Chamath’s prediction was that within 1–2 years of early 2022, many richly valued late‑stage private tech companies would either:

1. Be forced to raise capital at significantly lower valuations, or
2. Go public at valuations far below their last private marks (be “taken to the woodshed”).

1. Broad late‑stage valuation reset and surge in down rounds (2022–2023)
Data from major cap‑table and VC datasets shows a sharp reset in late‑stage valuations and an unusual rise in down rounds during 2022–2023:

• PitchBook’s 2023 US VC Valuations report notes that by 2023 the market was two years past the 2021 valuation highs and that companies which raised in that period but delayed new financings were expected to run low on cash and be “forced back into raising” with investor leverage, contributing to higher down‑round incidence.(scribd.com)
• Carta’s Q1 2023 late‑stage report shows the median Series D pre‑money valuation fell 70% year‑over‑year, and Series E+ medians fell 82% YoY—“the lowest quarterly figures in at least three years,” explicitly highlighting late‑stage startups as bearing the brunt of the correction.(carta.com)
• Carta’s 2023 State of Private Markets finds down rounds around 19–20% of all venture deals in every quarter of 2023, the four highest quarterly down‑round rates since 2018, and describes down rounds as a common feature of the landscape rather than a rarity.(carta.com)
• A Forbes summary of 2023 VC trends dubs 2023 “the year of the down round,” noting that over 19% of venture deals were down rounds in every quarter of 2023, as companies across stages faced valuation resets.(forbes.com)

These sources collectively show that by 2023 (within 1–2 years of Feb 2022), a large number of startups—especially at late stage—were raising at lower valuations, matching the core of Chamath’s thesis.

2. High‑profile late‑stage unicorns forced into steep down rounds
Several of the world’s most valuable private tech/fintech companies from the 2020–2021 boom raised new capital at dramatically lower valuations in 2022–2023:

• Klarna – Europe’s most valuable private fintech at a $45.6B valuation in 2021(en.wikipedia.org) raised $800M in July 2022 at a $6.7B valuation, an ~85% cut. Major outlets framed this as emblematic of the grim environment for high‑growth fintech and BNPL lenders.(cnbc.com)
• Stripe – Once valued at $95B in 2021, the payments giant raised $6.5B in March 2023 at a $50B valuation, almost halving its prior peak.(cnbc.com) Coverage explicitly describes this as part of a broader tech‑valuation correction affecting unicorns.
• A Crunchbase 2023 review of valuations documents a “significant valuation reset that began in 2022 and deepened in 2023,” listing multiple prominent unicorns that raised at large discounts, including Stripe (‑47%), Shein (‑34%), Cybereason (~‑90%), Tonal (‑64%), Flink (‑62%), Blockchain.com (‑50%), Jokr (‑38%), and Ramp (‑28%). It highlights Klarna’s 85% down round as one of the defining high‑profile examples.(news.crunchbase.com)

These are exactly the kind of high‑burn, late‑stage, previously sky‑high valued companies Chamath was referring to. Within his 1–2‑year window (roughly Feb 2022–Feb 2024), multiple marquee names were indeed forced to raise at valuations far below their 2021 peaks.

3. IPOs at valuations far below last private rounds
Chamath also said that companies needing to go public in that window would be “taken to the woodshed,” i.e., IPO at market caps well under their last private valuations. That, too, happened:

• Instacart (Maplebear) went public on Nasdaq in September 2023.
  • Forbes notes that at IPO, Instacart’s market cap was around $11.1B, far below the $39B private valuation it achieved in March 2021.(forbes.com)
  • A separate analysis of its S‑1 and private‑market history shows the company targeting an $8.6–9.4B IPO valuation, explicitly described as “a far cry from its last private round of $32.9B.”(primeunicornindex.com)

Instacart is a textbook case of a late‑stage, pandemic‑era high‑flyer that was compelled to IPO at a fraction of its last private valuation well within the two‑year horizon.

4. Synthesis vs. the prediction
Chamath’s normalized claim was not that every such company would IPO quickly, but that:

• The 2020–2021 late‑stage tech valuations would not be defendable if companies needed capital in the next 1–2 years; and
• When they did raise or IPO in that window, valuations would be significantly lower (i.e., they’d be “taken to the woodshed”).

Within roughly two years of February 2022:

• Late‑stage valuations collapsed, especially at Series D+ and venture‑growth stages.(carta.com)
• Down rounds became unusually common, with ~19–20% of all rounds in 2023 being down rounds—historically elevated levels.(carta.com)
• Many of the emblematic high‑valuation unicorns from 2021 (Klarna, Stripe, others) raised at drastic valuation cuts.(cnbc.com)
• Instacart’s 2023 IPO valuation was a fraction of its 2021 private valuation, illustrating the “woodshed” dynamic on the public‑market side.(forbes.com)

Not every late‑stage company was forced to raise or IPO in that exact window—some cut burn and delayed—but the prediction was about what would happen when these high‑valuation, high‑burn companies needed fresh capital or a public exit, and whether prior valuations could be defended. The data and high‑profile cases show that in 2022–2023, many could not defend those valuations and were repriced sharply downward in private rounds or IPOs.

Given the timing and breadth of the evidence, Chamath’s core prediction is substantially borne out, so the best classification is:

Result: right.