Available evidence shows that between roughly October 2022 and January 2023, global media and policy analysis did not broadly converge on the idea that China had gained major new geopolitical leverage by using its surplus food reserves during the food crisis.

1. What media and policy writing actually emphasized in 2022–early 2023

   • Coverage of the 2022–2023 global food crises highlighted Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, climate shocks, export bans by countries like India, and general supply-chain disruptions as the main drivers of the crisis. China was mentioned primarily for its large grain stockpiles and hoarding behavior, not as a newly dominant geopolitical food power.
     • Analyses note that by mid‑2022 China held about 51% of global wheat, 60% of rice, and 69% of maize stockpiles, and that these “historically high” reserves contributed to higher world prices. But the framing is about price effects and self‑protection, not about Beijing’s increased leverage over others. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • A U.S.–China food‑security debate in mid‑2022 (e.g., Voice of America) portrayed mutual accusations—Washington accusing Beijing of hoarding and China blaming the U.S. for sanctions and global instability. Again, the narrative is contention over responsibility for shortages and prices, not recognition that China had successfully converted reserves into broad geopolitical leverage. (voanews.com)

2. How experts actually talked about China’s food position

   • A detailed February 7, 2023 analysis in The Diplomat on China’s food security—right after the 6–9 month window—describes 2022 as a “tough year” for Chinese agriculture due to droughts, floods, zero‑COVID disruptions, and war‑related supply shocks. It acknowledges China’s “massive grain reserve systems” and huge share of global grain stocks, but frames them as tools to safeguard China’s own food supply amid vulnerability, not as a basis for new geopolitical leverage over other states. (thediplomat.com)
   • A strategic study in the U.S. Air University’s Journal of Indo‑Pacific Affairs ("Dragons Must Eat") treats Chinese food insecurity and reliance on imports as a strategic vulnerability that Western agricultural exporters might, in theory, leverage against China. The thrust is that others might gain leverage over Beijing via food exports—not that Beijing is gaining leverage over the world via surplus reserves. (airuniversity.af.edu)
   • Broader think‑tank work (e.g., CSIS’s ChinaPower project) consistently characterizes China as the world’s largest food importer with declining self‑sufficiency and substantial dependence on foreign soybeans and other inputs—again emphasizing vulnerability and dependence, not surplus‑based coercive power. (chinapower.csis.org)

3. Later discussions of “food as a strategic weapon” don’t backdate to 2022–early 2023

   • More explicit arguments that China is turning food trade or food aid into a strategic weapon—for example via Belt and Road food diplomacy or using food aid to pressure countries on Taiwan—appear in specialized commentary from 2023–2025. These pieces describe a potential or emerging strategy, not a widely acknowledged shift that had already occurred by late 2022. (skytopstrategies.com)
   • Even those later analyses still emphasize stockpiling for national resilience and import diversification, not a widely accepted view that China achieved a step‑change in global leverage in 2022 purely by drawing on its grain reserves.

4. Mismatch with the prediction’s specific claim
   The prediction required that within 6–9 months of April 2022, it would become a macro‑trend everyone wakes up to that:

   • (a) China had “so much leverage around the world”, and
   • (b) that leverage specifically came from using its surplus food reserves during the global food crisis.

   The actual record shows:

   • China’s large reserves and “hoarding” were noticed and debated, but this did not become a dominant global media theme about China gaining decisive new leverage. (en.wikipedia.org)
   • Policy and academic circles in 2022–early 2023 more often framed food as a strategic vulnerability for China and a potential lever for Western exporters, not as a new source of Chinese coercive power. (thediplomat.com)

Given those points, the forecast that by roughly October 2022–January 2023 it would be broadly recognized that China had significantly increased its geopolitical leverage by deploying its surplus food reserves did not materialize. The core mechanism (surplus‑food‑driven global leverage) and the timing (6–9 months) are both unsupported by the record.

Therefore, the prediction is wrong.