Scope of the prediction
Chamath said that from Q3 2025 onward the U.S. macro environment would look like Q2 2025, specifically: (1) a large surplus (fiscal/trade), (2) strong GDP expansion similar to Q2, and (3) inflation that continues to moderate.

1. “Large surplus” did not persist

• Trade: Official BEA data show the U.S. continued to run large trade deficits, not surpluses. The goods-and-services deficit was $60.2B in June, $78.3B in July, and $59.6B in August 2025, with the year‑to‑date deficit actually larger than in 2024. None of these months show a surplus. (bea.gov)
• Current account: For Q2 2025 itself, the U.S. still had a current‑account deficit of $251.3B (3.3% of GDP); it narrowed versus Q1 but remained firmly negative, not a surplus. (bea.gov)
• Fiscal: For fiscal year 2025 (ended Sept. 30), the federal government ran an annual deficit around $1.8T, only slightly smaller than 2024. July alone saw a $291B deficit, and October posted a $284B deficit, even though some months like April and June had temporary surpluses. The overall environment is one of persistent large deficits, not a sustained “large surplus.” (finance.yahoo.com)
  Given this, the central claim that Q3 and beyond would feature a large surplus similar to (his characterization of) Q2 is clearly false.

2. “Good GDP expansion” is likely but not fully observable yet

• Q2 2025 real GDP grew at about 3.3–3.8% annualized, a strong rebound from the Q1 contraction. (tradingeconomics.com)
• The Commerce Department’s advance Q3 GDP estimate was delayed by the government shutdown and is scheduled for Dec. 23, 2025, so as of Nov. 30 we do not yet have an official Q3 GDP print. (reuters.com)
• High‑frequency tracking (e.g., Atlanta Fed estimates around 4% annualized for Q3) suggests growth probably has remained solid, but that’s still model‑based, not realized data. (reuters.com)
  So this part of the prediction may be directionally right, but it isn’t fully verifiable yet.

3. Inflation has not kept “moderating” through Q3

• CPI: Year‑over‑year CPI inflation in 2025 starts near 3% and dips into the 2.3–2.4% range in March–April, but then rises back to about 3.0–3.1% by September 2025, indicating a re‑acceleration rather than a continued decline in Q3. (inflationtool.com)
• PCE (Fed’s preferred gauge): Headline PCE inflation rises from 2.5% in May to 2.7% in August, and core PCE YoY drifts up from about 2.6% in April to roughly 2.9% by August, with monthly readings of 0.2–0.3%. That is “sticky” or slightly higher inflation, not ongoing moderation. (bea.gov)
  Thus, the claim that inflation would continue to moderate into Q3 and beyond does not match the realized data; it flattened and then ticked up.

Overall assessment
Even allowing that Q3 GDP itself looks likely to be strong, two core pillars of Chamath’s forecast—a sustained large surplus and continued disinflation into Q3+—are clearly contradicted by the data we now have. Since these elements were central to his description of the future macro environment “similar to Q2,” the prediction as stated is wrong rather than merely unproven or ambiguous.