As of November 30, 2025, there hasn’t been enough time to judge a decade-scale prediction about “at least the next several years.” The evidence so far is mixed:

1. Realized CPI since mid‑2024
   After the July 12, 2024 podcast, U.S. headline CPI year‑over‑year has mostly run in the mid‑2% to low‑3% range. Data compiled from BLS releases show YoY CPI of about 2.4–3.5% through late 2024 and 2.3–3.0% for 2025, e.g. 2.31–2.39% in March–April 2025, then drifting back up toward ~3% by September 2025. (officialdata.org) That is above the Fed’s 2% target but below a clear 3% regime, and we have only ~1½ years of post‑prediction data—not enough to say whether inflation has sustainably failed to return to ~2% over “several years.”

2. Market expectations are closer to ~2–2.5% than to 3%
   Market‑implied 5‑year breakeven inflation has been around 2.2–2.6% since mid‑2024 and is about 2.3% in late 2025, not 3%. (ycharts.com) That contradicts the specific claim that markets would “assume that we’re going to be at a 3% kind of inflation level for quite some time,” at least so far.

3. Economist forecasts
   A late‑2025 survey by the National Association for Business Economics, summarized by Reuters, projects U.S. inflation easing from about 2.9% at the end of 2025 to around 2.6% in 2026. (reuters.com) That is still above 2% but again notably below 3%, suggesting consensus expects gradual convergence toward the low‑2s rather than a stable 3% regime.

4. Current underlying inflation
   Some gauges, including the Fed’s preferred measure, are still around 3% in late 2025, above target, with tariffs and policy uncertainty keeping upside risks alive. (reuters.com) This lends partial support to the idea that inflation may run above 2% for a while, but the direction of travel is downward from the post‑pandemic highs.

Putting this together: realized inflation since the podcast has indeed stayed above 2% and often in the high‑2s, which is loosely consistent with a world of somewhat higher inflation. However, market pricing and professional forecasts do not clearly back the notion of a durable 3% regime, and the forecast horizon (“for at least the next several years / on the order of a decade”) extends well beyond the data currently available. Because we cannot yet know whether inflation will or will not sustainably return to ~2% over that full period, the prediction’s long‑run accuracy is too early to call, hence inconclusive.