Last updated Nov 29, 2025
Prediction
Friedberg
marketseconomy
If by 48–72 hours after the end of the March 11–12, 2023 weekend all SVB depositors do not have 100% of their deposits made available in cash, there will be a serious crisis characterized by a massive run away from institutions that hold anything other than fully liquid cash.
every depositor needs to get paid 100% of their money, and that cash needs to be made available to them by early next week. And if that money is not available to them within the first 48 or 72 hours of the end of this weekend, then we are going to have a real crisis on our hands... that's going to cause a massive run.View on YouTube
Explanation

What was predicted

Friedberg’s claim was explicitly conditional:

If by ~48–72 hours after the end of the March 11–12, 2023 weekend all SVB depositors do not have 100% of their deposits available in cash, then there will be a “real crisis” with a massive run from institutions that don’t offer fully liquid cash.

So the prediction only applies in a world where SVB depositors are not fully and quickly made whole.

What actually happened

On Sunday, March 12, 2023, U.S. regulators (Treasury, Federal Reserve, FDIC) invoked the systemic risk exception and announced that all Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank depositors, insured and uninsured, would be fully protected and would have access to all their money starting Monday, March 13, 2023. (fdic.gov) SVB deposits (insured and uninsured) were transferred into a bridge bank and made available, with the cost of covering uninsured deposits to be recouped via special assessments on banks. (sec.gov)

Because of that intervention, the antecedent condition of the prediction (“if depositors don’t get 100% within 48–72 hours”) never occurred. In reality, regulators acted specifically to prevent the kind of broad bank run Friedberg was warning about; Fed and FDIC officials later described the measures as aimed at calming uninsured depositors and limiting contagion. (fdic.gov)

Why the outcome is ambiguous

  • The prediction is a counterfactual causal claim: it asserts what would have happened under a scenario that did not materialize.
  • Since depositors did receive full protection very quickly, the scenario “no full access within 48–72 hours” was never tested in the real world; we cannot directly observe whether there would have been the “massive run” he described.
  • We can see that regulators took his scenario seriously enough to act pre‑emptively, but that does not prove the magnitude of the hypothetical run, only that authorities perceived substantial risk.

Because the required condition for the prediction to be evaluated never occurred, its truth or falsity cannot be established from observed outcomes.

Conclusion

The correct classification is "ambiguous": there has been more than enough time, but the prediction concerns a counterfactual world (no quick, full guarantee of deposits), so we cannot determine from actual events whether his stated consequence (“massive run”) would indeed have followed.