicitly stating that the share price in that deal matched the company’s most recent $157B funding valuation, confirming that this higher mark was still in effect heading into year‑end 2024. (cnbc.com)
• In 2025, valuations only climbed further (to $300B in a SoftBank‑led round and then $500B in secondary sales), underlining that there was no subsequent down‑round that would retroactively make the 2023 ~$90B buyers structurally underwater. (reuters.com)

Given that by end of 2024 OpenAI’s widely cited valuation was about $157B, far above the ~$90B secondary valuation Jason warned about, those investors were not underwater on paper. On the available evidence, the prediction that they would be “underwater next year” is therefore wrong.

Evidence by late 2024 strongly supports Jason’s prediction.

• In June 2024 at WWDC, Apple announced “Apple Intelligence”, a broad suite of on‑device and cloud AI features (writing assistance, image generation/editing, etc.) for iPhone, iPad, and Mac, branded explicitly as its generative AI platform and positioned as a major strategic move. (pcquest.com) These capabilities began rolling out later in 2024 via OS updates (iOS 18, iPadOS 18, macOS Sequoia). (pcquest.com)
• The same initiative included a substantial Siri upgrade: Apple described a more capable assistant able to perform hundreds of new actions across apps and to tap into OpenAI’s ChatGPT, with a visible redesign and “personal intelligence” framing. Major coverage called this an “extensive makeover” for Siri and highlighted the ChatGPT integration as central to making Siri smarter. (adn.com)
• Mainstream outlets repeatedly framed this as Apple “entering the AI race” or “jumping into the race to bring generative AI to the masses,” explicitly contrasting Apple’s new efforts with earlier leaders like Microsoft and Google and treating Apple as now actively competing in generative AI rather than remaining on the sidelines. (adn.com)

By the end of 2024, Apple had launched major new AI capabilities, begun a significant Siri reboot, and was broadly covered as a real participant in the generative‑AI race. That matches the substance and timeline of Jason’s prediction, so it is right.

Evidence from 2024 and early 2025 shows that the core of Jason’s prediction—continued sluggish smartphone and premium-smartphone sales in 2024—did not materialize at the market level, even though some details (like long upgrade cycles and flat iPhone revenue) were directionally right.

Key points:

1. Global smartphone unit sales rebounded in 2024, rather than remaining sluggish.
   IDC reports worldwide smartphone shipments reached about 1.24 billion units in 2024, up 6.4% year‑over‑year, marking a strong recovery after two years of decline and six consecutive quarters of shipment growth. (businesswire.com) This is inconsistent with a continued "major slowdown" or broadly "sluggish" unit sales in 2024.

2. Premium smartphones grew faster than the overall market instead of seeing flattened/weak revenue growth.
   Counterpoint Research finds the premium segment (≥$600) grew about 8% YoY in 2024, outpacing overall smartphone market growth (~5–6%), and its share rose to 25% of the global market, a record high, with OEMs explicitly “focusing on revenue over volume.” (counterpointresearch.com) That indicates robust, not flat or weakening, revenue growth for premium smartphones overall.

3. Apple’s own iPhone business was flat, but that’s the exception, not the whole premium market.
   Apple’s FY 2024 Form 10‑K shows iPhone net sales of $201.2B in 2024 vs. $200.6B in 2023, and Apple explicitly describes iPhone net sales as “relatively flat” year‑over‑year. (sec.gov) IDC’s shipment data similarly show Apple’s 2024 smartphone shipments down about 0.9% YoY (232.1M vs. 234.3M). (businesswire.com) This does match his claim that high‑end makers like Apple would see muted growth—but the prediction was framed as a broader, global premium‑smartphone slowdown, which did not occur.

4. Upgrade/refresh cycles did continue to lengthen, but this did not prevent a 2024 rebound.
   IDC notes that even as refresh cycles continue getting longer and the used‑phone market grows, 2024 still brought a solid shipment rebound driven by pent‑up upgrade demand. (itnewsonline.com) Consumer reporting in 2025 also emphasizes that Western users now tend to upgrade roughly every four years instead of two, clearly indicating people are skipping multiple generations. (thetimes.co.uk) So the “people will skip 2–3 versions” / long‑cycle part was accurate, but it did not translate into the broad, continued slump he forecast for 2024.

Putting it together:

• Correct: upgrade cycles lengthened and Apple’s iPhone revenue was basically flat.
• Incorrect at market level: 2024 did not continue a “major slowdown” in smartphone unit sales, and premium‑smartphone revenue growth accelerated above the market rather than flattening or weakening.

Because the central thrust of the prediction was that 2024 would be another year of sluggish smartphone and premium‑smartphone performance globally—and the actual data show a clear rebound and strong premium growth—the prediction as stated is best judged wrong overall.

Jason defined his “consumer comfort services” pick as on‑demand platforms like DoorDash, Airbnb, and Uber: “small luxuries like DoorDash, Airbnb, Uber… consumer comfort services is my pick for the best performing asset of 2024.”(podscripts.co)

Looking at 2024 total returns for those exemplars:

• DoorDash (DASH): +69.6% in 2024.(alphacubator.com)
• Airbnb (ABNB): –3.47% in 2024.(financecharts.com)
• Uber (UBER): about –2% in 2024.(financecharts.com)
  A later review of the All‑In predictions similarly characterizes this basket as “mixed,” noting a strong gain in DoorDash but flat‑to‑low‑single‑digit gains for Airbnb and Uber.(linkedin.com)

An equal‑weighted basket of these three names would have returned roughly +21% in 2024—respectable, but below or in line with broad U.S. equities, which returned around +23–25% (S&P 500 / U.S. large‑caps; Nasdaq‑100 about +25.9%).(rbcwealthmanagement.com) Several major equity sectors (Communication Services, Information Technology, Financials, Consumer Discretionary) returned 30–40%, clearly outperforming this “consumer comfort” basket.(rbcwealthmanagement.com)

Across major asset classes, 2024 was dominated by Bitcoin, which is widely documented as the best‑performing asset class of the year with ~120%+ returns, far ahead of stocks, gold (~27%), and other categories.(visualcapitalist.com) In published asset‑class league tables, top slots are consistently occupied by Bitcoin, then gold and U.S. large‑cap equities—not a “consumer comfort services” grouping.(visualcapitalist.com)

Because Jason framed this as the best (or at least one of the standout top) asset categories for 2024, and in practice the DoorDash/Airbnb/Uber theme delivered only mid‑tier equity performance and clearly lagged the widely recognized top‑performing assets, the prediction did not come true.

Evidence from 2023–2024 private funding rounds and sector-level data shows the opposite of what Jason predicted.

1. Flagship LLM startups saw big up-rounds, not 50–80% markdowns, between 2023 peaks and end‑2024.

   • Cohere was valued around $2.1–2.2B in June 2023, then raised a new round in July 2024 at $5.5B, more than doubling its valuation instead of falling 50–80%. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Mistral AI was valued at “over $2B” in Dec 2023 and then raised a June 2024 round at €5.8B (~$6.2B), roughly tripling its valuation in a year. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • OpenAI completed an employee tender in late 2023 valuing it at $86B, and a follow‑on deal reported in Feb 2024 again valued it around $80–86B, i.e., holding or rising rather than dropping by half or more. (cnbc.com)
     Across the best‑known LLM startups, primary and secondary transactions in 2024 point to higher or at least sustained valuations vs. 2023, not a broad 50–80% reset.

2. Sector‑wide VC data shows GenAI/LLM companies were among the hottest areas of investment in 2024, not one of the worst‑performing asset categories.

   • An EY generative‑AI deal study (Dec 2024) reports that GenAI VC investment continued to surge in 2024, with total 2024 deal value expected to exceed $45B, up sharply from 2023, and explicitly describes GenAI as leading the way within AI funding. (ey.com)
   • Barron’s notes that overall VC funding in 2024 was still well below 2021, but AI investments grew over 80% year‑on‑year and accounted for close to one‑third of all VC funding, underscoring that AI/LLM startups were a central bright spot, not a laggard. (barrons.com)
   • A 2025 ecosystem report summarizing 2024 shows GenAI grabbing nearly half of all global VC money by end‑2024, characterizing GenAI as “the hottest investment trend,” again inconsistent with it being among the worst‑performing asset classes. (startupwired.com)

3. Other sectors, not LLMs, are singled out as 2024 underperformers.
   A global startup‑ecosystem report notes that sectors like Cleantech, Edtech, AdTech, and Digital Media saw funding and exits fall sharply in 2024, and describes their outlook as “rather gloomy,” while predicting AI will “remain the major growth sector” and continue to draw increasing VC capital. (startupgenome.com) That’s directly at odds with LLM startups being among the worst asset categories.

4. No credible data supports a broad, hidden 50–80% private‑market markdown for LLM startups by end‑2024.
   There were certainly many overhyped or weaker AI startups and some quiet down‑rounds or shutdowns, but available funding data and secondary‑market valuations for leading LLM companies show strong or rising prices, not a sector‑wide crash. If LLM startups had truly been marked down 50–80% across the board and become one of the worst‑performing asset classes in 2024, we would expect to see widespread reports from PitchBook, Carta, secondary‑market platforms, and major financial media. Instead, contemporaneous reporting frames GenAI as the standout growth and capital‑magnet sector of 2024.