So I would argue maybe NATO in a multi-polar world of abundance isn't as necessary as it has been in the past century... and we may find that in the next couple of years we start to really believe it.View on YouTube
The prediction’s own timeline runs “in the next couple of years” from March 8, 2025 (roughly out to 2027–2028), so as of November 30, 2025, we are far from the end of the forecast window. It is therefore too early to say definitively whether it will prove right or wrong.
Evidence so far is mixed and mostly against the idea that NATO is broadly seen as “not necessary”:
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US and NATO elites are doubling down on the alliance, not deemphasizing it. The 2024 Washington NATO summit and the 2025 The Hague summit reaffirmed NATO as central to Euro‑Atlantic security and produced a high‑profile pledge to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, framed explicitly as a response to enduring Russian and other threats, with an “ironclad” commitment to Article 5. (en.wikipedia.org) Senior US and NATO figures (e.g., Nancy Pelosi, Secretary‑General Mark Rutte) publicly stress that the US “needs NATO too” and that this is “not the time to go it alone,” describing NATO as irreplaceable for collective security. (politico.com)
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US public opinion still broadly sees NATO as beneficial and necessary. An April 2025 Pew survey finds 60% of Americans view NATO favorably and 66% say the US benefits from membership, with particularly strong support among Democrats. (pewresearch.org) A May–June 2025 Chicago Council/Ipsos poll reports that 74% of Americans favor maintaining or increasing the US commitment to NATO and 57% say NATO makes the US safer. (globalaffairs.org) A large YouGov survey likewise finds about 71% of Americans support NATO and 66% back its expansion. (today.yougov.com)
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There is, however, a notable segment moving in the direction Friedberg describes. Pew and Chicago Council data show Republican and especially conservative‑Republican skepticism about NATO has grown: only about half of Republicans say the US benefits from membership, and rising shares say the US does not benefit, while figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk have openly floated reducing or even ending US participation. (en.wikipedia.org) That’s a real elite‑and‑base shift, but it is still counterbalanced by strong overall support and increased alliance investment.
Given that (a) the prediction horizon runs to ~2028 and (b) current evidence shows strong but increasingly polarized support rather than a broad consensus that NATO is “less necessary,” the correct assessment as of late 2025 is that it is too early to determine whether the prediction will ultimately be right or wrong.