Key parts of Friedberg’s scenario happened, but not exactly as he specified, and whether it “avoided a broader crisis” is a judgment call.

What he said needed to happen

1. “Someone takes over Silicon Valley Bank this weekend.”
2. The federal government “guarantee 100% of those deposits.”
3. Depositors have immediate cash access the following week, to prevent a broader crisis.

What actually happened

• Full deposit guarantee and access next week: On Sunday, March 12, 2023, the Treasury, Fed, and FDIC announced a systemic risk exception for SVB. They stated that all SVB depositors would be “fully protected” and would “have access to all of their money starting Monday, March 13.” (fdic.gov) This effectively guaranteed 100% of deposits (including uninsured), funded by the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund and later recouped via special assessments on banks. (reuters.com) So the guarantee-and-access part of his prescription was met very closely.

• Timing and nature of the “takeover”: Regulators closed SVB on March 10 and transferred all deposits and substantially all assets into a temporary FDIC-run Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., whose purpose was to stabilize and market the franchise. (fdic.gov) A true private‑sector buyer, First Citizens Bank, did not acquire the bridge bank’s deposits and loans until a purchase and assumption deal announced March 26–27, 2023—two weeks after the weekend in question. (ir.firstcitizens.com) So if “someone takes over … this weekend” means a private buyer, that part did not happen on his timeline; if one counts the FDIC/bridge bank as the “takeover,” it roughly did.

• Did this avert a ‘broader crisis’?

  • There was further turmoil: Signature Bank failed on March 12 and was also resolved with a systemic risk exception and full depositor protection, (hunton.com) and First Republic Bank was seized and sold to JPMorgan on May 1, 2023, becoming the second‑largest bank failure in U.S. history. (forbes.com)
  • However, there was no 2008‑style systemic collapse: the combination of the SVB/Signature guarantees and the Fed’s liquidity facilities stabilized the system, and widescale cascading failures did not materialize. (fortune.com)

Why this is classified as ambiguous

• His core policy prescription—government backstopping all SVB deposits and ensuring immediate access—did occur almost exactly as described and appears to have been central to containing contagion. (fdic.gov)
• His timing/detail about a buyer “this weekend” was off; the actual private acquisition came later, after an FDIC bridge period. (fdic.gov)
• The phrase “avoid a broader crisis” is inherently subjective: you can reasonably argue either that the measures did prevent a full‑blown systemic crisis, or that the subsequent failure of multiple additional banks means a broader crisis did occur.

Because the factual outcome partly matches (full guarantee, next‑week access) but diverges on the buyer timing, and because the success criterion (“broader crisis”) is not objectively clear-cut, the prediction can’t be cleanly labeled purely right or wrong—hence “ambiguous.”