The prediction tied war‑driven disruptions in Russia/Ukraine and high fertilizer costs to (1) a major decline in global food production over the following year and (2) ensuing famine in parts of the world, especially Africa, by roughly spring 2023.

1. Global production did not collapse.
FAO estimates for 2022 put world cereal output at about 2.77 billion tonnes, only ~1.2–1.3% below 2021, with the global cereal stocks‑to‑use ratio still around 29.5–29.7%, which FAO characterized as relatively comfortable. (ukragroconsult.com) By 2023–24, total cereal production rebounded to a record ~2.836 billion tonnes, again indicating no sustained global production shortfall. (world-grain.com)

2. Ukraine’s planting and exports were hit but far less than implied.
In 2022, Ukraine’s planted area fell about 28% versus pre‑war levels, with corn and wheat output down roughly 34–35% from 2021, not an ~80% collapse in acreage. (farmdocdaily.illinois.edu) Despite the war, large beginning stocks plus the Black Sea Grain Initiative and alternative routes allowed wheat exports to fall only ~5% and corn exports to increase ~9% versus pre‑war levels in 2022/23, softening the global shock. (farmdocdaily.illinois.edu)

3. Fertilizer and price dynamics eased instead of worsening through 2023.
Fertilizer prices spiked in 2022 but were forecast – and then observed – to fall sharply (around 37%) in 2023, remaining high but no longer at crisis peaks, reducing the risk that planting would become broadly uneconomic. (worldbank.org) The FAO Food Price Index, after peaking in March 2022, fell for 12 consecutive months and by March 2023 was about 20.5% below its peak, helped by ample harvests (e.g., Brazil, Australia, EU) and continued Black Sea exports from Ukraine and Russia. (fao.org) This pattern is inconsistent with a deep, supply‑driven global production shock.

4. Famine outcomes in Africa were grave but not what was predicted.
The Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya) did experience a devastating drought from 2020–2023, with tens of thousands of excess deaths and many millions in severe food insecurity, a crisis that pre‑dated the Ukraine war but was worsened by high global prices. (en.wikipedia.org) In Somalia, IPC analyses for late 2022 and early 2023 projected extremely high needs: millions in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3+), with hundreds of thousands in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and famine projected in specific districts. (ipcinfo.org) However, UN and IPC updates repeatedly noted that, while conditions were “catastrophic,” a formal famine declaration was narrowly averted during 2022–23 due to large‑scale humanitarian response. (aljazeera.com) Severe hunger crises were driven primarily by drought, conflict, and chronic vulnerability; the Ukraine war and price shock were aggravating factors, not the singular trigger of a new, clearly war‑caused famine by spring 2023.

5. Overall assessment.
Within the one‑year horizon the speaker emphasized (“famine hits us in a year”), the world saw:

• Only a modest, manageable dip in global cereal output rather than a sharp production collapse; (ukragroconsult.com)
• Rapid normalization and then record‑high production soon after; (world-grain.com)
• Severe but largely pre‑existing hunger emergencies in Africa, where projected famines were mostly averted through aid, and no widely recognized, new, war‑caused global famine event by spring 2023.

Because both the scale of production decline and the predicted, war‑driven famines did not materialize in the way described, the prediction is best classified as wrong. It substantially overstated the magnitude and global impact of war‑ and fertilizer‑related supply shocks, even though it correctly anticipated serious food‑security stress in vulnerable regions.