So far (March 2023 → November 2025), the prediction is neither clearly confirmed nor clearly falsified.

1. Monetary expansion / “money printing”
Friedberg argued that to get out of the debt and fragility hole the U.S. would need substantial further monetary expansion. In fact, since his March 2023 comment the Fed has continued quantitative tightening:

• Fed total assets fell from about $8.7T on March 29, 2023 to $8.0T by September 27, 2023.【1search0】
• They then declined further to $7.5T by March 27, 2024 and $7.1T → $6.7T between September 25, 2024 and March 26, 2025.【1search2【1search1】
• By November 2025, reserve bank credit is around $6.5T, still well below 2023 levels.【1search5】
  This is balance‑sheet shrinkage, not renewed large‑scale “money printing.” That part of the prediction clearly has not happened yet, but he explicitly hedged the timing (“I don't know if it's necessarily in this moment”), so it cannot be called wrong on a multi‑year horizon where the key stress (debt overhang) is long‑run.

2. Inflation behavior
He also implied that this future monetary response would be inflationary, but not in a Weimar‑style hyperinflation sense. Post‑2022, U.S. inflation has actually moderated:

• CPI inflation was 4.1% in 2023, down sharply from 2022’s 8%.【2search1】
• It fell further to about 2.9% in 2024 and is running around 2.9–3.0% in 2025, near but above the Fed’s 2% target.【2search0【1search3【2news15】
  That’s normal advanced‑economy inflation, not the “substantial further inflation” one would associate with a decisive new money‑printing cycle; but again, his statement is about eventual policy needed to resolve long‑term debt/fragility, not strictly about the next two years.

3. No hyperinflation / no collapse to zero
The prediction that the dollar would not suffer Weimar‑style hyperinflation or go to (or near) zero in this period is plainly borne out:

• Hyperinflation is usually defined as >50% per month; U.S. CPI has been ~3% per year, far from that threshold.【2search1【2search0【1search3】
• The U.S. Dollar Index (DXY) is around 99–100 in late November 2025, a level generally considered strong by historical standards, not remotely near currency collapse.【3search3【3search4】
  So the “no Weimar, no zero” sub‑claim has been correct so far, but it was also the least controversial part.

4. Long‑term devaluation “like the pound at the end of the British Empire”
This is inherently a multi‑decade structural claim about the dollar’s global role and gradual loss of real value, analogous to sterling’s slow post‑imperial decline. With only ~2.5 years elapsed since the prediction, and the dollar still the dominant reserve currency trading near historical averages in DXY terms, there is not yet enough evidence to say whether this analogy will prove right or wrong.

Bottom line

• The dramatic parts that would be clearly falsifiable in the short run (hyperinflation, dollar near zero) have not happened, in line with his view.
• The core mechanism he described (eventual renewed money‑printing to resolve debt, leading to a slow, structural dollar decline) is about the long‑run path of U.S. fiscal/monetary policy and the dollar’s reserve‑currency status. Given ongoing QT and only moderate inflation so far, this has not been validated, but the relevant time horizon is much longer than 2023–2025.

Because the main claim is explicitly long‑term and the key monetary‑expansion piece could still occur in future cycles, the correct classification as of November 30, 2025 is **“inconclusive (too early)” rather than clearly right or wrong.