Based on data through late 2025, the prediction has not come true yet, but its timeframe (“at some point in the coming years”) is long enough that it can’t be definitively judged.

1. Fed Treasury purchases have not significantly increased; they’ve declined.
   Federal Reserve balance sheet reports show that from September 25, 2024 to March 26, 2025, total assets fell from about $7.1T to $6.7T, with securities held outright down $240B and U.S. Treasury holdings down from about $4.38T to $4.24T. (federalreserve.gov) Subsequent H.4.1 data for October 1, 2025 show Reserve Bank credit and securities held outright continuing to fall, with U.S. Treasury securities down to about $4.20T, confirming ongoing balance sheet runoff (quantitative tightening), not renewed large-scale buying. (federalreserve.gov) A Congressional Research Service summary for March 26, 2025 likewise notes about $4.2T in Treasuries on the Fed’s balance sheet, consistent with a smaller, not larger, Fed footprint. (congress.gov) This is the opposite of “needing to buy the debt” in a new monetization phase.

2. There is still substantial private and foreign demand for Treasuries.
   Market coverage of a 2025 30‑year Treasury auction reports “strong demand,” with the issue clearing at a yield below pre‑auction levels and a higher‑than‑average combined share for direct and indirect bidders, suggesting that investors remain willing to absorb new supply. (barrons.com) Broader commentary notes that despite de‑dollarization talk and some reduction in foreign central bank custody holdings at the New York Fed, total foreign holdings of Treasuries reached a record around March 2025, implying ongoing foreign (especially private-sector) appetite for U.S. debt. (reuters.com) That contradicts the near‑term premise that “there is no one else to buy the debt.”

3. But the prediction’s horizon is multi‑year, so it can’t yet be falsified.
   The statement was that “at some point in the coming years” the Fed will be forced to monetize federal debt because other buyers will be insufficient. Only a bit more than one year has elapsed since the October 25, 2024 episode, and current evidence only shows that this scenario has not occurred yet—not that it cannot occur later in the remaining “coming years.”

Because (a) the Fed has not significantly ramped up Treasury purchases and demand from other buyers remains adequate so far, but (b) the time window of the prediction clearly extends beyond late 2025, the correct classification at this point is inconclusive (too early) rather than right or wrong.